Key Arguments

• He declares: 'I am a psychological and historical structure. Along with existence, I received a way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is,' presenting the subject as essentially structured and historical.
• Yet he immediately states: 'And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but rather by their means,' directly rejecting the identification of freedom with a substrate beneath motivations.
• For him, 'that meaningful life, that particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it,' so my factical style is the channel, not the limit, of my openness.
• Accordingly, 'It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther,' specifying how transcendence arises from radical acceptance of one’s current being.
• He formulates the only genuine failure of freedom: 'The only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social situation by refusing to take it up at first, rather than meeting up with the natural and human world through it,' so evasion of situation undermines, rather than secures, freedom.
• He clarifies that 'Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing solicits me, but rather because I am immediately outside of myself and open to the world,' grounding non‑determinism not in inward insulation but in an intrinsic ek-stasis toward the world.
• He summarizes human being as: 'We are true right through; we carry with us – from the mere fact that we are in and toward the world [au monde] and not merely in the world [dans le monde], like things – all that is necessary for transcending ourselves,' which ties transcendence to our basic being‑in‑ and toward‑the‑world.
• Thus, 'We need not worry that our choices or our actions restrain our freedom, since choice and action alone can free us from our anchors,' turning the suspicion of commitment on its head and making commitment the vehicle of liberation.
• He draws an analogy with reflection and perception: 'Just as reflection borrows its desire for absolute adequation from the perception that makes something appear, and that idealism thereby tacitly makes use of the “originary opinion” that it had wanted to destroy as mere opinion, so too does freedom become mired in the contradictions of commitment and does not notice that it would not be freedom without the roots that it thrusts into the world,' arguing that freedom’s very notion presupposes rootedness.
• Finally, in discussing concrete moral questions—'Will I make that promise? Will I risk my life for so little? Will I give up my freedom in order to save freedom?'—he emphasizes that 'There are no theoretical responses to these questions. There are, however, these things that appear, irrecusably, that loved person in front of you, these men existing as slaves around you,' indicating that freedom's exercise is always via a concrete, situated encounter rather than abstract maxim.

Source Quotes

All explanations of my behavior in terms of my past, my temperament, or my milieu are thus true, but only on condition of not considering them as separable contributions, but rather as moments of my total being whose sense I could make explicit in different directions, without our ever being able to say if it is I who give them their sense or if I receive it from them. [o. My signification is outside of myself.]* I am a psychological and historical structure. Along with existence, I received a way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is.

Along with existence, I received a way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is. And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but rather by their means.

All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is. And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but rather by their means. For that meaningful life, that particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it.

And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but rather by their means. For that meaningful life, that particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it. It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.

For that meaningful life, that particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it. It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther. The only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social situation by refusing to take it up at first, rather than meeting up with the natural and human world through it.

It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther. The only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social situation by refusing to take it up at first, rather than meeting up with the natural and human world through it. Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing solicits me, but rather because I am immediately outside of myself and open to the world.

The only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social situation by refusing to take it up at first, rather than meeting up with the natural and human world through it. Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing solicits me, but rather because I am immediately outside of myself and open to the world. We are true right through; we carry with us – from the mere fact that we are in and toward the world [au monde] and not merely in the world [dans le monde], like things – all that is necessary for transcending ourselves.

Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing solicits me, but rather because I am immediately outside of myself and open to the world. We are true right through; we carry with us – from the mere fact that we are in and toward the world [au monde] and not merely in the world [dans le monde], like things – all that is necessary for transcending ourselves. We need not worry that our choices or our actions restrain our freedom, since choice and action alone can free us from our anchors.

We are true right through; we carry with us – from the mere fact that we are in and toward the world [au monde] and not merely in the world [dans le monde], like things – all that is necessary for transcending ourselves. We need not worry that our choices or our actions restrain our freedom, since choice and action alone can free us from our anchors. Just as reflection borrows its desire for absolute adequation from the perception that makes something appear, and that idealism thereby tacitly makes use of the “originary opinion” that it had wanted to destroy as mere opinion, so too does freedom become mired in the contradictions of commitment and does not notice that it would not be freedom without the roots that it thrusts into the world.

Key Concepts

• I am a psychological and historical structure. Along with existence, I received a way of existing, or a style.
• All of my actions and thoughts are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is.
• And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but rather by their means.
• that meaningful life, that particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it.
• It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at progressing;
• by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.
• The only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social situation by refusing to take it up at first, rather than meeting up with the natural and human world through it.
• Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing solicits me, but rather because I am immediately outside of myself and open to the world.
• We are true right through; we carry with us – from the mere fact that we are in and toward the world [au monde] and not merely in the world [dans le monde], like things – all that is necessary for transcending ourselves.
• We need not worry that our choices or our actions restrain our freedom, since choice and action alone can free us from our anchors.

Context

Part Three, III - FREEDOM, subsection [o. My signification is outside of myself.], where Merleau-Ponty articulates the notion of the subject as a 'psychological and historical structure' or style, and redefines freedom as the active assumption and transformation of this structure in and through worldly engagement.