Key Arguments

• Objective thought can 'only choose between reason and cause,' so every critique of intellectualism conducted within its terms ends up restoring realism and causal thinking; a third notion is needed.
• The 'phenomenological notion of motivation' is introduced as one of those '“fluid” concepts that must be formulated if we want to return to phenomena,' signaling a departure from rigid causal or rational schemas.
• In motivation, 'One phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the sense it offers,' indicating that the connection is semantic or meaningful, not mechanical.
• Merleau-Ponty characterizes this as 'a sort of operative reason, or a raison d’être that orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them,' emphasizing that the 'reason' at work is implicit in the field, not an explicit judgment.
• He illustrates motivation with the example: 'This is how the intention of looking to the left and the adherence of the landscape to the gaze motivates the illusion of a movement in the object,' where bodily intention plus field-structure give rise to an illusion.
• He notes a distinctive temporal/expressive structure: 'To the extent that the motivated phenomenon is brought about, its internal relation with the motivating phenomenon appears, and rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it,' to the point that 'the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive.'
• The example of distance and retinal projection shows this retrospective illusion: 'Thus, the object at a distance and its physical projection upon the retina explain the disparity of the images and, through a retrospective illusion, we end up following Malebranche in speaking of a natural geometry of projection,' i.e., once the motivated structure is in place, we project back a 'natural geometry' as if it had always governed perception.
• He criticizes the tendency to 'prematurely locate in perception a science that is in fact constructed upon perception,' which 'loses sight of the original relation of motivation in which distance springs forth prior to all science,' reinforcing that science rests on, and is later than, motivated perceptual structures.

Source Quotes

of the world) can only choose between reason and cause, and why every critique of intellectualism ends up (in the hands of objective thought) in a restoration of realism and of causal thinking. On the contrary, the phenomenological notion of motivation is one of those “fluid”59 concepts that must be formulated if we want to return to phenomena. One phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the sense it offers – there is a sort of operative reason, or a raison d’être that orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them.

On the contrary, the phenomenological notion of motivation is one of those “fluid”59 concepts that must be formulated if we want to return to phenomena. One phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the sense it offers – there is a sort of operative reason, or a raison d’être that orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them. This is how the intention of looking to the left and the adherence of the landscape to the gaze motivates the illusion of a movement in the object.

One phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the sense it offers – there is a sort of operative reason, or a raison d’être that orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them. This is how the intention of looking to the left and the adherence of the landscape to the gaze motivates the illusion of a movement in the object. To the extent that the motivated phenomenon is brought about, its internal relation with the motivating phenomenon appears, and rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive.

This is how the intention of looking to the left and the adherence of the landscape to the gaze motivates the illusion of a movement in the object. To the extent that the motivated phenomenon is brought about, its internal relation with the motivating phenomenon appears, and rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive. Thus, the object at a distance and its physical projection upon the retina explain the disparity of the images and, through a retrospective illusion, we end up following Malebranche in speaking of a natural geometry of projection.

To the extent that the motivated phenomenon is brought about, its internal relation with the motivating phenomenon appears, and rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive. Thus, the object at a distance and its physical projection upon the retina explain the disparity of the images and, through a retrospective illusion, we end up following Malebranche in speaking of a natural geometry of projection. Or again, we prematurely locate in perception a science that is in fact constructed upon perception and we thus lose sight of the original relation of motivation in which distance springs forth prior to all science.

Key Concepts

• the phenomenological notion of motivation is one of those “fluid”59 concepts that must be formulated if we want to return to phenomena.
• One phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the sense it offers – there is a sort of operative reason, or a raison d’être that orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them.
• This is how the intention of looking to the left and the adherence of the landscape to the gaze motivates the illusion of a movement in the object.
• rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive.
• through a retrospective illusion, we end up following Malebranche in speaking of a natural geometry of projection.

Context

Continuation of subsection (d) '“Motivation.”' in chapter III ('“ATTENTION” AND “JUDGMENT”'), where Merleau-Ponty contrasts phenomenological motivation with the dichotomy of cause vs. reason in objective thought, and uses examples like gaze-induced motion illusion and distance perception to articulate how motivated phenomena both arise from and reveal their motives.