Key Arguments

• Weber reintroduces his fourfold typology: 'As with any form of action, social action can be determined either (1) by purposive rationality ...; or by (2) value rationality ...; or by (3) affect, especially emotion ...; or by (4) tradition: through ingrained habituation.'
• He defines purposive rationality as orientation 'through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives.'
• He defines value rationality as acting from 'conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however construed—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome.'
• Affectual action is 'through actual emotions and feelings', and traditional action is 'through ingrained habituation.'
• He explicitly calls these 'conceptually pure types created for sociological ends' and stresses that 'Action, especially social action, is very rarely oriented solely to the one or the other type.'
• He notes that these four 'are in no way exhaustive with respect to types of action', but serve as heuristic constructs: 'to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it is more often combined in reality. Only their outcome can determine their utility for us.'

Source Quotes

For this reason, sociology is not only concerned with “social action,” for the sociology pursued here is simply its central referent, what could be said to be constitutive for it as a science. But this is to say nothing about the importance of this referent as compared with that of others. §2. As with any form of action, social action can be determined either (1) by purposive rationality: through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives; or by (2) value rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however construed—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome; or by (3) affect, especially emotion: through actual emotions and feelings; or by (4) tradition: through ingrained habituation. 1.

5. Action, especially social action, is very rarely oriented solely to the one or the other type. Similarly, these types of orientation are in no way exhaustive with respect to types of action, but are instead conceptually pure types created for sociological ends, to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it is more often combined in reality.

Action, especially social action, is very rarely oriented solely to the one or the other type. Similarly, these types of orientation are in no way exhaustive with respect to types of action, but are instead conceptually pure types created for sociological ends, to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it is more often combined in reality. Only their outcome can determine their utility for us. §3.

Similarly, these types of orientation are in no way exhaustive with respect to types of action, but are instead conceptually pure types created for sociological ends, to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it is more often combined in reality. Only their outcome can determine their utility for us. §3. Social “relationship” shall refer to the meaningful content of the mutual disposition of several persons, and comportment arising from such an orientation.

Key Concepts

• §2. As with any form of action, social action can be determined either (1) by purposive rationality: through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives; or by (2) value rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however construed—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome; or by (3) affect, especially emotion: through actual emotions and feelings; or by (4) tradition: through ingrained habituation.
• Action, especially social action, is very rarely oriented solely to the one or the other type.
• these types of orientation are in no way exhaustive with respect to types of action, but are instead conceptually pure types created for sociological ends, to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it is more often combined in reality.
• Only their outcome can determine their utility for us.

Context

Beginning and conclusion of §2, where Weber sets out and characterizes his well‑known four types of orientation of action as ideal types.