Key Arguments

• He announces that, just as with position, we must go beneath the objective conception of movement: 'there is an objective conception of movement that defines it through intra-worldly relations by taking the experience of the world as acquired. And just as we had to uncover the origin of spatial position in the pre-objective situation or locality of the subject who focuses upon his milieu, so too will we have to rediscover beneath the objective thought of movement a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its sense and where movement, still tied to the person who perceives, is a variation of the subject’s hold upon his world.'
• He criticizes the 'critical attitude or the attitude of verification' with which we 'attempt to think movement or to undertake the philosophy of movement,' because this attitude 'reduces the phenomenon and ... will block us from attaining it itself, because this attitude introduces – along with the notion of truth in itself – presuppositions capable of concealing from me the birth of movement.'
• In the stone example, reflective analysis decomposes the phenomenon: 'The stone itself, I will say, is not in fact modified by the movement. I find again on the ground at the end of its trajectory the very same stone I held in my hand, and thus it is the same stone that moved through the air. Movement is but an accidental attribute of the moving object [le mobile], and it cannot somehow be seen in the stone.'
• From this perspective, 'It can be nothing but a change in the relations between the stone and the surroundings,' requiring a persistent identical stone: 'if I assume that the stone is annihilated upon arriving at point P, and that another identical stone springs forth at point P′, as adjacent to the first as one would like, then we no longer have a unique movement, but rather two movements.'
• Movement also 'does not work without an external reference point, and, in short, there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the “moving object” rather than to the reference point,' leading to the conclusion 'there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute movement.'
• He then delivers the critical punchline: 'Nevertheless, this conception of movement is in fact a negation of movement: to distinguish movement rigorously from the moving object is to say, strictly speaking, that the “moving object” does not move,' since if the moving stone is in no way different from the stone at rest, movement vanishes from the stone itself.
• By framing movement as mere relational change between identical states, the objective conception strips away the very phenomenon of qualitative alteration that we initially experience when we see the stone as 'a blurry meteorite' in flight.
• His announced task is therefore to return to movement 'still tied to the person who perceives' and to understand it as 'a variation of the subject’s hold upon his world,' though the detailed positive account continues beyond this passage.

Source Quotes

Just as we initially encountered a conception of position that defined it through relations in objective space, so too is there an objective conception of movement that defines it through intra-worldly relations by taking the experience of the world as acquired. And just as we had to uncover the origin of spatial position in the pre-objective situation or locality of the subject who focuses upon his milieu, so too will we have to rediscover beneath the objective thought of movement a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its sense and where movement, still tied to the person who perceives, is a variation of the subject’s hold upon his world. When we attempt to think movement or to undertake the philosophy of movement, we immediately place ourselves in the critical attitude or the attitude of verification: we ask ourselves what is actually given to us in movement, we prepare ourselves for rejecting appearances in order to attain the truth of movement, and we fail to notice that it is precisely this attitude that reduces the phenomenon and that will block us from attaining it itself, because this attitude introduces – along with the notion of truth in itself – presuppositions capable of concealing from me the birth of movement.

And just as we had to uncover the origin of spatial position in the pre-objective situation or locality of the subject who focuses upon his milieu, so too will we have to rediscover beneath the objective thought of movement a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its sense and where movement, still tied to the person who perceives, is a variation of the subject’s hold upon his world. When we attempt to think movement or to undertake the philosophy of movement, we immediately place ourselves in the critical attitude or the attitude of verification: we ask ourselves what is actually given to us in movement, we prepare ourselves for rejecting appearances in order to attain the truth of movement, and we fail to notice that it is precisely this attitude that reduces the phenomenon and that will block us from attaining it itself, because this attitude introduces – along with the notion of truth in itself – presuppositions capable of concealing from me the birth of movement. I throw a stone.

I find again on the ground at the end of its trajectory the very same stone I held in my hand, and thus it is the same stone that moved through the air. Movement is but an accidental attribute of the moving object [le mobile], and it cannot somehow be seen in the stone. It can be nothing but a change in the relations between the stone and the surroundings.

Movement is but an accidental attribute of the moving object [le mobile], and it cannot somehow be seen in the stone. It can be nothing but a change in the relations between the stone and the surroundings. We can only speak of a change if the same rock persists beneath the different relations to the surroundings.

On the contrary, if I assume that the stone is annihilated upon arriving at point P, and that another identical stone springs forth at point P′, as adjacent to the first as one would like, then we no longer have a unique movement, but rather two movements. There is, then, no movement without a moving object that bears it uninterruptedly from the starting point right through to the end point. Since it is in no way inherent to the moving object and consists entirely in its relations to the surroundings, movement does not work without an external reference point, and, in short, there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the “moving object” rather than to the reference point.

There is, then, no movement without a moving object that bears it uninterruptedly from the starting point right through to the end point. Since it is in no way inherent to the moving object and consists entirely in its relations to the surroundings, movement does not work without an external reference point, and, in short, there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the “moving object” rather than to the reference point. Once the distinction between the moving object and the movement has been made, there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute movement.

Since it is in no way inherent to the moving object and consists entirely in its relations to the surroundings, movement does not work without an external reference point, and, in short, there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the “moving object” rather than to the reference point. Once the distinction between the moving object and the movement has been made, there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute movement. Nevertheless, this conception of movement is in fact a negation of movement: to distinguish movement rigorously from the moving object is to say, strictly speaking, that the “moving object” does not move.

Once the distinction between the moving object and the movement has been made, there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute movement. Nevertheless, this conception of movement is in fact a negation of movement: to distinguish movement rigorously from the moving object is to say, strictly speaking, that the “moving object” does not move. If the moving-stone is not in some way different from the stone at rest, then

Key Concepts

• And just as we had to uncover the origin of spatial position in the pre-objective situation or locality of the subject who focuses upon his milieu, so too will we have to rediscover beneath the objective thought of movement a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its sense and where movement, still tied to the person who perceives, is a variation of the subject’s hold upon his world.
• When we attempt to think movement or to undertake the philosophy of movement, we immediately place ourselves in the critical attitude or the attitude of verification:
• Movement is but an accidental attribute of the moving object [le mobile], and it cannot somehow be seen in the stone.
• It can be nothing but a change in the relations between the stone and the surroundings.
• There is, then, no movement without a moving object that bears it uninterruptedly from the starting point right through to the end point.
• there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the “moving object” rather than to the reference point.
• there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute movement.
• Nevertheless, this conception of movement is in fact a negation of movement: to distinguish movement rigorously from the moving object is to say, strictly speaking, that the “moving object” does not move.

Context

Beginning of section '[C. Movement.] [i. Thinking about movement destroys movement.]' in II - SPACE, where Merleau-Ponty analyzes the standard objective definition of movement as change of position of an identical object relative to a reference frame, shows how this definition eliminates genuine movement from the moving object, and announces the need to return to a pre-objective, bodily experience of movement as variation of the subject’s hold on the world.