Key Arguments

• For 'primitive persons' living within myth, space is organized by great affective entities rather than by neutral coordinates: the clan’s encampment is not located relative to an external landmark because 'the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks'; knowing its place is a matter of tending toward it as the 'natural place' of certain emotional states (peace, joy), analogous to how I 'know' where my hand is by joining myself to its dormant agile power.
• Similarly, for the augur, right and left are not geometrical coordinates but sources of blessed or ill-fated events, just as my right and left hands are lived as embodiments of dexterity and clumsiness; in dreams and myths, we learn the location of phenomena by feeling what desire moves toward, what threatens us, or what our life depends upon.
• He shows that even in waking life our spatial life is structured existentially: upon arriving in a village, it can initially become 'the center of my life', but when news from Paris or threats of war arrive, the same village comes to feel like exile, prison, or an exclusion from 'real life'; thus our body and perception solicit us to take the immediate landscape as 'the center of the world', but this need not be the true center of our life.
• He introduces 'lived distance' as distinct from physical or geometrical distance: beyond metric separation, a lived distance links me to things 'that count and exist for me' and links them to each other, measuring at every moment the 'scope' of my life; phenomena like Bovarism, homesickness, or mania exemplify decentered or hyper-centered lives in this lived space.
• He notes that sometimes there is a 'leeway (Spielraum)' between me and events that preserves freedom while events still touch me, whereas in other cases lived distance is simultaneously too short and too wide: most events cease to count, while the nearest ones completely consume me, enveloping me 'like the night' and robbing me of individuality and freedom—an experiential description of possession.
• He uses schizophrenic experiences to show that contraction of lived space eliminates leeway and chance: one patient fuses disparate sensory impressions (draft, scent of chestnuts, rain) into a single event affecting 'someone like me'; others suppose hidden conspiratorial meetings about them or infer impossible causal links from mere resemblances, demonstrating that 'short circuits' of delirious causality go hand in hand with a contracted lived space that leaves no room for contingency.
• He explicitly claims that causality, like space, 'is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects'; thus the abnormal 'short circuits' and the 'long causal chains of methodical thought' alike are expressions of 'ways of existing', and spatial experience 'is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens.'
• He argues that 'clear space', the impartial, homogeneous space of classical psychology where all objects have equal importance, is 'wholly penetrated by another spatiality' that morbid variations (especially schizophrenia) reveal: a schizophrenic patient feels a second, 'limitless', 'subtle, invisible, and terrifying' sky penetrate the visible evening sky, paired with a 'permanent question' or order addressed to him, exemplifying a second, existentially-tensed space permeating objective space.
• He interprets this 'second space' as the one composing 'our own manner of projecting the world' at each moment; in schizophrenic disorder this perpetual project gets 'dissociated from the objective world such as it is still offered by perception' and 'withdraws, so to speak, into itself', so that the patient no longer lives in the common world but in a 'private world' and no longer reaches 'geographical space' but remains within 'the space of the landscape', itself impoverished once cut off from the common world.
• From this, he concludes that the schizophrenic’s questioning experience—where everything becomes 'amazing, absurd, or unreal'—arises because the 'movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy', its contingency appears, and the world is no longer self‑evident; conversely, the 'natural space' of classical psychology seems reassuring only because 'existence rushes into it and forgets itself there.'

Source Quotes

There is a determination of up and down and, in general, a determination of “place” that precedes “perception.” Life and sexuality haunt their world and their space. [iv. Mythical space.]* To the extent that they live within the myth, primitive persons do not transcend this existential space, and this is why dreams count for them as much as perceptions. There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities.

Mythical space.]* To the extent that they live within the myth, primitive persons do not transcend this existential space, and this is why dreams count for them as much as perceptions. There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities. For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan’s encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks.

There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities. For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan’s encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks. Rather, to know this location is to tend toward it as if toward the natural place of a certain peace or a certain joy, just as, for me, knowing where my hand is involves joining myself to this agile power that is dormant for the moment, but that I can take up and discover as my own.

