Key Arguments

• When we try to define sensing via qualities ('to see is to have colors or lights, to hear is to have sounds'), Merleau-Ponty insists that 'Red and green are not sensations, they are the sensibles, and quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the object.'
• The 'red patch' on the rug is only red in a complex context: 'its quality only appears in relation to the play of light, and thus only as an element in a spatial configuration'; moreover 'the color is only determinate if it spreads across a certain surface' and a surface too small would be 'unqualifiable,' and the red is essentially a '“wooly red” of a carpet,' so analysis reveals that each quality already harbors multiple significations.
• Any appeal to a 'pure quality' of 'pure sensing' fails because, as shown earlier, such pure sensing 'would amount to not sensing anything and thus to not sensing at all'; there is no experiential basis for such a notion.
• Our belief that we know what it is 'to see,' 'to hear,' or 'to sense' comes not from direct testimony of consciousness but from 'the unquestioned belief in the world [le préjugé du monde]'; we simply import already constituted colored or sonorous objects into consciousness when analyzing perception.
• This is 'the experience error': 'we immediately assume that what we know to exist among things is also in our consciousness of them. We build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither.' This circular move prevents us from accessing the true structure of perceptual consciousness.
• If we managed to 'shift to the consciousness of the world,' we would see that 'the quality is never directly experienced and that all consciousness is consciousness of something'; quality is always given as an aspect of something, not as an isolated content.
• Objective construction from optics and geometry would lead us to expect a 'sharply delimited segment of the world, surrounded by a black zone, filled with qualities without any lacunae, and subtended by determinate size relations like those existing upon the retina,' but actual experience 'offers nothing of the sort'—the visual field’s periphery is variable, its limits are not sharply locatable, and 'the region surrounding the visual field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray.'
• Even what is 'behind my back is not without visual presence,' indicating that the visual field includes a kind of indeterminate presence; likewise, in the Müller-Lyer illusion 'The two straight lines ... are neither equal nor unequal, this is only an essential alternative in the objective world,' since each is grasped in its own context rather than within a single universe of precise comparison.
• Psychology’s appeal to 'inattention' to preserve a determinate, non-ambiguous object-world lacks phenomenological evidence; 'the notion of attention, as we will show more fully below, has for itself no evidence from consciousness. It is but an auxiliary hypothesis concocted to preserve the unquestioned belief in the objective world.'
• Instead, 'We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon. Quality appears within this atmosphere. The sense that it contains is an equivocal sense, and more a question of an expressive value than a logical signification.' Thus, the 'determinate quality' used by empiricism to define sensation is actually an object of scientific consciousness, not an element of lived consciousness, and 'for these two reasons, the notion of quality conceals rather than reveals subjectivity.'

Source Quotes

Sensation as quality.] I will thus give up the attempt to define sensation as pure impression. But to see is to have colors or lights, to hear is to have sounds, to sense is to have qualities; is it not sufficient to have seen red or to have heard an A in order to know what sensing is? Red and green are not sensations, they are the sensibles, and quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the object.

But to see is to have colors or lights, to hear is to have sounds, to sense is to have qualities; is it not sufficient to have seen red or to have heard an A in order to know what sensing is? Red and green are not sensations, they are the sensibles, and quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the object. Rather than providing a simple means of delimiting sensations, the quality, if we consider it in the very experience in which it is revealed, is just as rich and obscure as the object or as the entire perceptual spectacle.

Rather than providing a simple means of delimiting sensations, the quality, if we consider it in the very experience in which it is revealed, is just as rich and obscure as the object or as the entire perceptual spectacle. The red patch I see on the rug is only red if the shadow that lies across it is taken into account; its quality only appears in relation to the play of light, and thus only as an element in a spatial configuration. Moreover, the color is only determinate if it spreads across a certain surface; a surface too small would be unqualifiable.

The red patch I see on the rug is only red if the shadow that lies across it is taken into account; its quality only appears in relation to the play of light, and thus only as an element in a spatial configuration. Moreover, the color is only determinate if it spreads across a certain surface; a surface too small would be unqualifiable. Finally, this red would literally not be the same if it were not the “wooly red” of a carpet.3 Analysis thus discovers the significations that reside in each quality. Might the objection be raised that only the qualities of our actual experience are at issue here, overlaid with an entire body of knowledge, and that we still have the right to conceive of a “pure quality” that might define “pure sensing”?

And yet, as we have just seen, this pure sensing would amount to not sensing anything and thus to not sensing at all. The supposed evidence of sensing is not grounded upon the testimony of consciousness, but rather upon the unquestioned belief in the world [le préjugé du monde].4 We believe we know perfectly well what it is “to see,” “to hear,” or “to sense,” because perception has long given us colored or sonorous objects. When we want to analyze perception, we transport these objects into consciousness.

When we want to analyze perception, we transport these objects into consciousness. We commit what psychologists call “the experience error,”5 that is, we immediately assume that what we know to exist among things is also in our consciousness of them. We build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither. We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in detaching ourselves from it in order to shift to the consciousness of the world.

We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in detaching ourselves from it in order to shift to the consciousness of the world. If we were to do so, we would see that the quality is never directly experienced and that all consciousness is consciousness of something. This “something,” moreover, is not necessarily an identifiable object.

Anything outside of this perimeter – not reflecting upon any sensitive surface – no more acts upon our vision than does light falling upon our closed eyes. We ought to thus perceive a sharply delimited segment of the world, surrounded by a black zone, filled with qualities without any lacunae, and subtended by determinate size relations like those existing upon the retina. But experience offers nothing of the sort, and we will never understand what a visual field is by beginning from the world. Even if it is possible to trace a perimeter around vision by beginning at the center and gradually approaching lateral stimuli, the results of such a measurement nonetheless vary from one moment to the next, and the precise moment at which a previously seen stimulus ceases to be seen can never be identified.

