Key Arguments

• Weber explicitly defines rulership by reference to a previous definition: 'As defined above (Chapter 1, §16), rulership is the chance that specific (or all) commands will be met with obedience on the part of a specifiable group of persons.'
• He immediately distinguishes this from broader notions of power and influence: 'It is not therefore each and every kind of chance of exercising “power” and “influence” over other people.'
• He underscores that genuine rulership presupposes a minimum readiness to obey: 'Present in every genuine relationship of rule is a specific minimum of willingness to obey, hence an (outward or inner) interest in obedience.'
• Later, he further restricts the concept of rulership by excluding mere economic monopsony power or bargaining advantage, insisting that rulership requires orders that claim obedience and are supervised in their execution.

Source Quotes

The Validity of Legitimacy §1. As defined above (Chapter 1, §16), rulership is the chance that specific (or all) commands will be met with obedience on the part of a specifiable group of persons. It is not therefore each and every kind of chance of exercising “power” and “influence” over other people.

As defined above (Chapter 1, §16), rulership is the chance that specific (or all) commands will be met with obedience on the part of a specifiable group of persons. It is not therefore each and every kind of chance of exercising “power” and “influence” over other people. In this sense, in the individual instance rulership (“authority”) can also rely on the most varied motives for conformity: from dull habituation to purely purposively rational considerations.

In this sense, in the individual instance rulership (“authority”) can also rely on the most varied motives for conformity: from dull habituation to purely purposively rational considerations. Present in every genuine relationship of rule is a specific minimum of willingness to obey, hence an (outward or inner) interest in obedience. Not every instance of rule makes use of economic means.

In fact, the worker is formally a partner in exchange with an employer with a “right” to receive payments. All the same, the concept of a relationship between ruler and ruled should not, of course, preclude its foundation in a formally free contract: hence, the way that the terms and conditions of employment provide for rule by the employer, and the way the feudal lord exercised rule over the serf who voluntarily entered the state of serfdom. That obedience to military discipline is formally “involuntary,” while that of the workplace is formally “voluntary,” does not change the fact that subordination to workplace discipline also implies submission to rule.

Even the stance of a “salon” can imply something very like authoritarian power without at the same time being necessarily a form of “rule.” In reality, it is often not possible to make such precise distinctions, but in these cases precise concepts are all the more important. 3.

Key Concepts

• rulership is the chance that specific (or all) commands will be met with obedience on the part of a specifiable group of persons.
• It is not therefore each and every kind of chance of exercising “power” and “influence” over other people.
• Present in every genuine relationship of rule is a specific minimum of willingness to obey, hence an (outward or inner) interest in obedience.
• the concept of a relationship between ruler and ruled should not, of course, preclude its foundation in a formally free contract
• in these cases precise concepts are all the more important.

Context

Opening of §1 in 'The Validity of Legitimacy', where Weber restates and sharpens his basic definition of rulership in contrast to generic power or influence.