Key Arguments

• Weber states that 'The statutory orders of a sociation may originate a) by voluntary agreement; or b) through imposition and compliance.', distinguishing consensual from imposed rule-formation.
• He then defines the 'constitution of an organisation' as 'the actual Chance—varying in degree, form, and preconditions—of compliance with the power of imposition enjoyed by the existing governing bodies.', centering it on effective obedience rather than formal documents.
• He notes that 'Prevailing rules might specify that among these preconditions particular groups or sections of the corporate membership be heard, or be called upon to express their agreement, in addition to which there are the most varied other possible preconditions.', indicating that constitutions embed procedural constraints and participation requirements.
• He clarifies that his use of 'constitution' matches Lassalle’s sociological sense and is 'not the same as a “written” constitution and is certainly quite distinct from the legal sense.', underscoring the empirical, power-relational character of the concept.
• He formulates the key sociological question as: 'when, involving which objects, within which boundaries, and (probably) under which special conditions (e.g., approval on the part of gods or priests, or the assent of elected bodies) do the members of a corporate body accept the leadership of the executive, and under what conditions is the administrative staff and corporate conduct at its disposal when the executive “makes decisions,” or in particular, when the executive imposes orders.'

Source Quotes

An organisation that is entirely heteronymous as well as heterocephalous (such as a “regiment” within an army) can usually be said to be a “part” of a larger whole. Whether this is in fact the case or not depends on the actual extent of independence in the orientation of action in each individual case and is terminologically a pure matter of convenience. §13. The statutory orders of a sociation may originate a) by voluntary agreement; or b) through imposition and compliance. The governing power of an organisation may claim a legitimate power to impose new orders.

The governing power of an organisation may claim a legitimate power to impose new orders. The constitution of an organisation denotes the actual Chance—varying in degree, form, and preconditions—of compliance with the power of imposition enjoyed by the existing governing bodies. Prevailing rules might specify that among these preconditions particular groups or sections of the corporate membership be heard, or be called upon to express their agreement, in addition to which there are the most varied other possible preconditions.

The constitution of an organisation denotes the actual Chance—varying in degree, form, and preconditions—of compliance with the power of imposition enjoyed by the existing governing bodies. Prevailing rules might specify that among these preconditions particular groups or sections of the corporate membership be heard, or be called upon to express their agreement, in addition to which there are the most varied other possible preconditions. An organisation’s orders can be imposed on members and also, in particular circumstances, on nonmembers.

As far as sociology is concerned, it is the actual nature of the relationship that is important. 3. The concept of “constitution” used here is the same as that used by Lassalle. It is not the same as a “written” constitution and is certainly quite distinct from the legal sense. The sociological question is simply: when, involving which objects, within which boundaries, and (probably) under which special conditions (e.g., approval on the part of gods or priests, or the assent of elected bodies) do the members of a corporate body accept the leadership of the executive, and under what conditions is the administrative staff and corporate conduct at its disposal when the executive “makes decisions,” or in particular, when the executive imposes orders.

It is not the same as a “written” constitution and is certainly quite distinct from the legal sense. The sociological question is simply: when, involving which objects, within which boundaries, and (probably) under which special conditions (e.g., approval on the part of gods or priests, or the assent of elected bodies) do the members of a corporate body accept the leadership of the executive, and under what conditions is the administrative staff and corporate conduct at its disposal when the executive “makes decisions,” or in particular, when the executive imposes orders. 4.

Key Concepts

• §13. The statutory orders of a sociation may originate a) by voluntary agreement; or b) through imposition and compliance.
• The constitution of an organisation denotes the actual Chance—varying in degree, form, and preconditions—of compliance with the power of imposition enjoyed by the existing governing bodies.
• Prevailing rules might specify that among these preconditions particular groups or sections of the corporate membership be heard, or be called upon to express their agreement, in addition to which there are the most varied other possible preconditions.
• 3. The concept of “constitution” used here is the same as that used by Lassalle. It is not the same as a “written” constitution and is certainly quite distinct from the legal sense.
• The sociological question is simply: when, involving which objects, within which boundaries, and (probably) under which special conditions (e.g., approval on the part of gods or priests, or the assent of elected bodies) do the members of a corporate body accept the leadership of the executive

Context

Opening and middle of §13, where Weber turns from the structure of organisations to the genesis and effective force of their statutory orders and articulates his sociological notion of 'constitution'.