For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan’s encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks. Rather, to know this location is to tend toward it as if toward the natural place of a certain peace or a certain joy, just as, for me, knowing where my hand is involves joining myself to this agile power that is dormant for the moment, but that I can take up and discover as my own. For the augur, the right and the left are the sources from which the blessed or the ill-fated arrive, just as for me my right hand and my left hand are respectively the embodiment of my dexterity and of my clumsiness.

For the augur, the right and the left are the sources from which the blessed or the ill-fated arrive, just as for me my right hand and my left hand are respectively the embodiment of my dexterity and of my clumsiness. In the dream, as in the myth, we learn where the phenomenon is located by sensing [en éprouvant] what our desire moves toward, what strikes fear in our hearts, and upon what our life depends. [ v. Lived space.]* Even in waking life, things do not proceed otherwise.

For the augur, the right and the left are the sources from which the blessed or the ill-fated arrive, just as for me my right hand and my left hand are respectively the embodiment of my dexterity and of my clumsiness. In the dream, as in the myth, we learn where the phenomenon is located by sensing [en éprouvant] what our desire moves toward, what strikes fear in our hearts, and upon what our life depends. [ v. Lived space.]* Even in waking life, things do not proceed otherwise. I arrive in a village for the holidays, happy to leave behind my work and my ordinary surroundings.

Bovarism and certain forms of homesickness are examples of a decentered life. The maniac, however, centers himself everywhere: “his mental space is large and luminous, his thought, sensitive to all the objects that are presented, flies from one to the other and is drawn into their movement.”75 Beyond the physical or geometrical distance existing between me and all things, a lived distance links me to things that count and exist for me, and links them to each other. At each moment, this distance measures the “scope” of my life.76 Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (Spielraum) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me. Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me.

The maniac, however, centers himself everywhere: “his mental space is large and luminous, his thought, sensitive to all the objects that are presented, flies from one to the other and is drawn into their movement.”75 Beyond the physical or geometrical distance existing between me and all things, a lived distance links me to things that count and exist for me, and links them to each other. At each moment, this distance measures the “scope” of my life.76 Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (Spielraum) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me. Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me.

At each moment, this distance measures the “scope” of my life.76 Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (Spielraum) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me. Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me. They envelop me like the night, and they rob me of individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe. I am possessed.77 At the same time, the events gather together. One patient senses a cold draft, a scent of chestnuts, and the freshness of the rain.

One patient senses a cold draft, a scent of chestnuts, and the freshness of the rain. Perhaps, he says, “at this exact moment a person, suffering from suggestions like me, passed under the rain and in front of someone selling grilled chestnuts.”78 One schizophrenic, under the care of both Minkowski and the village priest, believes that they have met to talk about him.79 One elderly schizophrenic woman believes that a person who resembles another person must have known the latter.80 The contraction of lived space, which no longer leaves the patient any leeway, no longer leaves any role for chance to play. Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects.

Perhaps, he says, “at this exact moment a person, suffering from suggestions like me, passed under the rain and in front of someone selling grilled chestnuts.”78 One schizophrenic, under the care of both Minkowski and the village priest, believes that they have met to talk about him.79 One elderly schizophrenic woman believes that a person who resembles another person must have known the latter.80 The contraction of lived space, which no longer leaves the patient any leeway, no longer leaves any role for chance to play. Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects. The “short circuits”81 of delirious causality and the long causal chains of methodical thought express ways of existing:82 “the experience of space is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens.”83 Clear space, that impartial space where all objects have the same importance and the same right to exist, is not merely surrounded, but also wholly penetrated by another spatiality that morbid variations reveal. One schizophrenic stops in the mountains and views the landscape.

Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects. The “short circuits”81 of delirious causality and the long causal chains of methodical thought express ways of existing:82 “the experience of space is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens.”83 Clear space, that impartial space where all objects have the same importance and the same right to exist, is not merely surrounded, but also wholly penetrated by another spatiality that morbid variations reveal. One schizophrenic stops in the mountains and views the landscape.

