Key Arguments

• Weber summarizes that in all cases '“understanding” means the construal of a) what in an individual instance was really intended (viewed historically), or b) what was really intended as an approximation or average (as a massed sociological appraisal), or c) what is for the pure type (ideal type) of a frequently recurring phenomenon the sense or context that must be scientifically (“ideal typically”) constructed.'
• He identifies 'Ideal typical constructions of this kind' with 'concepts and “laws” developed in pure economic theory,' which 'represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective.16'
• He notes that 'Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type.17', making clear these are analytical fictions.
• He insists that 'Of course, any construction (Deutung) aspires to self-evidence. But even an obvious construction whose meaning is quite evident cannot, simply by virtue of this self-evidence, immediately claim to be the causally valid construction. It is always, intrinsically, an especially self-evident causal hypothesis.'
• He warns that 'supposed “motives” and “repressed factors” (primarily unacknowledged motives) conceal from the actor himself the real context forming his action, to such a degree that only limited value can be attached to sincere personal expression of an actor’s motivation. In this case, sociology18 has the task of investigating this context and construing it, although this context has not been, or has not usually been, completely fixed in consciousness as something that was definitely “intended.” This is a limiting case in the construction of meaning.'
• He further notes that 'External properties of action that appear to us as “the same” or “similar” can be founded on very different contextual meanings for an actor or actors, and we also “understand” action that is quite deviant, and sometimes quite contradictory, with respect to situations that we treat as intrinsically quite “similar.”19', hence form cannot be equated with meaning.
• He observes that 'Acting human beings very often find themselves, in given situations, driven by contradictory imperatives that we on the whole “understand.” All experience tells us that very often we cannot be certain—in many cases, we cannot even begin to form a judgement—of the relative strength with which meanings underlying this motivational conflict are expressed in action, meanings that are nevertheless to us equally intelligible. Only the actual outcome of this motivational struggle clarifies this.'
• Accordingly, 'As with every hypothesis, it is vital that the evaluation and reappraisal of our understanding of a construed meaning is made on the basis of the eventual real outcome.'
• He concedes that such evaluation 'can be done more or less precisely only in those (unfortunately very few) special cases suited to psychological experiments' and, to a lesser extent, in 'cases of mass phenomena susceptible to numerical representation and exact statistical calculation.'
• For 'the remainder,' i.e., most sociological cases, he indicates that 'the only prospect is a comparison of as many' instances as possible (the sentence continues beyond the supplied excerpt), implying a comparative-historical method.

Source Quotes

This goes beyond common usage, where “intention” generally refers only to rational and purposively intentional action. 6. In all of these cases, “understanding” means the construal of a) what in an individual instance was really intended (viewed historically), or b) what was really intended as an approximation or average (as a massed sociological appraisal), or c) what is for the pure type (ideal type) of a frequently recurring phenomenon the sense or context that must be scientifically (“ideal typically”) constructed. Ideal typical constructions of this kind are, for instance, those concepts and “laws” developed in pure economic theory.

In all of these cases, “understanding” means the construal of a) what in an individual instance was really intended (viewed historically), or b) what was really intended as an approximation or average (as a massed sociological appraisal), or c) what is for the pure type (ideal type) of a frequently recurring phenomenon the sense or context that must be scientifically (“ideal typically”) constructed. Ideal typical constructions of this kind are, for instance, those concepts and “laws” developed in pure economic theory. They represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective.16 Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type.17 Of course, any construction (Deutung) aspires to self-evidence.

Ideal typical constructions of this kind are, for instance, those concepts and “laws” developed in pure economic theory. They represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective.16 Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type.17 Of course, any construction (Deutung) aspires to self-evidence. But even an obvious construction whose meaning is quite evident cannot, simply by virtue of this self-evidence, immediately claim to be the causally valid construction.

They represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective.16 Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type.17 Of course, any construction (Deutung) aspires to self-evidence. But even an obvious construction whose meaning is quite evident cannot, simply by virtue of this self-evidence, immediately claim to be the causally valid construction. It is always, intrinsically, an especially self-evident causal hypothesis. a) Often enough, supposed “motives” and “repressed factors” (primarily unacknowledged motives) conceal from the actor himself the real context forming his action, to such a degree that only limited value can be attached to sincere personal expression of an actor’s motivation. In this case, sociology18 has the task of investigating this context and construing it, although this context has not been, or has not usually been, completely fixed in consciousness as something that was definitely “intended.”

