Key Arguments

• Classical psychology notes that my body is 'constantly perceived' unlike external things, but Merleau-Ponty argues that genuine objects are such that their presence 'requires a possible absence' and are constituted through 'indefinite exploration' and perspectival variation, whereas my body 'defies exploration and always appears to me from the same angle.'
• He distinguishes the body’s permanence: 'Its permanence is not a permanence in the world, but a permanence on my side. To say that my body is always near to me or always there for me is to say that it is never truly in front of me, that I cannot spread it out under my gaze, that it remains on the margins of all of my perceptions, and that it is with me.'
• Even though external objects are perspectival, 'I can at least choose the side I want them to show me'; by contrast, I cannot similarly vary the perspective on my own body, which undercuts the analogy between bodily permanence and object permanence.
• Cases like being a prisoner who sees only a church steeple or never removing one’s clothes show not that the body is just a permanently available tool, but 'that the actions in which I habitually engage incorporate their instruments and make them participate in the original structure of my own body [le corps propre].'
• He calls my own body 'the primordial habit, the one that conditions all others and by which they can be understood', indicating that bodily permanence is transcendental, not empirical.
• He claims that 'its near presence and its invariable perspective are not a factual necessity, since factual necessity presupposes them': for a window to impose a certain perspective, 'my body must first impose on me a perspective on the world', so bodily permanence is a 'metaphysical' necessity that grounds physical constraints.
• He concludes that 'In other words, I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, inspect them, and walk around them. But when it comes to my body, I never observe it itself. I would need a second body to be able to do so, which would itself be unobservable,' showing that the body’s permanence is that of the observing subject, not of an observed thing.

Source Quotes

It first claimed that my body is distinguished from the table or the lamp because my body is constantly perceived, whereas I can turn away from these other objects. Thus, my body is an object that is always with me. But then, is it still an object? If an object is an invariable structure, this is not in spite of the change of perspectives, but rather in this change, or through it.

Otherwise, the object would be true in the manner of an idea and not present in the manner of a thing. In particular, the object is only an object if it can be moved away and ultimately disappear from my visual field. Its presence is such that it requires a possible absence. Now, the permanence of one’s own body is of an entirely different type: it is not to be found as the result of an indefinite exploration.

Now, the permanence of one’s own body is of an entirely different type: it is not to be found as the result of an indefinite exploration. In fact, my own body defies exploration and always appears to me from the same angle. Its permanence is not a permanence in the world, but a permanence on my side. To say that my body is always near to me or always there for me is to say that it is never truly in front of me, that I cannot spread it out under my gaze, that it remains on the margins of all of my perceptions, and that it is with me.

Its permanence is not a permanence in the world, but a permanence on my side. To say that my body is always near to me or always there for me is to say that it is never truly in front of me, that I cannot spread it out under my gaze, that it remains on the margins of all of my perceptions, and that it is with me. Of course, external objects themselves never show me one of their sides without thereby hiding from me all their other sides, but I can at least choose the side I want them to show me.

On the contrary, it shows that the actions in which I habitually engage incorporate their instruments and make them participate in the original structure of my own body [le corps propre]. Moreover, my own body is the primordial habit, the one that conditions all others and by which they can be understood. Its near presence and its invariable perspective are not a factual necessity, since factual necessity presupposes them: for my window to impose on me a perspective on the church, my body must first impose on me a perspective on the world, and the former necessity can only be a purely physical one because the latter necessity is metaphysical.

Moreover, my own body is the primordial habit, the one that conditions all others and by which they can be understood. Its near presence and its invariable perspective are not a factual necessity, since factual necessity presupposes them: for my window to impose on me a perspective on the church, my body must first impose on me a perspective on the world, and the former necessity can only be a purely physical one because the latter necessity is metaphysical. Factual situations can only affect me if I am first of such a nature that there can be factual situations for me.

Factual situations can only affect me if I am first of such a nature that there can be factual situations for me. In other words, I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, inspect them, and walk around them. But when it comes to my body, I never observe it itself. I would need a second body to be able to do so, which would itself be unobservable.

Key Concepts

• Thus, my body is an object that is always with me. But then, is it still an object?
• In particular, the object is only an object if it can be moved away and ultimately disappear from my visual field. Its presence is such that it requires a possible absence.
• In fact, my own body defies exploration and always appears to me from the same angle. Its permanence is not a permanence in the world, but a permanence on my side.
• To say that my body is always near to me or always there for me is to say that it is never truly in front of me, that I cannot spread it out under my gaze, that it remains on the margins of all of my perceptions, and that it is with me.
• my own body is the primordial habit, the one that conditions all others and by which they can be understood.
• for my window to impose on me a perspective on the church, my body must first impose on me a perspective on the world, and the former necessity can only be a purely physical one because the latter necessity is metaphysical.
• I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, inspect them, and walk around them. But when it comes to my body, I never observe it itself.

Context

Subsection [a. The “permanence” of one’s own body.], where Merleau-Ponty reinterprets classical psychology’s claim that the body is constantly perceived, arguing that bodily permanence is fundamentally different from, and prior to, the permanence of objects.