But experience offers nothing of the sort, and we will never understand what a visual field is by beginning from the world. Even if it is possible to trace a perimeter around vision by beginning at the center and gradually approaching lateral stimuli, the results of such a measurement nonetheless vary from one moment to the next, and the precise moment at which a previously seen stimulus ceases to be seen can never be identified. The region surrounding the visual field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray. In this region there is an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other, and, if taken to the extreme, that which is behind my back is not without visual presence.

The region surrounding the visual field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray. In this region there is an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other, and, if taken to the extreme, that which is behind my back is not without visual presence. The two straight lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1) are neither equal nor unequal, this is only an essential alternative in the objective world.6 The visual field is this strange milieu in which contradictory notions intertwine because the objects (the straight lines of Müller-Lyer’s illusion) are not here placed in the domain of being where a comparison would be possible, but are rather each grasped in its own private context, as if they did not belong to the same universe.

In this region there is an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other, and, if taken to the extreme, that which is behind my back is not without visual presence. The two straight lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1) are neither equal nor unequal, this is only an essential alternative in the objective world.6 The visual field is this strange milieu in which contradictory notions intertwine because the objects (the straight lines of Müller-Lyer’s illusion) are not here placed in the domain of being where a comparison would be possible, but are rather each grasped in its own private context, as if they did not belong to the same universe. Psychologists have for a long time gone to great lengths to ignore these phenomena.

There are of course confused spectacles, such as a landscape in the fog, but even so, one still admits that no real landscape is in itself confused – it is only confused for us. Psychologists will contend that the object is never ambiguous, that it only becomes so through inattention. The limits of the visual field are not themselves variable, and there is an absolute moment in which the approaching object objectively begins to be seen; quite simply, we fail to “notice.”7 But the notion of attention, as we will show more fully below, has for itself no evidence from consciousness.

Psychologists will contend that the object is never ambiguous, that it only becomes so through inattention. The limits of the visual field are not themselves variable, and there is an absolute moment in which the approaching object objectively begins to be seen; quite simply, we fail to “notice.”7 But the notion of attention, as we will show more fully below, has for itself no evidence from consciousness. It is but an auxiliary hypothesis concocted to preserve the unquestioned belief in the objective world. We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon.

It is but an auxiliary hypothesis concocted to preserve the unquestioned belief in the objective world. We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon. Quality appears within this atmosphere. The sense that it contains is an equivocal sense, and more a question of an expressive value than a logical signification. The determinate quality by which empiricism wanted to define sensation is an object for, not an element of consciousness, and it is the recently introduced object of scientific consciousness.

The sense that it contains is an equivocal sense, and more a question of an expressive value than a logical signification. The determinate quality by which empiricism wanted to define sensation is an object for, not an element of consciousness, and it is the recently introduced object of scientific consciousness. For these two reasons, the notion of quality conceals rather than reveals subjectivity. Figure 1 [c.

Key Concepts

• But to see is to have colors or lights, to hear is to have sounds, to sense is to have qualities; is it not sufficient to have seen red or to have heard an A in order to know what sensing is?
• Red and green are not sensations, they are the sensibles, and quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the object.
• The red patch I see on the rug is only red if the shadow that lies across it is taken into account; its quality only appears in relation to the play of light, and thus only as an element in a spatial configuration.
• Moreover, the color is only determinate if it spreads across a certain surface; a surface too small would be unqualifiable. Finally, this red would literally not be the same if it were not the “wooly red” of a carpet.
• the supposed evidence of sensing is not grounded upon the testimony of consciousness, but rather upon the unquestioned belief in the world [le préjugé du monde].
• We commit what psychologists call “the experience error,”5 that is, we immediately assume that what we know to exist among things is also in our consciousness of them. We build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither.
• If we were to do so, we would see that the quality is never directly experienced and that all consciousness is consciousness of something.
• We ought to thus perceive a sharply delimited segment of the world, surrounded by a black zone, filled with qualities without any lacunae, and subtended by determinate size relations like those existing upon the retina. But experience offers nothing of the sort, and we will never understand what a visual field is by beginning from the world.
• the precise moment at which a previously seen stimulus ceases to be seen can never be identified. The region surrounding the visual field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray.
• In this region there is an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other, and, if taken to the extreme, that which is behind my back is not without visual presence.
• The two straight lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1) are neither equal nor unequal, this is only an essential alternative in the objective world.
• Psychologists will contend that the object is never ambiguous, that it only becomes so through inattention.
• the notion of attention, as we will show more fully below, has for itself no evidence from consciousness. It is but an auxiliary hypothesis concocted to preserve the unquestioned belief in the objective world.
• We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon. Quality appears within this atmosphere. The sense that it contains is an equivocal sense, and more a question of an expressive value than a logical signification.
• The determinate quality by which empiricism wanted to define sensation is an object for, not an element of consciousness, and it is the recently introduced object of scientific consciousness. For these two reasons, the notion of quality conceals rather than reveals subjectivity.

Context

Middle section of 'Sensation' where Merleau-Ponty critiques the definition of sensation as possession of qualities, exposes the 'préjugé du monde' and the 'experience error,' and uses the structure and indeterminacy of the visual field (including Müller-Lyer) to argue that quality is always context-bound, equivocal, and object-like rather than a simple content of consciousness.