In historically older rank‑based representative bodies and in contemporary workers’ associations, de… — Max Weber

In historically older rank‑based representative bodies and in contemporary workers’ associations, decision‑making properly rests on compromise between heterogeneous interests, not on numerical voting, because there is no objective way to quantify the 'importance' of occupations, the interests of workers and entrepreneurs are both antagonistic and asymmetrically informed, and using vote‑counting to aggregate such heterogeneous elements is a 'mechanical nonsense'; the ballot is appropriate to parties, not to 'social ranks'.

By Max Weber, from Economy and Society

Key Arguments

Weber notes: '1. Common to all the historically older bodies based on “social rank” is representation with compromise as the means for the settlement of disputes.', emphasising compromise over voting.
He adds that 'This prevails today in “workers’ associations,” and everywhere that negotiation between advisory and executive authorities is practised.', extending the pattern to modern corporatist negotiations.
He insists that 'No numerical value can be placed on the “importance” of an occupation.', denying the possibility of objective weighting for votes by occupation.
He highlights class antagonism and asymmetry: 'Above all, the interests of the mass of workers and those of the (increasingly fewer) entrepreneurs are often greatly antagonistic; allowance has to be made in some way for the fact that the latter, while numerically weaker, are likely to be better informed (although of course also particularly self-interested).', describing the structural situation.
He concludes that 'Arriving at a decision made by adding such heterogeneous elements—heterogeneous by class, or by social rank—is a mechanical nonsense: a ballot paper as the last resort for settling conflict is proper to parties that argue and compromise, not to “social ranks.”', offering a normative and analytical critique of applying simple majoritarianism to corporatist bodies.

Source Quotes

This is because the only professional representatives of interests who will come forwards are those able to devote all of their time to the service of a particular interest, which for the poor strata means: salaried secretaries of interest groups. 1. Common to all the historically older bodies based on “social rank” is representation with compromise as the means for the settlement of disputes. This prevails today in “workers’ associations,” and everywhere that negotiation between advisory and executive authorities is practised.

Common to all the historically older bodies based on “social rank” is representation with compromise as the means for the settlement of disputes. This prevails today in “workers’ associations,” and everywhere that negotiation between advisory and executive authorities is practised. No numerical value can be placed on the “importance” of an occupation.

This prevails today in “workers’ associations,” and everywhere that negotiation between advisory and executive authorities is practised. No numerical value can be placed on the “importance” of an occupation. Above all, the interests of the mass of workers and those of the (increasingly fewer) entrepreneurs are often greatly antagonistic; allowance has to be made in some way for the fact that the latter, while numerically weaker, are likely to be better informed (although of course also particularly self-interested).

No numerical value can be placed on the “importance” of an occupation. Above all, the interests of the mass of workers and those of the (increasingly fewer) entrepreneurs are often greatly antagonistic; allowance has to be made in some way for the fact that the latter, while numerically weaker, are likely to be better informed (although of course also particularly self-interested). Arriving at a decision made by adding such heterogeneous elements—heterogeneous by class, or by social rank—is a mechanical nonsense: a ballot paper as the last resort for settling conflict is proper to parties that argue and compromise, not to “social ranks.”

Above all, the interests of the mass of workers and those of the (increasingly fewer) entrepreneurs are often greatly antagonistic; allowance has to be made in some way for the fact that the latter, while numerically weaker, are likely to be better informed (although of course also particularly self-interested). Arriving at a decision made by adding such heterogeneous elements—heterogeneous by class, or by social rank—is a mechanical nonsense: a ballot paper as the last resort for settling conflict is proper to parties that argue and compromise, not to “social ranks.” 2.

Key Concepts

1. Common to all the historically older bodies based on “social rank” is representation with compromise as the means for the settlement of disputes.
This prevails today in “workers’ associations,” and everywhere that negotiation between advisory and executive authorities is practised.
No numerical value can be placed on the “importance” of an occupation.
Above all, the interests of the mass of workers and those of the (increasingly fewer) entrepreneurs are often greatly antagonistic; allowance has to be made in some way for the fact that the latter, while numerically weaker, are likely to be better informed (although of course also particularly self-interested).
Arriving at a decision made by adding such heterogeneous elements—heterogeneous by class, or by social rank—is a mechanical nonsense: a ballot paper as the last resort for settling conflict is proper to parties that argue and compromise, not to “social ranks.”

Context

First analytical point under §22, where Weber evaluates decision procedures in rank‑ and occupation‑based representative bodies and criticises applying parliamentary voting logic to them.