But even an obvious construction whose meaning is quite evident cannot, simply by virtue of this self-evidence, immediately claim to be the causally valid construction. It is always, intrinsically, an especially self-evident causal hypothesis. a) Often enough, supposed “motives” and “repressed factors” (primarily unacknowledged motives) conceal from the actor himself the real context forming his action, to such a degree that only limited value can be attached to sincere personal expression of an actor’s motivation. In this case, sociology18 has the task of investigating this context and construing it, although this context has not been, or has not usually been, completely fixed in consciousness as something that was definitely “intended.”

In this case, sociology18 has the task of investigating this context and construing it, although this context has not been, or has not usually been, completely fixed in consciousness as something that was definitely “intended.” This is a limiting case in the construction of meaning. b) External properties of action that appear to us as “the same” or “similar” can be founded on very different contextual meanings for an actor or actors, and we also “understand” action that is quite deviant, and sometimes quite contradictory, with respect to situations that we treat as intrinsically quite “similar.”19 c) Acting human beings very often find themselves, in given situations, driven by contradictory imperatives that we on the whole “understand.” All experience tells us that very often we cannot be certain—in many cases, we cannot even begin to form a judgement—of the relative strength with which meanings underlying this motivational conflict are expressed in action, meanings that are nevertheless to us equally intelligible.

All experience tells us that very often we cannot be certain—in many cases, we cannot even begin to form a judgement—of the relative strength with which meanings underlying this motivational conflict are expressed in action, meanings that are nevertheless to us equally intelligible. Only the actual outcome of this motivational struggle clarifies this. As with every hypothesis, it is vital that the evaluation and reappraisal of our understanding of a construed meaning is made on the basis of the eventual real outcome.

Only the actual outcome of this motivational struggle clarifies this. As with every hypothesis, it is vital that the evaluation and reappraisal of our understanding of a construed meaning is made on the basis of the eventual real outcome. This can be done more or less precisely only in those (unfortunately very few) special cases suited to psychological experiments.

Variable degrees of approximation can be achieved in a similarly limited number of cases of mass phenomena susceptible to numerical representation and exact statistical calculation. For the remainder, the only prospect is a comparison of as many

Key Concepts

• 6. In all of these cases, “understanding” means the construal of a) what in an individual instance was really intended (viewed historically), or b) what was really intended as an approximation or average (as a massed sociological appraisal), or c) what is for the pure type (ideal type) of a frequently recurring phenomenon the sense or context that must be scientifically (“ideal typically”) constructed.
• Ideal typical constructions of this kind are, for instance, those concepts and “laws” developed in pure economic theory.
• They represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective.16
• Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type.17
• But even an obvious construction whose meaning is quite evident cannot, simply by virtue of this self-evidence, immediately claim to be the causally valid construction. It is always, intrinsically, an especially self-evident causal hypothesis.
• supposed “motives” and “repressed factors” (primarily unacknowledged motives) conceal from the actor himself the real context forming his action, to such a degree that only limited value can be attached to sincere personal expression of an actor’s motivation.
• External properties of action that appear to us as “the same” or “similar” can be founded on very different contextual meanings for an actor or actors, and we also “understand” action that is quite deviant, and sometimes quite contradictory, with respect to situations that we treat as intrinsically quite “similar.”19
• Acting human beings very often find themselves, in given situations, driven by contradictory imperatives that we on the whole “understand.”
• Only the actual outcome of this motivational struggle clarifies this.
• As with every hypothesis, it is vital that the evaluation and reappraisal of our understanding of a construed meaning is made on the basis of the eventual real outcome.
• For the remainder, the only prospect is a comparison of as many

Context

Sixth numbered point of 'I. Methodic Foundations', where Weber links individual, average, and ideal-typical meaning-construal to the status of ideal types as causal hypotheses, and discusses methodological difficulties in inferring motives and testing interpretive constructions.