Key Arguments

• Merleau-Ponty notes that the classical notion of sensation is not a reflective concept but 'the final term in the representation of the world, the furthest removed from the constitutive source, and thereby the least clear,' produced by a thought turned toward objects within the general effort of objectification.
• In this objectifying movement, science 'inevitably comes to a conception of the human organism as a physical system in the presence of stimuli themselves defined by their physico‑chemical properties,' and tries 'to reconstruct actual perception upon this basis' and to 'close the cycle of scientific knowledge' by 'establishing an objective science of subjectivity.'
• He insists that 'it is, however, also inevitable that this attempt should fail,' indicating that the project is self‑defeating.
• If one looks back at the 'objective investigations themselves,' one finds first that 'the exterior conditions of the sensory field do not determine it part for part and only intervene by making an autochthonous organization possible'—as Gestalt theory has demonstrated—so external stimuli do not mechanically fix each sensory element.
• Second, 'structure in the organism depends on variables such as the biological sense of the situation, which are no longer physical variables,' meaning that the organization of perception invokes meanings and functions irreducible to physico‑chemical parameters, thereby escaping 'the well‑known instruments of physico‑mathematical analysis' and requiring 'another type of intelligibility.'
• When we 'turn back, as is done here, toward perceptual experience,' we see that 'science only succeeds in constructing a semblance of subjectivity': it 'introduces sensations, as things, precisely where experience shows there to already be meaningful wholes,' so its basic units falsify the structure of lived perception.
• Moreover, science 'imposes categories upon the phenomenal universe that only make sense within the scientific universe,' for instance the demand that every pair of perceived lines be either equal or unequal, or that a perceived crystal have a determinate number of sides, which do not respect the ambiguity and indeterminacy tolerated by perception.
• Thus, the classic theory of sensation is revealed as a theoretical artifact that fits the needs of a certain scientific representation rather than arising from or accurately describing the genesis of experience.

Source Quotes

We grasp the sensible with the senses, but we know now that this “with” is not merely instrumental, that the sensory apparatus is not a conductor, and that even at the periphery, the physiological impression is engaged in relations that were previously considered to be central. [d. What is sensing?] Once again, reflection – even the second-order reflection of science – obscures what was believed clear. We thought we knew what sensing, seeing, and hearing are, but now these words pose problems.

We are led back to the very experiences that these words designate in order to define them anew. The classical notion of sensation was not itself a concept derived from reflection, but rather a recently developed product of thought turned toward objects; it was the final term in the representation of the world, the furthest removed from the constitutive source, and thereby the least clear. In its general effort toward objectification, science inevitably comes to a conception of the human organism as a physical system in the presence of stimuli themselves defined by their physico-chemical properties, seeks to reconstruct actual perception24 upon this basis and to close the cycle of scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself is produced, that is, by establishing an objective science of subjectivity.25 It is, however, also inevitable that this attempt should fail.

The classical notion of sensation was not itself a concept derived from reflection, but rather a recently developed product of thought turned toward objects; it was the final term in the representation of the world, the furthest removed from the constitutive source, and thereby the least clear. In its general effort toward objectification, science inevitably comes to a conception of the human organism as a physical system in the presence of stimuli themselves defined by their physico-chemical properties, seeks to reconstruct actual perception24 upon this basis and to close the cycle of scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself is produced, that is, by establishing an objective science of subjectivity.25 It is, however, also inevitable that this attempt should fail. If we think back to the objective investigations themselves, we discover first that the exterior conditions of the sensory field do not determine it part for part and only intervene by making an autochthonous organization possible – this is what Gestalt theory shows – and second, that structure in the organism depends on variables such as the biological sense of the situation, which are no longer physical variables, such that the whole escapes the well-known instruments of physico-mathematical analysis to open onto another type of intelligibility.26 If we now turn back, as is done here, toward perceptual experience, we observe that science only succeeds in constructing a semblance of subjectivity: it introduces sensations, as things, precisely where experience shows there to already be meaningful wholes; it imposes categories upon the phenomenal universe that only make sense within the scientific universe.

In its general effort toward objectification, science inevitably comes to a conception of the human organism as a physical system in the presence of stimuli themselves defined by their physico-chemical properties, seeks to reconstruct actual perception24 upon this basis and to close the cycle of scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself is produced, that is, by establishing an objective science of subjectivity.25 It is, however, also inevitable that this attempt should fail. If we think back to the objective investigations themselves, we discover first that the exterior conditions of the sensory field do not determine it part for part and only intervene by making an autochthonous organization possible – this is what Gestalt theory shows – and second, that structure in the organism depends on variables such as the biological sense of the situation, which are no longer physical variables, such that the whole escapes the well-known instruments of physico-mathematical analysis to open onto another type of intelligibility.26 If we now turn back, as is done here, toward perceptual experience, we observe that science only succeeds in constructing a semblance of subjectivity: it introduces sensations, as things, precisely where experience shows there to already be meaningful wholes; it imposes categories upon the phenomenal universe that only make sense within the scientific universe. Science requires that two perceived lines, like two real lines, be either equal or unequal, and that a perceived crystal have a determinate number of sides,27 without noticing that the nature of the perceived is to tolerate ambiguity, a certain “shifting” or “haziness” [bougé],28 and to allow itself to be shaped by the context.

Key Concepts

• Once again, reflection – even the second-order reflection of science – obscures what was believed clear.
• The classical notion of sensation was not itself a concept derived from reflection, but rather a recently developed product of thought turned toward objects; it was the final term in the representation of the world, the furthest removed from the constitutive source, and thereby the least clear.
• seeks to reconstruct actual perception24 upon this basis and to close the cycle of scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself is produced, that is, by establishing an objective science of subjectivity.25
• It is, however, also inevitable that this attempt should fail.
• the exterior conditions of the sensory field do not determine it part for part and only intervene by making an autochthonous organization possible – this is what Gestalt theory shows –
• structure in the organism depends on variables such as the biological sense of the situation, which are no longer physical variables, such that the whole escapes the well-known instruments of physico-mathematical analysis to open onto another type of intelligibility.26
• we observe that science only succeeds in constructing a semblance of subjectivity: it introduces sensations, as things, precisely where experience shows there to already be meaningful wholes; it imposes categories upon the phenomenal universe that only make sense within the scientific universe.

Context

Section (d), 'What is sensing?,' where Merleau-Ponty diagnoses how scientific objectification produced the classical notion of sensation and argues, via Gestalt theory and analysis of biological organization, that the project of an objective science of subjectivity misconstrues perception and can only generate a distorted, thing‑like 'subjectivity.'