Key Arguments

• A painting depends on our senses and yet exceeds them: 'we did not have eyes or senses in general then there would be no painting for us, and yet the painting “says” more than what the simple exercise of our senses could teach us.'
• Therefore 'the painting beyond the sensory givens and speech beyond the givens of constituted language must thus in themselves have a signifying virtue, without reference to a signification that exists for itself in the mind of the spectator or the listener.'
• Like the painter with colors or the musician with notes, the speaker 'attempt – with a spectacle, an emotion, or even an abstract idea – to constitute a sort of equivalent or a type that can be absorbed by the mind,' so that 'Here the expression becomes the primary thing.'
• Through expression 'We impart a form to the reader [nous informons le lecteur], we make him participate in our creative or poetic action, we place some object or some emotion into the secret mouth of his mind.'
• Consequently, 'for the painter or the speaking subject, the painting and the speech are not the illustration of an already completed thought, but rather the appropriation of this very thought.'
• This leads to a distinction 'between a secondary speech, which conveys an already acquired thought, and an originary speech, which first brings this thought into existence for us just as it does for others.'
• Even words that now function as mere signs once had the creative force of originary speech: 'all of the words that have become the simple signs of a univocal thought could only do so because they first functioned as originary spoken words, and we still remember the precious appearance that they had, like an unknown landscape, when we were in the process of “acquiring” them and when they still exerted the primordial function of expression.'

Source Quotes

we did not have eyes or senses in general then there would be no painting for us, and yet the painting “says” more than what the simple exercise of our senses could teach us. The painting beyond the sensory givens and speech beyond the givens of constituted language must thus in themselves have a signifying virtue, without reference to a signification that exists for itself in the mind of the spectator or the listener.

we did not have eyes or senses in general then there would be no painting for us, and yet the painting “says” more than what the simple exercise of our senses could teach us. The painting beyond the sensory givens and speech beyond the givens of constituted language must thus in themselves have a signifying virtue, without reference to a signification that exists for itself in the mind of the spectator or the listener. By means of words, like the painter by means of colors or the musician by means of notes, we attempt – with a spectacle, an emotion, or even an abstract idea – to constitute a sort of equivalent or a type that can be absorbed by the mind.

The painting beyond the sensory givens and speech beyond the givens of constituted language must thus in themselves have a signifying virtue, without reference to a signification that exists for itself in the mind of the spectator or the listener. By means of words, like the painter by means of colors or the musician by means of notes, we attempt – with a spectacle, an emotion, or even an abstract idea – to constitute a sort of equivalent or a type that can be absorbed by the mind. Here the expression becomes the primary thing.

By means of words, like the painter by means of colors or the musician by means of notes, we attempt – with a spectacle, an emotion, or even an abstract idea – to constitute a sort of equivalent or a type that can be absorbed by the mind. Here the expression becomes the primary thing. We impart a form to the reader [nous informons le lecteur], we make him participate in our creative or poetic action, we place some object or some emotion into the secret mouth of his mind.34 For the painter or the speaking subject, the painting and the speech are not the illustration of an already completed thought, but rather the appropriation of this very thought.

Here the expression becomes the primary thing. We impart a form to the reader [nous informons le lecteur], we make him participate in our creative or poetic action, we place some object or some emotion into the secret mouth of his mind.34 For the painter or the speaking subject, the painting and the speech are not the illustration of an already completed thought, but rather the appropriation of this very thought. This is why we have been led to distinguish between a secondary speech, which conveys an already acquired thought, and an originary speech, which first brings this thought into existence for us just as it does for others.

We impart a form to the reader [nous informons le lecteur], we make him participate in our creative or poetic action, we place some object or some emotion into the secret mouth of his mind.34 For the painter or the speaking subject, the painting and the speech are not the illustration of an already completed thought, but rather the appropriation of this very thought. This is why we have been led to distinguish between a secondary speech, which conveys an already acquired thought, and an originary speech, which first brings this thought into existence for us just as it does for others. Now, all of the words that have become the simple signs of a univocal thought could only do so because they first functioned as originary spoken words, and we still remember the precious appearance that they had, like an unknown landscape, when we were in the process of “acquiring” them and when they still exerted the primordial function of expression.

This is why we have been led to distinguish between a secondary speech, which conveys an already acquired thought, and an originary speech, which first brings this thought into existence for us just as it does for others. Now, all of the words that have become the simple signs of a univocal thought could only do so because they first functioned as originary spoken words, and we still remember the precious appearance that they had, like an unknown landscape, when we were in the process of “acquiring” them and when they still exerted the primordial function of expression. Thus, self-possession or the coinciding with the self is not the definition of thought: this is rather a product of expression and is always an illusion to the extent that the clarity of the acquired rests upon the fundamentally obscure operation by which we have eternalized a moment of fleeting life within ourselves.

Key Concepts

• the painting “says” more than what the simple exercise of our senses could teach us.
• The painting beyond the sensory givens and speech beyond the givens of constituted language must thus in themselves have a signifying virtue, without reference to a signification that exists for itself in the mind of the spectator or the listener.
• By means of words, like the painter by means of colors or the musician by means of notes, we attempt – with a spectacle, an emotion, or even an abstract idea – to constitute a sort of equivalent or a type that can be absorbed by the mind.
• Here the expression becomes the primary thing.
• For the painter or the speaking subject, the painting and the speech are not the illustration of an already completed thought, but rather the appropriation of this very thought.
• a secondary speech, which conveys an already acquired thought, and an originary speech, which first brings this thought into existence for us just as it does for others.
• we still remember the precious appearance that they had, like an unknown landscape, when we were in the process of “acquiring” them and when they still exerted the primordial function of expression.

Context

Beginning of the passage in I - THE COGITO1, using the example of painting, music, and speaking to argue that expression itself is primary, introduce the distinction between secondary and originary speech, and show that thought is constituted in expressive acts rather than pre-existing them.