Speech is a 'genuine gesture' whose sense is inherent in the gesturing itself; understanding another… — Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Speech is a 'genuine gesture' whose sense is inherent in the gesturing itself; understanding another’s words is not a matter of associating representations but of modulating one’s own existence in response to a speaking subject’s style of being and the world he aims at.

By Maurice Merleau-Ponty, from Phenomenology of Perception

Key Arguments

He concludes that 'Speech is a genuine gesture and, just like all gestures, speech too contains its own sense. This is what makes communication possible.'
Although understanding presupposes shared language, 'that does not mean that the words act by arousing “representations” in me, which could be associated with them and which, when taken together, could eventually reproduce in me the speaker’s original “representation.”'
He insists, 'I do not primarily communicate with “representations” or with a thought, but rather with a speaking subject, with a certain style of being, and with the “world” that he aims at.'
The speaker’s 'significative intention' is not an explicit thought but 'a certain lack that seeks to be fulfilled'; correspondingly, 'my taking up of this intention is not an operation of my thought, but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence, a transformation of my being.'
He emphasizes that we live in an already instituted 'linguistic and intersubjective world' in which banal speech and second‑order thoughts hide the original, effortful expressive acts that first opened the space of communication.
Because ordinary language use presupposes that 'the decisive step of expression has been accomplished,' our view of man will be 'superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the gesture that breaks this silence.'

Source Quotes

Thought and expression are thus constituted simultaneously when our cultural assets are mobilized in the service of this unknown law, just as our body suddenly lends itself to a new gesture in the acquisition of habit. Speech is a genuine gesture and, just like all gestures, speech too contains its own sense. This is what makes communication possible.

But that does not mean that the words act by arousing “representations” in me, which could be associated with them and which, when taken together, could eventually reproduce in me the speaker’s original “representation.” I do not primarily communicate with “representations” or with a thought, but rather with a speaking subject, with a certain style of being, and with the “world” that he aims at. Just as the significative intention that initiated the other person’s speech is not an explicit thought, but rather a certain lack that seeks to be fulfilled, so too is my taking up of this intention not an operation of my thought, but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence, a transformation of my being.

I do not primarily communicate with “representations” or with a thought, but rather with a speaking subject, with a certain style of being, and with the “world” that he aims at. Just as the significative intention that initiated the other person’s speech is not an explicit thought, but rather a certain lack that seeks to be fulfilled, so too is my taking up of this intention not an operation of my thought, but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence, a transformation of my being. We live in a world where speech is already instituted.

Just as the significative intention that initiated the other person’s speech is not an explicit thought, but rather a certain lack that seeks to be fulfilled, so too is my taking up of this intention not an operation of my thought, but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence, a transformation of my being. We live in a world where speech is already instituted. We possess in ourselves already formed significations for all of these banal words [paroles].

It is, however, clear that constituted speech, such as it plays out in everyday life, assumes that the decisive step of expression has been accomplished. Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the gesture that breaks this silence. Speech is a gesture, and its signification is a world. [f.

Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the gesture that breaks this silence. Speech is a gesture, and its signification is a world. [f. The understanding of gestures.] Modern psychology has, of course, shown that the spectator does not look within himself or within his inner experience for the sense of gestures he witnesses.16 Consider an angry or threatening gesture.

Key Concepts

Speech is a genuine gesture and, just like all gestures, speech too contains its own sense.
I do not primarily communicate with “representations” or with a thought, but rather with a speaking subject, with a certain style of being, and with the “world” that he aims at.
my taking up of this intention not an operation of my thought, but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence, a transformation of my being.
We live in a world where speech is already instituted.
Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the gesture that breaks this silence.
Speech is a gesture, and its signification is a world.

Context

End of [e. Thought is expression.] and bridge to [f. The understanding of gestures.], where Merleau-Ponty interprets speech as gestural and reframes linguistic comprehension as existential co‑modulation rather than representation association.