Key Arguments

• He argues that 'the “spatial level” does not merge with the orientation of one’s own body'; although body-awareness 'contributes to the constitution of the level,' it 'is, in this function, in competition with the other sectors of experience,' and vertical only follows the head’s direction when visual anchorage points are absent (e.g., 'when one moves about in the dark').
• Considered as a bundle of sensations—'a mass of tactile, labyrinthine, and kinesthetic givens'—the body 'has no more precise an orientation than other contents, and it itself receives this orientation from the general level of experience,' so the objective body cannot serve as the ultimate source of spatial direction.
• Yet the 'body as an agent, on the contrary, plays an essential role in establishing a level,' since changes in muscular tonus shift the apparent vertical, and the subject leans the head 'in order to place it parallel to this altered vertical,' indicating active bodily adjustment to the field.
• He rejects defining vertical simply as 'the direction defined by the axis of symmetry of our body, considered as a synergetic system,' because experiments show that 'the objective direction of my body can form an appreciable angle with the apparent vertical of the spectacle.'
• He introduces the notion of a 'virtual body': 'What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal “place” is defined by its task and by its situation.'
• In Wertheimer’s setting, once the subject 'takes up a place within the apparatus... the area of his possible actions... sketches out in front of him a possible habitat, even if his eyes are closed,' and initially he does not 'inhabit the room' or 'live with the man he sees moving about.'
• After several minutes, 'that miracle takes place: the reflected room conjures up a subject capable of living in it. This virtual body displaces the real body, so much so that the subject no longer feels himself to be in the world he is actually in,' and he feels instead 'the legs and arms required for walking and acting in the reflected room – he inhabits the spectacle.' The shift of level coincides with this inhabitation.
• He defines the spatial level as 'a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain hold my body has on the world,' arising 'at the intersection of my motor intentions and my perceptual field' when 'my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle.'
• This culminates in the idea of a 'pact' between body and world: the level 'sets itself up when... between my body as the power of certain gestures... and the perceived spectacle as the invitation to these very gestures... a pact is established that gives me possession of space and gives to the things a direct power upon my body.'

Source Quotes

It remains to be shown precisely what this level is that always precedes itself, every constitution of a level presupposing another preestablished level, precisely how the “anchorage points” invite us to constitute another space in the midst of a certain space to which they owe their stability, and finally, precisely what “up” and “down” are, if not simple names for designating an orientation of sensory content in itself. Rather, our claim is that the “spatial level” does not merge with the orientation of one’s own body. Although the consciousness of one’s own body undoubtedly contributes to the constitution of the level – one subject, whose head is tilted, places a string on an angle that he had been asked to place vertically20– it is, in this function, in competition with the other sectors of experience, and the vertical only tends to follow the direction of the head if the visual field is empty, and if the “anchorage points” are absent, such as when one moves about in the dark.

Although the consciousness of one’s own body undoubtedly contributes to the constitution of the level – one subject, whose head is tilted, places a string on an angle that he had been asked to place vertically20– it is, in this function, in competition with the other sectors of experience, and the vertical only tends to follow the direction of the head if the visual field is empty, and if the “anchorage points” are absent, such as when one moves about in the dark. As a mass of tactile, labyrinthine, and kinesthetic givens, the body has no more precise an orientation than other contents, and it itself receives this orientation from the general level of experience. Wertheimer’s observation shows precisely how the visual field can impose an orientation that is not the orientation of the body.

Wertheimer’s observation shows precisely how the visual field can impose an orientation that is not the orientation of the body. But even if the body, considered as a mosaic of given sensations, does not trace out any direction, the body as an agent, on the contrary, plays an essential role in establishing a level. Variations in muscular tonus, even with a full visual field, modify the apparent vertical to the extent that the subject leans his head in order to place it parallel to this altered vertical.21 We might be tempted to say that the vertical is the direction defined by the axis of symmetry of our body, considered as a synergetic system.

But my body can nevertheless move without dragging along with it the orientations of up and down, such as when I lie on the ground, and Wertheimer’s experiment shows that the objective direction of my body can form an appreciable angle with the apparent vertical of the spectacle. What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal “place” is defined by its task and by its situation. My body is wherever it has something to do.

After several minutes, and provided that he does not reinforce the initial anchorage by glancing away from the mirror, that miracle takes place: the reflected room conjures up a subject capable of living in it. This virtual body displaces the real body, so much so that the subject no longer feels himself to be in the world he is actually in, and that, rather than his genuine legs and arms, he feels the legs and arms required for walking and acting in the reflected room – he inhabits the spectacle. And this is when the spatial level shifts and is established in its new position.

And this is when the spatial level shifts and is established in its new position. The spatial level is, then, a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain hold my body has on the world. In the absence of anchorage points, and so projected solely by my body’s attitude (as in Nagel’s experiments), and determined solely by the demands of the spectacle when the body is inattentive (as in Wertheimer’s experiment), the spatial level normally appears at the intersection of my motor intentions and my perceptual field, that is, when my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle, and when the actual spectacle comes to coincide with the milieu that my body projects around itself.

The spatial level is, then, a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain hold my body has on the world. In the absence of anchorage points, and so projected solely by my body’s attitude (as in Nagel’s experiments), and determined solely by the demands of the spectacle when the body is inattentive (as in Wertheimer’s experiment), the spatial level normally appears at the intersection of my motor intentions and my perceptual field, that is, when my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle, and when the actual spectacle comes to coincide with the milieu that my body projects around itself. It sets itself up when, between my body as the power of certain gestures and as the demand for certain privileged planes, and the perceived spectacle as the invitation to these very gestures and as the theater of these very actions, a pact is established that gives me possession22 of space and gives to the things a direct power upon my body.

In the absence of anchorage points, and so projected solely by my body’s attitude (as in Nagel’s experiments), and determined solely by the demands of the spectacle when the body is inattentive (as in Wertheimer’s experiment), the spatial level normally appears at the intersection of my motor intentions and my perceptual field, that is, when my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle, and when the actual spectacle comes to coincide with the milieu that my body projects around itself. It sets itself up when, between my body as the power of certain gestures and as the demand for certain privileged planes, and the perceived spectacle as the invitation to these very gestures and as the theater of these very actions, a pact is established that gives me possession22 of space and gives to the things a direct power upon my body. The constitution of a spatial level is only one of the means of the constitution of an integrated world.

Key Concepts

• our claim is that the “spatial level” does not merge with the orientation of one’s own body.
• As a mass of tactile, labyrinthine, and kinesthetic givens, the body has no more precise an orientation than other contents, and it itself receives this orientation from the general level of experience.
• But even if the body, considered as a mosaic of given sensations, does not trace out any direction, the body as an agent, on the contrary, plays an essential role in establishing a level.
• What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal “place” is defined by its task and by its situation.
• This virtual body displaces the real body, so much so that the subject no longer feels himself to be in the world he is actually in, and that, rather than his genuine legs and arms, he feels the legs and arms required for walking and acting in the reflected room – he inhabits the spectacle.
• The spatial level is, then, a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain hold my body has on the world.
• when my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle, and when the actual spectacle comes to coincide with the milieu that my body projects around itself.
• a pact is established that gives me possession22 of space and gives to the things a direct power upon my body.

Context

Middle of '[iii. The spatial level, anchorage points, and existential space.]' in II - SPACE, where Merleau-Ponty refines the concept of spatial level by differentiating the objective body from the 'virtual body' and describing how inhabiting a spectacle via possible actions establishes an oriented space.