Key Arguments

• Developmental psychology has 'long been known' to show that 'children, during the first nine months of life, only distinguish globally between the colored and the achromatic; subsequently, colored areas become articulated into “warm” and “cool” shades, and eventually detailed colors are obtained.'
• Psychologists had assumed that the child already experiences full colors but fails in naming them: 'Where there is green, the child must surely have seen green; he just failed to pay attention to it and to apprehend his own phenomena,' i.e., attention is treated as a secondary apprehension of pre‑existing qualities.
• Merleau-Ponty criticizes this as the projection of adult categories on infant experience: 'On the contrary, psychologists themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality.'
• Once this prejudice is dropped, 'the world of colors' appears 'as a second-order formation, established upon a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-colored.”'
• These primitive 'physiognomic' phenomena 'occupying the place of color for the child' cannot be assimilated to any adult quality: 'We cannot compare these phenomena ... to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s “strange” colors cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum.'
• Hence, 'The first perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of consciousness, the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of an a priori.'
• Because attention is modeled on such 'originary acts' of instituting new experiential dimensions, 'To pay attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens; rather, it is to realize in them a new articulation by taking them as figures,' so even at 'second‑order' levels attention is genuinely constitutive.
• Once the quality 'color' is acquired, earlier experiences are retroactively reinterpreted: 'Once the quality “color” is acquired, and only thanks to it, the previous givens appear as preparations for this quality,' showing that acquisition changes the sense of the past field.

Source Quotes

Here it is literally a question of a creation. For example, it has long been known that children, during the first nine months of life, only distinguish globally between the colored and the achromatic; subsequently, colored areas become articulated into “warm” and “cool” shades, and eventually detailed colors are obtained. But psychologists12 assumed that what prevents the child from distinguishing colors is merely an ignorance of or a confusion over color names.

But psychologists12 assumed that what prevents the child from distinguishing colors is merely an ignorance of or a confusion over color names. Where there is green, the child must surely have seen green; he just failed to pay attention to it and to apprehend his own phenomena. On the contrary, psychologists themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality.

Where there is green, the child must surely have seen green; he just failed to pay attention to it and to apprehend his own phenomena. On the contrary, psychologists themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality. The critique of these prejudices, however, allows us to perceive the world of colors as a second-order formation, established upon a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-colored.”

On the contrary, psychologists themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality. The critique of these prejudices, however, allows us to perceive the world of colors as a second-order formation, established upon a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-colored.” We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the place of color for the child to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s “strange” colors cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum.13 The first perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of consciousness,14 the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of an a priori.

The critique of these prejudices, however, allows us to perceive the world of colors as a second-order formation, established upon a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-colored.” We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the place of color for the child to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s “strange” colors cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum.13 The first perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of consciousness,14 the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of an a priori. Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself.

Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself. To pay attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens; rather, it is to realize in them a new articulation by taking them as figures.15 They are only pre-formed as horizons, they truly constitute new regions in the total world. The original structure that they introduce is precisely what makes the identity of the object before and after the act of attention appear.

The original structure that they introduce is precisely what makes the identity of the object before and after the act of attention appear. Once the quality “color” is acquired, and only thanks to it, the previous givens appear as preparations for this quality. Once the idea of an equation is acquired, arithmetical identities appear as varieties of the same equation.

Key Concepts

• children, during the first nine months of life, only distinguish globally between the colored and the achromatic; subsequently, colored areas become articulated into “warm” and “cool” shades, and eventually detailed colors are obtained.
• Where there is green, the child must surely have seen green; he just failed to pay attention to it and to apprehend his own phenomena.
• psychologists themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality.
• the world of colors as a second-order formation, established upon a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-colored.”
• We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the place of color for the child to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s “strange” colors cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum.
• The first perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of consciousness,14 the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of an a priori.
• To pay attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens; rather, it is to realize in them a new articulation by taking them as figures.
• Once the quality “color” is acquired, and only thanks to it, the previous givens appear as preparations for this quality.

Context

Following the analysis of tactile attention, Merleau-Ponty turns to developmental color perception to illustrate attention as an 'originary act' that institutes new experiential dimensions, thereby rejecting the idea that attention only ever clarifies already determinate qualities.