Key Arguments

• He distinguishes the phenomenal or 'intentional' body from the 'objective body' by defining it as the body 'insofar as it projects a certain “milieu” around itself, insofar as its “parts” know each other dynamically and its receptors are arranged in such a way as to make the perception of the object possible through their synergy,' thus rooting synthesis in bodily organization rather than in a pure thought.
• He insists that this intentionality 'is not a thought,' since 'it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and ... takes up as acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself,' thereby opposing a reflective, intellectual synthesis to an operative, bodily one.
• Perceptual synthesis 'resting upon the pre-logical unity of the body schema ... no more possesses the secret of its object than it does the secret of one’s own body, and this is why the perceived object always presents itself as transcendent,' showing that the object's transcendence is tied to the opacity of our own bodily being.
• In binocular vision, when he passes from double to normal vision, he is 'conscious of progressing toward the object itself and of finally having its carnal presence'; the monocular images 'wander vaguely in front of the things' and are then 'absorbed into the world,' so that 'The binocular object absorbs the monocular images, and the synthesis is accomplished in it,' illustrating that synthesis is experienced as taking place in the thing, not in a detached subject.
• He explicitly contrasts perceptual and intellectual synthesis: 'the synthesis takes place not insofar as all of my experiences express a certain invariant and in the identity of the object, but insofar as they are all collected together by the last one in the series and in the ipseity of the thing,' emphasizing a lived gathering in the thing itself rather than a conceptual subsumption under an invariant.
• The 'ipseity is never attained'; 'Each appearance of the thing ... is still nothing but an invitation to perceive more and a momentary pause in the perceptual process,' so if 'the thing itself were attained, it would from then on be stretched out before us without any mystery. It would cease to exist as a thing at the very moment that we believed we possessed it,' implying that the very reality of the thing consists in its ungraspable excess.
• He describes the 'aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it withdraws – [as] two inseparable aspects of transcendence,' and concludes that 'if we wish to account for the thing as the transcendent term of an open series of experiences, then we must give the subject of perception the unity of the body schema, itself open and indefinite,' thereby tying object-transcendence to the open, indefinite structure of the bodily subject.

Source Quotes

from the objective body in order to give it to the phenomenal body, that is, the body insofar as it projects a certain “milieu”63 around itself, insofar as its “parts” know each other dynamically and its receptors are arranged in such a way as to make the perception of the object possible through their synergy. By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and that it takes up as acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself.

from the objective body in order to give it to the phenomenal body, that is, the body insofar as it projects a certain “milieu”63 around itself, insofar as its “parts” know each other dynamically and its receptors are arranged in such a way as to make the perception of the object possible through their synergy. By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and that it takes up as acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself. Resting upon the pre-logical unity of the body schema, the perceptual synthesis no more possesses the secret of its object than it does the secret of one’s own body, and this is why the perceived object always presents itself as transcendent, this is why the synthesis appears to be carried out upon the object itself, in the world, and not within this metaphysical point that is the thinking subject.

By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and that it takes up as acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself. Resting upon the pre-logical unity of the body schema, the perceptual synthesis no more possesses the secret of its object than it does the secret of one’s own body, and this is why the perceived object always presents itself as transcendent, this is why the synthesis appears to be carried out upon the object itself, in the world, and not within this metaphysical point that is the thinking subject. And herein lies the distinction between the perceptual synthesis and the intellectual synthesis.

The monocular images wander vaguely in front of the things, they have no place in the world, and suddenly they pull back toward a certain place in the world and are absorbed into the world, just as ghosts return through the fissures of the earth from which they came when the day breaks. The binocular object absorbs the monocular images, and the synthesis is accomplished in it; in its clarity, they are finally recognized as appearances of this object. The sequence of my experiences is given as concordant, and the synthesis takes place not insofar as all of my experiences express a certain invariant and in the identity of the object, but insofar as they are all collected together by the last one in the series and in the ipseity of the thing.

The binocular object absorbs the monocular images, and the synthesis is accomplished in it; in its clarity, they are finally recognized as appearances of this object. The sequence of my experiences is given as concordant, and the synthesis takes place not insofar as all of my experiences express a certain invariant and in the identity of the object, but insofar as they are all collected together by the last one in the series and in the ipseity of the thing. Of course, the ipseity is never attained.

It would cease to exist as a thing at the very moment that we believed we possessed it. What makes up the “reality” of the thing is thus precisely what steals if from our possession. The aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it withdraws – are two inseparable aspects of transcendence.

What makes up the “reality” of the thing is thus precisely what steals if from our possession. The aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it withdraws – are two inseparable aspects of transcendence. Intellectualism is unaware of both, and if we wish to account for the thing as the transcendent term of an open series of experiences, then we must give the subject of perception the unity of the body schema, itself open and indefinite.

The aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it withdraws – are two inseparable aspects of transcendence. Intellectualism is unaware of both, and if we wish to account for the thing as the transcendent term of an open series of experiences, then we must give the subject of perception the unity of the body schema, itself open and indefinite. And this is what the synthesis of binocular vision teaches us. [n.

Key Concepts

• the phenomenal body, that is, the body insofar as it projects a certain “milieu”63 around itself, insofar as its “parts” know each other dynamically and its receptors are arranged in such a way as to make the perception of the object possible through their synergy.
• By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and that it takes up as acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself.
• Resting upon the pre-logical unity of the body schema, the perceptual synthesis no more possesses the secret of its object than it does the secret of one’s own body, and this is why the perceived object always presents itself as transcendent
• The binocular object absorbs the monocular images, and the synthesis is accomplished in it; in its clarity, they are finally recognized as appearances of this object.
• the synthesis takes place not insofar as all of my experiences express a certain invariant and in the identity of the object, but insofar as they are all collected together by the last one in the series and in the ipseity of the thing.
• What makes up the “reality” of the thing is thus precisely what steals if from our possession.
• The aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it withdraws – are two inseparable aspects of transcendence.
• we must give the subject of perception the unity of the body schema, itself open and indefinite.

Context

Continuation of subsection '[m. The senses are distinct and yet indiscernible, like monocular images in binocular vision.]' in I - SENSING, where Merleau-Ponty uses binocular vision to articulate the bodily, non-intellectual nature of perceptual synthesis and the transcendence of the perceived thing.