Key Arguments

• If 'pure sensation' were defined as the undergoing of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, punctual 'jolt' in which I coincide with the sensed and it 'ceases to have a place in the objective world' and 'signifies nothing,' then it must be sought 'beneath all qualitative content'; but this would amount to an experience in which nothing is distinguishable and thus nothing is actually perceived.
• Even the simplest animal perceptions we know (chimpanzee, chicken) 'have to do with relationships and not with absolute terms,' showing that factual perception is always relational and not made of absolute, atomic impressions.
• In the example of 'a white patch against a homogeneous background,' all points of the patch have a common 'function' that makes them into a 'figure'; the patch’s color is 'denser and somehow more resistant' than the background, its borders 'belong' to the patch and do not join with the background, the patch seems 'placed upon' the background and 'does not interrupt it,' and 'each part announces more than it contains'—so even this 'elementary perception is already charged with a sense.'
• The objection that figure and background must be sensed point by point ignores that 'each point in turn can only be perceived as a figure on a background,' so there is no level of perception that is not already organized as figure/background.
• Gestalt theory’s thesis that 'a figure against a background is the most basic sensible given we can have' is not a contingent empirical fact but 'the very definition of the perceptual phenomenon, or that without which a phenomenon cannot be called perception,' implying that any notion of a layer of impressions beneath this is a theoretical construction against experience.
• Merleau-Ponty concludes that 'a truly homogeneous area, offering nothing to perceive, cannot be given to any perception,' so the pure, undifferentiated field that pure sensation would require is never actually given.
• From this it follows that 'pure impression is thus not merely undiscoverable, but imperceptible, and therefore is inconceivable as a moment of perception'; the idea of an impression layer arises only when one neglects perceptual experience 'in favor of the perceived object' and projects onto experience the divisibility and externality of objective space.
• He notes that 'a visual field is not made up of isolated visions' whereas 'the viewed object is made up of material fragments, and spatial points are external to each other'; the notion of an 'isolated perceptual given' is 'inconceivable, so long as we perform the mental experiment of trying to perceive it,' even though in the objective world we can speak of isolated objects or a physical void.

Source Quotes

I - “SENSATION” In beginning the study of perception, we find in language the seemingly clear and straightforward notion of sensation: I sense red or blue, hot or cold. We will see, however, that this is the most confused notion there is, and that, for having accepted it, classical analyses have missed the phenomenon of perception. [a. Sensation as impression.]1 I might first understand sensation to be the manner in which I am affected and the undergoing [l’épreuve] of a state of myself.

Perhaps the gray that immediately envelops me when I close my eyes or the sounds that vibrate “in my head” when I am half-asleep indicate what pure sensing might be. I would sense precisely insofar as I coincide with the sensed, insofar as this latter ceases to have a place in the objective world, and insofar as it signifies nothing to me. This is to acknowledge that sensation must be sought beneath all qualitative content, since in order to be distinguished as two colors, red and green – even if lacking a precise location – must already form some scene before me and thus cease to be part of myself.

This is to acknowledge that sensation must be sought beneath all qualitative content, since in order to be distinguished as two colors, red and green – even if lacking a precise location – must already form some scene before me and thus cease to be part of myself. Pure sensation will be the undergoing of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, and punctual “jolt.” Since these authors readily concede the point, it is unnecessary to show that this notion corresponds to nothing in our experience, and that for animals such as the chimpanzee or the chicken, the most simple factual perceptions that we know have to do with relationships and not with absolute terms.2 But we must still wonder why they believe themselves authorized by right to mark off a layer of “impressions” in perceptual experience.

Pure sensation will be the undergoing of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, and punctual “jolt.” Since these authors readily concede the point, it is unnecessary to show that this notion corresponds to nothing in our experience, and that for animals such as the chimpanzee or the chicken, the most simple factual perceptions that we know have to do with relationships and not with absolute terms.2 But we must still wonder why they believe themselves authorized by right to mark off a layer of “impressions” in perceptual experience. Consider a white patch against a homogeneous background.

Consider a white patch against a homogeneous background. All points on the patch have a certain common “function” that makes them into a “figure.” The figure’s color is denser and somehow more resistant than the background’s color. The borders of the white patch “belong” to the patch and, despite being contiguous with it, do not join with the background.

The patch seems to be placed upon the background and does not interrupt it. Each part announces more than it contains, and thus this elementary perception is already charged with a sense. The objection will be raised that if the figure and the background are not sensed as a whole, then they must surely be sensed in each of their points.

This would be to forget that each point in turn can only be perceived as a figure on a background. When Gestalt theory tells us that a figure against a background is the most basic sensible given we can have, this is not a contingent characteristic of factual perception that would, in an ideal analysis, leave us free to introduce the notion of impression. Rather, this is the very definition of the perceptual phenomenon, or that without which a phenomenon cannot be called perception. The perceptual “something” is always in the middle of some other thing, it always belongs to a “field.”

Rather, this is the very definition of the perceptual phenomenon, or that without which a phenomenon cannot be called perception. The perceptual “something” is always in the middle of some other thing, it always belongs to a “field.” A truly homogeneous area, offering nothing to perceive, cannot be given to any perception. The structure of actual perception alone can teach us what it is to perceive.

The structure of actual perception alone can teach us what it is to perceive. Pure impression is thus not merely undiscoverable, but imperceptible, and therefore is inconceivable as a moment of perception. If it is introduced, this is because, rather than being attentive to perceptual experience, this experience is neglected in favor of the perceived object.

If it is introduced, this is because, rather than being attentive to perceptual experience, this experience is neglected in favor of the perceived object. A visual field is not made up of isolated visions. But the viewed object is made up of material fragments, and spatial points are external to each other. An isolated perceptual given is inconceivable, so long as we perform the mental experiment of trying to perceive it. Yet in the world there are isolated objects or a physical void. [b.

Key Concepts

• we will see, however, that this is the most confused notion there is, and that, for having accepted it, classical analyses have missed the phenomenon of perception.
• I would sense precisely insofar as I coincide with the sensed, insofar as this latter ceases to have a place in the objective world, and insofar as it signifies nothing to me.
• Pure sensation will be the undergoing of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, and punctual “jolt.”
• for animals such as the chimpanzee or the chicken, the most simple factual perceptions that we know have to do with relationships and not with absolute terms.
• All points on the patch have a certain common “function” that makes them into a “figure.” The figure’s color is denser and somehow more resistant than the background’s color.
• Each part announces more than it contains, and thus this elementary perception is already charged with a sense.
• When Gestalt theory tells us that a figure against a background is the most basic sensible given we can have, this is not a contingent characteristic of factual perception that would, in an ideal analysis, leave us free to introduce the notion of impression. Rather, this is the very definition of the perceptual phenomenon, or that without which a phenomenon cannot be called perception.
• The perceptual “something” is always in the middle of some other thing, it always belongs to a “field.” A truly homogeneous area, offering nothing to perceive, cannot be given to any perception.
• Pure impression is thus not merely undiscoverable, but imperceptible, and therefore is inconceivable as a moment of perception.
• A visual field is not made up of isolated visions. But the viewed object is made up of material fragments, and spatial points are external to each other. An isolated perceptual given is inconceivable, so long as we perform the mental experiment of trying to perceive it.

Context

Opening section of chapter I ('Sensation') where Merleau-Ponty first examines and rejects the definition of sensation as a pure inner impression, using Gestalt figure-ground analysis and the structure of elementary perception to argue that perception is intrinsically field-structured and cannot be decomposed into atomic impressions.