Objectivity in space and time arises from the horizon-structure of perception, whereby each object and each present moment is implicitly seen from 'everywhere' and 'everywhen' through a system of co-present perspectives and temporal retentions–protensions, even though any actual gaze or present only holds these horizons in intention and never exhausts the object.
By Maurice Merleau-Ponty, from Phenomenology of Perception
Key Arguments
- He first revises the Leibnizian formula: 'the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but rather the house seen from everywhere,' suggesting that full objectivity is a virtual intersection of all possible views rather than a view from nowhere.
- In spatial vision, 'Each object, then, is the mirror of all the others,' since when he sees the lamp he 'attribute[s] to it not merely the qualities that are visible from my location, but also those that the fireplace, the walls, and the table can “see,”' so hidden aspects are guaranteed by the perspectives of other objects.
- Thus 'The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden,' an idealization grounded in the horizon-structure of coexistent things.
- He draws an exact parallel with time: 'What we have just said about spatial perspective could also be said about temporal perspective,' since an old man and a child 'gaze upon the same house' and its existence 'today' remains true even if it collapses tomorrow.
- Temporal objectivity comes from each moment testifying to others: 'Each moment of time gives itself as a witness to all the others. It shows, by taking place, “how this was bound to happen” and “how it will have ended.”'
- Through 'the double horizon of retention and protention, my present can cease to be a present that is in fact about to be carried off and destroyed by the flow of duration and can rather become a fixed and identifiable point in an objective time.'
- But these syntheses are only presumptive: my gaze 'never posits more than one side of the object, even if by means of horizons it intends all the others,' and my present only possesses past and future 'in intention.'
- Autobiographical memory illustrates this limit: 'this past that I claim to take hold of again is not itself the past in person; it is my past such as I now see it, and I have perhaps altered it. Perhaps in the future I will similarly misjudge the present that I am currently living.'
- He concludes that 'the synthesis of horizons is but a presumptive synthesis, it only operates with certainty and precision within the object’s immediate surroundings,' while further horizons become 'an anonymous horizon' that 'leaves the object incomplete and open, as it in fact is in perceptual experience.'
Source Quotes
Each act of seeing that I perform is instantly reiterated among all the objects of the world that are grasped as coexistent because each object just is all that the others “see” of it. Thus, our formula above must be modified: the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but rather the house seen from everywhere. The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden.
And yet, to the extent that I also see those things, they remain places open to my gaze and, being virtually situated in them, I already perceive the central object of my present vision from different angles. Each object, then, is the mirror of all the others. When I see the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not merely the qualities that are visible from my location, but also those that the fireplace, the walls, and the table can “see.”
Each object, then, is the mirror of all the others. When I see the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not merely the qualities that are visible from my location, but also those that the fireplace, the walls, and the table can “see.” The back of my lamp is merely the face that it “shows” to the fireplace.
Thus, our formula above must be modified: the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but rather the house seen from everywhere. The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden. What we have just said about spatial perspective could also be said about temporal perspective.
The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden. What we have just said about spatial perspective could also be said about temporal perspective. If I examine the house attentively and unreflectively, it seems eternal, and a sort of wonder emanates from it.
The house surely has its own age and its own changes; however, even if it collapses tomorrow, it will always remain true that it existed today. Each moment of time gives itself as a witness to all the others. It shows, by taking place, “how this was bound to happen” and “how it will have ended.” Each present definitively establishes a point of time that solicits the recognition of all others.
Along with the imminent future, I also have the horizon of the past that will surround it; that is, I have my actual present as the past of that future. Thus, thanks to the double horizon of retention and protention, my present can cease to be a present that is in fact about to be carried off and destroyed by the flow of duration and can rather become a fixed and identifiable point in an objective time. But again, my human gaze never posits more than one side of the object, even if by means of horizons it intends all the others.
Perhaps in the future I will similarly misjudge the present that I am currently living. Thus the synthesis of horizons is but a presumptive synthesis, it only operates with certainty and precision within the object’s immediate surroundings. I no longer hold in hand the more distant surroundings, for it no longer consists in still identifiable objects or memories; rather, it is an anonymous horizon that can no longer provide precise testimony, it leaves the object incomplete and open, as it in fact is in perceptual experience.
Thus the synthesis of horizons is but a presumptive synthesis, it only operates with certainty and precision within the object’s immediate surroundings. I no longer hold in hand the more distant surroundings, for it no longer consists in still identifiable objects or memories; rather, it is an anonymous horizon that can no longer provide precise testimony, it leaves the object incomplete and open, as it in fact is in perceptual experience. Through this openness, the substantiality of the object slips away.
Key Concepts
- Thus, our formula above must be modified: the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but rather the house seen from everywhere.
- Each object, then, is the mirror of all the others.
- When I see the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not merely the qualities that are visible from my location, but also those that the fireplace, the walls, and the table can “see.”
- The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden.
- What we have just said about spatial perspective could also be said about temporal perspective.
- Each moment of time gives itself as a witness to all the others. It shows, by taking place, “how this was bound to happen” and “how it will have ended.”
- Thus, thanks to the double horizon of retention and protention, my present can cease to be a present that is in fact about to be carried off and destroyed by the flow of duration and can rather become a fixed and identifiable point in an objective time.
- Thus the synthesis of horizons is but a presumptive synthesis, it only operates with certainty and precision within the object’s immediate surroundings.
- it leaves the object incomplete and open, as it in fact is in perceptual experience.
Context
Middle of subsection [a. Experience and objective thought.], where Merleau-Ponty develops his account of spatial and temporal horizons, explaining how the perceived object and objective time are constituted through reciprocal perspectives and temporal horizons that nonetheless remain incomplete in any concrete act of perception.