Suddenly the landscape is snatched away from him by some alien force. It is as if a second limitless sky were penetrating the blue sky of the evening. This new sky is empty, “subtle, invisible, and terrifying.” Sometimes it moves into the autumn landscape, and sometimes the landscape itself moves.

Sometimes it moves into the autumn landscape, and sometimes the landscape itself moves. And during this time, says the patient, “a permanent question is asked of me; it is like an order to stay put or to die, or to go farther.”84 This second space permeating visible space is the one that composes, at each moment, our own manner of projecting the world, and the schizophrenic disorder consists merely in that this perpetual project is dissociated from the objective world such as it is still offered by perception, and it withdraws, so to speak, into itself. The schizophrenic patient no longer lives in the common world, but in a private world; he does not go all the way to geographical space, he remains within “the space of the landscape,”85 and this landscape itself, once cut off from the common world, is considerably impoverished.

The schizophrenic patient no longer lives in the common world, but in a private world; he does not go all the way to geographical space, he remains within “the space of the landscape,”85 and this landscape itself, once cut off from the common world, is considerably impoverished. This results in the schizophrenic questioning: everything is amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-evident. If the natural space of classical psychology is on the contrary reassuring and evident, then this is because existence rushes into it and forgets itself there. [vi.

This results in the schizophrenic questioning: everything is amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-evident. If the natural space of classical psychology is on the contrary reassuring and evident, then this is because existence rushes into it and forgets itself there. [vi. Do these spaces presuppose geometrical space?] This description of anthropological space could be developed indefinitely.86 The objection that will be raised by objective thought, however, is obvious: do these descriptions have any philosophical value?

Key Concepts

• [iv. Mythical space.]* To the extent that they live within the myth, primitive persons do not transcend this existential space, and this is why dreams count for them as much as perceptions.
• There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities.
• For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan’s encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks.
• Rather, to know this location is to tend toward it as if toward the natural place of a certain peace or a certain joy, just as, for me, knowing where my hand is involves joining myself to this agile power that is dormant for the moment, but that I can take up and discover as my own.
• In the dream, as in the myth, we learn where the phenomenon is located by sensing [en éprouvant] what our desire moves toward, what strikes fear in our hearts, and upon what our life depends.
• [ v. Lived space.]* Even in waking life, things do not proceed otherwise.
• Beyond the physical or geometrical distance existing between me and all things, a lived distance links me to things that count and exist for me, and links them to each other. At each moment, this distance measures the “scope” of my life.76
• Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (Spielraum) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me.
• Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me. They envelop me like the night, and they rob me of individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe. I am possessed.77
• The contraction of lived space, which no longer leaves the patient any leeway, no longer leaves any role for chance to play.
• Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects. The “short circuits”81 of delirious causality and the long causal chains of methodical thought express ways of existing:82 “the experience of space is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens.”83
• Clear space, that impartial space where all objects have the same importance and the same right to exist, is not merely surrounded, but also wholly penetrated by another spatiality that morbid variations reveal.
• It is as if a second limitless sky were penetrating the blue sky of the evening. This new sky is empty, “subtle, invisible, and terrifying.”
• This second space permeating visible space is the one that composes, at each moment, our own manner of projecting the world, and the schizophrenic disorder consists merely in that this perpetual project is dissociated from the objective world such as it is still offered by perception, and it withdraws, so to speak, into itself.
• This results in the schizophrenic questioning: everything is amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-evident.
• If the natural space of classical psychology is on the contrary reassuring and evident, then this is because existence rushes into it and forgets itself there.

Context

II - SPACE, subsections '[iv. Mythical space.]' and '[ v. Lived space.]', where Merleau-Ponty first describes mythical/primitive space, then extends the analysis to ordinary lived distance and pathological cases (mania, schizophrenia) to argue that anthropological space and causality are grounded in ways of existing rather than in prior geometrical space.