Key Arguments

• He defines motive: 'A “motive” is the meaningful context that appears, to the actor himself or to an observer, to be the relevant and appropriate “basis” for a form of behaviour.'
• Behaviour is 'meaningfully adequate' when, relative to our ordinary cognitive and evaluative standards, 'we consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context.'
• By contrast, '“Causal adequacy,” by contrast, refers to a sequence of events where it is known from experience that there is the chance that the sequence will always recur in exactly the same manner,' i.e., a probabilistically established regularity.
• He uses an arithmetic analogy: '“meaningfully adequate” here our usual norms for calculating or conceiving correct solutions to an arithmetical problem. Statistically speaking, “causal adequacy” is the probability, according to proven empirical rules, that a “correct” or a “false” solution exists in terms of norms that are current today—the latter being a typical “calculation mistake” or a typical “entanglement of problems.”'
• Thus, '“Causal explanation” therefore involves the idea that there is some kind of calculable rule governing the way that one particular observed (inward or manifest) event is succeeded by another particular event (or occurs at the same time). In the ideal case, this rule can be expressed as a numerical probability, but such instances are rare.'
• A 'true causal construal of a given action means that its external execution and its motive are properly recognised, and at the same time are rendered meaningfully understandable in its context,' so causal explanation of individual action necessarily includes interpretive understanding of its motive.
• For typical, recurrent action, 'A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate.'
• Without meaningful adequacy, 'even where there is the greatest, precisely quantifiable probabilistic regularity in its occurrence (both external and psychic), we are left only with an unintelligible (or only partially intelligible) statistical probability,' which does not count as sociological understanding.
• Conversely, 'even the most evident meaningful adequacy has significance for sociological knowledge only to the extent that a correct causal statement can be given—as proof of the existence of a (specifiable) Chance that action does tend to follow an apparently meaningful course with specifiable frequency, or something close to it.'
• He concludes that 'Only those statistical regularities that correspond to the understandable intended meaning of social action are in the sense used here understandable types of action, that is, “sociological rules.” Only such rational constructions of meaningfully intelligible action are sociological types of real events that are observable in reality to some degree.'
• He explicitly denies any simple correlation between meaningful adequacy and empirical frequency: 'It is certainly not the case that in parallel with the degree of inferred meaningful adequacy, the actual Chance of frequency of the corresponding events always increases. Whether or not this occurs must be demonstrated for each instance through external experience.'

Source Quotes

Consequently, imputation necessarily remains ultimately a matter of “hypothesis.” 7. A “motive” is the meaningful context that appears, to the actor himself or to an observer, to be the relevant and appropriate “basis” for a form of behaviour. We consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context.

A “motive” is the meaningful context that appears, to the actor himself or to an observer, to be the relevant and appropriate “basis” for a form of behaviour. We consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context. “Causal adequacy,” by contrast, refers to a sequence of events where it is known from experience that there is the chance that the sequence will always recur in exactly the same manner.

We consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context. “Causal adequacy,” by contrast, refers to a sequence of events where it is known from experience that there is the chance that the sequence will always recur in exactly the same manner. (We understand by “meaningfully adequate” here our usual norms for calculating or conceiving correct solutions to an arithmetical problem.

Statistically speaking, “causal adequacy” is the probability, according to proven empirical rules, that a “correct” or a “false” solution exists in terms of norms that are current today—the latter being a typical “calculation mistake” or a typical “entanglement of problems.” “Causal explanation” therefore involves the idea that there is some kind of calculable rule governing the way that one particular observed (inward or manifest) event is succeeded by another particular event (or occurs at the same time). In the ideal case, this rule can be expressed as a numerical probability, but such instances are rare.

In the ideal case, this rule can be expressed as a numerical probability, but such instances are rare. A true causal construal of a given action means that its external execution and its motive are properly recognised, and at the same time are rendered meaningfully understandable in its context. A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate.

A true causal construal of a given action means that its external execution and its motive are properly recognised, and at the same time are rendered meaningfully understandable in its context. A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate. Without such meaningful adequacy (Sinnadäquanz), then even where there is the greatest, precisely quantifiable probabilistic regularity in its occurrence (both external and psychic), we are left only with an unintelligible (or only partially intelligible) statistical probability.

A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate. Without such meaningful adequacy (Sinnadäquanz), then even where there is the greatest, precisely quantifiable probabilistic regularity in its occurrence (both external and psychic), we are left only with an unintelligible (or only partially intelligible) statistical probability. On the other hand, even the most evident meaningful adequacy has significance for sociological knowledge only to the extent that a correct causal statement can be given—as proof of the existence of a (specifiable) Chance that action does tend to follow an apparently meaningful course with specifiable frequency, or something close to it (either on average, or in a “pure” case).

On the other hand, even the most evident meaningful adequacy has significance for sociological knowledge only to the extent that a correct causal statement can be given—as proof of the existence of a (specifiable) Chance that action does tend to follow an apparently meaningful course with specifiable frequency, or something close to it (either on average, or in a “pure” case). Only those statistical regularities that correspond to the understandable intended meaning of social action are in the sense used here understandable types of action, that is, “sociological rules.” Only such rational constructions of meaningfully intelligible action are sociological types of real events that are observable in reality to some degree.21 It is certainly not the case that in parallel with the degree of inferred meaningful adequacy, the actual Chance of frequency of the corresponding events always increases.

Only those statistical regularities that correspond to the understandable intended meaning of social action are in the sense used here understandable types of action, that is, “sociological rules.” Only such rational constructions of meaningfully intelligible action are sociological types of real events that are observable in reality to some degree.21 It is certainly not the case that in parallel with the degree of inferred meaningful adequacy, the actual Chance of frequency of the corresponding events always increases. Whether or not this occurs must be demonstrated for each instance through external experience.

Key Concepts

• 7. A “motive” is the meaningful context that appears, to the actor himself or to an observer, to be the relevant and appropriate “basis” for a form of behaviour.
• We consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context.
• “Causal adequacy,” by contrast, refers to a sequence of events where it is known from experience that there is the chance that the sequence will always recur in exactly the same manner.
• “Causal explanation” therefore involves the idea that there is some kind of calculable rule governing the way that one particular observed (inward or manifest) event is succeeded by another particular event (or occurs at the same time).
• A true causal construal of a given action means that its external execution and its motive are properly recognised, and at the same time are rendered meaningfully understandable in its context.
• A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate.
• Without such meaningful adequacy (Sinnadäquanz), then even where there is the greatest, precisely quantifiable probabilistic regularity in its occurrence (both external and psychic), we are left only with an unintelligible (or only partially intelligible) statistical probability.
• Only those statistical regularities that correspond to the understandable intended meaning of social action are in the sense used here understandable types of action, that is, “sociological rules.”
• Only such rational constructions of meaningfully intelligible action are sociological types of real events that are observable in reality to some degree.
• It is certainly not the case that in parallel with the degree of inferred meaningful adequacy, the actual Chance of frequency of the corresponding events always increases.

Context

Numbered point 7 in 'I. Methodic Foundations', where Weber sharpens his methodological concepts of 'motive', meaningful adequacy, and causal adequacy, and specifies what qualifies as a sociological rule.