Key Arguments

• Weber defines: 'We will call the substantive meaning of a social relation a) an “order” only when action is (on average and approximately) oriented to definable “principles.”'
• He adds: 'We shall b) only speak of this order being “validated” if this actual orientation to those principles is also in practice followed because these principles are in some way or another recognised as binding or exemplary for the action.' Thus, validation requires a normative recognition, not just de facto regularity.
• He notes that while action can be oriented to an order 'for a wide variety of motives', the fact that 'for at least a proportion of actors the order seems exemplary, or obligatory, and hence is something that should have validity, naturally increases the Chance that action will be oriented to this order, often to a very significant extent.'
• He contrasts motivational bases: 'An order that is internalised only for purely purposively rational motives is generally a great deal more volatile than an orientation based solely on custom, from the sheer familiarity of a mode of behaviour; this is the most frequently encountered internalised attitude. But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.”'
• He remarks that 'The transition from merely traditional or merely purposively rational motivated orientation to an orientation based on a belief in its legitimacy is, of course, in reality an extremely fluid one.', underlining the continuity between different motivational regimes.

Source Quotes

This happens as a rule generally because of the imperative “validity” of an order (an office rule), infringement of which would not only bring disadvantage but which would normally be abhorrent to his “sense of duty,” a sentiment linked to value rationality but which can manifest itself in numerous ways. 2. We will call the substantive meaning of a social relation a) an “order” only when action is (on average and approximately) oriented to definable “principles.” We shall b) only speak of this order being “validated” if this actual orientation to those principles is also in practice followed because these principles are in some way or another recognised as binding or exemplary for the action.

We will call the substantive meaning of a social relation a) an “order” only when action is (on average and approximately) oriented to definable “principles.” We shall b) only speak of this order being “validated” if this actual orientation to those principles is also in practice followed because these principles are in some way or another recognised as binding or exemplary for the action. In fact, the orientation of action to an order occurs for a wide variety of motives.

But besides other motives, the circumstances that for at least a proportion of actors the order seems exemplary, or obligatory, and hence is something that should have validity, naturally increases the Chance that action will be oriented to this order, often to a very significant extent. An order that is internalised only for purely purposively rational motives is generally a great deal more volatile than an orientation based solely on custom, from the sheer familiarity of a mode of behaviour; this is the most frequently encountered internalised attitude. But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.”

An order that is internalised only for purely purposively rational motives is generally a great deal more volatile than an orientation based solely on custom, from the sheer familiarity of a mode of behaviour; this is the most frequently encountered internalised attitude. But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.” The transition from merely traditional or merely purposively rational motivated orientation to an orientation based on a belief in its legitimacy is, of course, in reality an extremely fluid one.

But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.” The transition from merely traditional or merely purposively rational motivated orientation to an orientation based on a belief in its legitimacy is, of course, in reality an extremely fluid one. 3.

Key Concepts

• 2. We will call the substantive meaning of a social relation a) an “order” only when action is (on average and approximately) oriented to definable “principles.”
• We shall b) only speak of this order being “validated” if this actual orientation to those principles is also in practice followed because these principles are in some way or another recognised as binding or exemplary for the action.
• An order that is internalised only for purely purposively rational motives is generally a great deal more volatile than an orientation based solely on custom, from the sheer familiarity of a mode of behaviour; this is the most frequently encountered internalised attitude.
• But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.”
• The transition from merely traditional or merely purposively rational motivated orientation to an orientation based on a belief in its legitimacy is, of course, in reality an extremely fluid one.

Context

§5, point 2, where Weber formally defines 'order' and 'validated order' and compares different motivational bases for orienting to an order.