Key Arguments

• He presents cultural objects as carriers of anonymous others: 'In the cultural object, I experience the near presence of others under a veil of anonymity. One uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, or the bell for summoning, and the perception of a cultural world could be verified through the perception of a human act and of another man.'
• He criticizes the 'easy response' that the 'one' is merely a vague way of designating many I’s or an I in general: 'The easy response is that the indefinite pronoun is here simply a vague formula for designating a multiplicity of I’s, or even an I in general.'
• Against the analogy theory of other minds, he objects that this presupposes an already understood 'own' cultural world and I: 'But it would first be necessary to know how I could have the experience of my own cultural world, of my own civilization.'
• He summarizes the analogical explanation: I see other men using tools and interpret their behavior by analogy with my own inner experience: 'The response will again be that I see other men around me putting the tools that surround me to a certain use and that I interpret their behavior through analogy with my own behavior and my own inner experience, which teaches me the sense and the intention of the perceived gestures.'
• He identifies the core problem as the pluralization of the 'I': 'But this is precisely the question: how can the word “I” be made plural? How can we form a general idea of the I? How can I speak of another I than my own? How can I know that there are other I’s?'
• He formulates the paradox of grasping consciousness as You and One: 'How can consciousness, which as knowledge of itself is, in principle, in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the You [To i], and thereby in the mode of the “One”?1'
• He claims the 'very first cultural object' is the other’s body as bearer of behavior, indicating that intersubjectivity is primarily bodily and perceptual: 'The very first cultural object, and the one by which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior.'
• He poses the central problem: how can an object in space become 'the speaking trace of an existence', and, inversely, how can intention detach from the personal subject and become visible in body and environment: 'we must ask how an object in space can become the speaking trace of an existence, and how, inversely, an intention, a thought, or a project can detach from the personal subject and become visible outside of him in his body and in the environment that he constructs.'

Source Quotes

How is this possible? [c. How are others possible?]* In the cultural object, I experience the near presence of others under a veil of anonymity. One uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, or the bell for summoning, and the perception of a cultural world could be verified through the perception of a human act and of another man.

How are others possible?]* In the cultural object, I experience the near presence of others under a veil of anonymity. One uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, or the bell for summoning, and the perception of a cultural world could be verified through the perception of a human act and of another man. How can a human action or thought be grasped in the mode of the “one,” given that it is, in principle, a first person operation and inseparable from an I?

How can a human action or thought be grasped in the mode of the “one,” given that it is, in principle, a first person operation and inseparable from an I? The easy response is that the indefinite pronoun is here simply a vague formula for designating a multiplicity of I’s, or even an I in general. It will be said that I have the experience of a certain cultural milieu and of behaviors that correspond to it; standing before the vestiges of a lost civilization, I imagine through analogy the type of man who lived there.

But it would first be necessary to know how I could have the experience of my own cultural world, of my own civilization. The response will again be that I see other men around me putting the tools that surround me to a certain use and that I interpret their behavior through analogy with my own behavior and my own inner experience, which teaches me the sense and the intention of the perceived gestures. In the end, the other person’s actions would here still be understood through my own; the “one” or the “we” would still be understood through the I.

In the end, the other person’s actions would here still be understood through my own; the “one” or the “we” would still be understood through the I. But this is precisely the question: how can the word “I” be made plural? How can we form a general idea of the I? How can I speak of another I than my own? How can I know that there are other I’s? How can consciousness, which as knowledge of itself is, in principle, in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the You [To i], and thereby in the mode of the “One”?1 The very first cultural object, and the one by which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior.

How can I know that there are other I’s? How can consciousness, which as knowledge of itself is, in principle, in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the You [To i], and thereby in the mode of the “One”?1 The very first cultural object, and the one by which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior. Whether it has to do with vestiges or with another person’s body, we must ask how an object in space can become the speaking trace of an existence, and how, inversely, an intention, a thought, or a project can detach from the personal subject and become visible outside of him in his body and in the environment that he constructs.

How can consciousness, which as knowledge of itself is, in principle, in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the You [To i], and thereby in the mode of the “One”?1 The very first cultural object, and the one by which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior. Whether it has to do with vestiges or with another person’s body, we must ask how an object in space can become the speaking trace of an existence, and how, inversely, an intention, a thought, or a project can detach from the personal subject and become visible outside of him in his body and in the environment that he constructs. The constitution of others does not entirely clarify the constitution of society, which is not an existence shared by two or even three persons, but is rather a coexistence with an indefinite number of consciousnesses.

Key Concepts

• In the cultural object, I experience the near presence of others under a veil of anonymity.
• One uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, or the bell for summoning, and the perception of a cultural world could be verified through the perception of a human act and of another man.
• The easy response is that the indefinite pronoun is here simply a vague formula for designating a multiplicity of I’s, or even an I in general.
• The response will again be that I see other men around me putting the tools that surround me to a certain use and that I interpret their behavior through analogy with my own behavior and my own inner experience, which teaches me the sense and the intention of the perceived gestures.
• how can the word “I” be made plural? How can we form a general idea of the I? How can I speak of another I than my own? How can I know that there are other I’s?
• How can consciousness, which as knowledge of itself is, in principle, in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the You [To i], and thereby in the mode of the “One”?1
• The very first cultural object, and the one by which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior.
• how an object in space can become the speaking trace of an existence, and how, inversely, an intention, a thought, or a project can detach from the personal subject and become visible outside of him in his body and in the environment that he constructs.

Context

IV - OTHERS AND THE HUMAN WORLD, subsection [c. How are others possible?], where Merleau-Ponty formulates the problem of intersubjectivity and cultural objectivity in terms of the plurality of 'I' and the other’s body as primordial cultural object.