Key Arguments

• Weber defines traditional rule as based on belief in the sacredness of long‑standing arrangements: rule 'will be called traditional if its legitimacy is based on, and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of long-established orders and ruling powers that have existed “time out of mind.”'
• The ruler is determined by tradition and is obeyed because tradition confers dignity on him: 'The ruler (or rulers) are determined by traditionally established regulation. They are obeyed by virtue of the dignity attributed to them by tradition.'
• The organisational structure is personal rather than impersonal: 'The ruler is not a “superior,” but a personal ruler; his administrative staff is not primarily formed of “officials,” but of personal “retainers”; the ruled are not “members” of the organisation, but either (1) “traditional associates” (Genossen) (§7), or (2) “subjects.”'
• Obedience is oriented to a person appointed by tradition, not to abstract statutes: 'The administrative staff’s relationship to the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity. Obedience is not to statutes, but to the person appointed by tradition or by a traditionally determined ruler.'
• Weber specifies two legitimacy bases for the ruler’s commands: they are legitimate partly 'by virtue of the traditional content of dispositions made and the meaning and extent attributed to them' and partly 'by virtue of the ruler’s freedom of decision conferred on him by tradition.'
• He emphasises that this traditional discretion is structurally very wide: 'This traditional freedom of decision mainly derives from the reverential basis of obedience, and is in principle unlimited.'

Source Quotes

Traditional Rule §6. Rule will be called traditional if its legitimacy is based on, and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of long-established orders and ruling powers that have existed “time out of mind.” The ruler (or rulers) are determined by traditionally established regulation.

The ruler (or rulers) are determined by traditionally established regulation. They are obeyed by virtue of the dignity attributed to them by tradition. The ruling organisation is in the simplest case an organisation based on a reverence cultivated through a life lived in common.

The ruling organisation is in the simplest case an organisation based on a reverence cultivated through a life lived in common. The ruler is not a “superior,” but a personal ruler; his administrative staff is not primarily formed of “officials,” but of personal “retainers”; the ruled are not “members” of the organisation, but either (1) “traditional associates” (Genossen) (§7), or (2) “subjects.” The administrative staff’s relationship to the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity.

The ruler is not a “superior,” but a personal ruler; his administrative staff is not primarily formed of “officials,” but of personal “retainers”; the ruled are not “members” of the organisation, but either (1) “traditional associates” (Genossen) (§7), or (2) “subjects.” The administrative staff’s relationship to the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity. Obedience is not to statutes, but to the person appointed by tradition or by a traditionally determined ruler, and this person’s commands are legitimate in two respects: a) in part, very much by virtue of the traditional content of dispositions made and the meaning and extent attributed to them; any infringement of the traditional limits to the legitimacy thereby created could be very dangerous for the ruler’s own traditional position; b) in part by virtue of the ruler’s freedom of decision conferred on him by tradition.

The administrative staff’s relationship to the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity. Obedience is not to statutes, but to the person appointed by tradition or by a traditionally determined ruler, and this person’s commands are legitimate in two respects: a) in part, very much by virtue of the traditional content of dispositions made and the meaning and extent attributed to them; any infringement of the traditional limits to the legitimacy thereby created could be very dangerous for the ruler’s own traditional position; b) in part by virtue of the ruler’s freedom of decision conferred on him by tradition. This traditional freedom of decision mainly derives from the reverential basis of obedience, and is in principle unlimited.

Obedience is not to statutes, but to the person appointed by tradition or by a traditionally determined ruler, and this person’s commands are legitimate in two respects: a) in part, very much by virtue of the traditional content of dispositions made and the meaning and extent attributed to them; any infringement of the traditional limits to the legitimacy thereby created could be very dangerous for the ruler’s own traditional position; b) in part by virtue of the ruler’s freedom of decision conferred on him by tradition. This traditional freedom of decision mainly derives from the reverential basis of obedience, and is in principle unlimited. There is therefore a duality governing the ruler’s action: a) on the one hand, bound substantively to tradition; b) on the other, substantively free of tradition.

Key Concepts

• Rule will be called traditional if its legitimacy is based on, and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of long-established orders and ruling powers that have existed “time out of mind.”
• They are obeyed by virtue of the dignity attributed to them by tradition.
• The ruler is not a “superior,” but a personal ruler; his administrative staff is not primarily formed of “officials,” but of personal “retainers”; the ruled are not “members” of the organisation, but either (1) “traditional associates” (Genossen) (§7), or (2) “subjects.”
• The administrative staff’s relationship to the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity.
• Obedience is not to statutes, but to the person appointed by tradition or by a traditionally determined ruler
• in part, very much by virtue of the traditional content of dispositions made and the meaning and extent attributed to them; any infringement of the traditional limits to the legitimacy thereby created could be very dangerous for the ruler’s own traditional position; b) in part by virtue of the ruler’s freedom of decision conferred on him by tradition.
• This traditional freedom of decision mainly derives from the reverential basis of obedience, and is in principle unlimited.

Context

Opening of §6 in 'Traditional Rule', where Weber introduces the ideal type of traditional domination and contrasts its personal, tradition‑based structure with impersonal legal rule.