Key Arguments

• Weber notes that 'It is usual to call some principles of the sociology of Verstehen “laws”—Gresham’s “Law,” for example. Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor.'
• He argues that 'These motives and intentions are most likely to be understandable and unambiguous where the typical pattern of action observed is founded on purely purposively rational motives—or where such action can for reasons of expediency be attributed to a methodically constructed type—such that the relation between means and ends is clearly unambiguous according to empirical principles; where, for example, the means selected were “unavoidable.”'
• He illustrates the rational-law assumption with: 'we might say: if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other (for the participants, in pursuing their explicit and specifiable ends, can, for “technical” reasons, avail themselves of these and no other means).'
• He then criticizes the view that psychology underpins sociology: 'This also goes to show how wrong it is to regard some form of “psychology” as the ultimate foundation of a sociology of understanding.'
• He points out that natural-scientific psychology separates 'the “physical” from the “psychic,” a separation that is in this sense quite alien to the disciplines of action,' and that the '“findings” of a “psychic” science really working solely in terms of natural scientific method' are methodologically different from a psychology of human action and intended meaning.
• Weber states that 'The mistake lies in the concept of the “psychic”: what is not “physical” is supposed to be “psychic.” But the meaning of an arithmetical calculation that someone makes is of course not “psychic.”'
• He adds: 'When a person makes a rational assessment of whether the anticipated outcomes of a particular course of action advance or injure specific given interests, and according to the result of this assessment makes a particular decision, no “psychological” considerations will make this process a jot more intelligible. Sociology, including economics, constructs most of its “laws” on just such rational assumptions.'
• Finally, he grants that 'there is no doubt at all that an interpretive psychology can contribute a great deal to the sociological explanation of the irrationalities of action,' but insists that 'that does not alter the fundamental methodological position in any respect,' preserving sociology’s independence from psychology at the level of method.

Source Quotes

All functional concept formation that starts at the level of the “whole” is only a preliminary for such an investigation, a preparation whose utility and indispensability—if done properly—no one can dispute. 10. It is usual to call some principles of the sociology of Verstehen “laws”—Gresham’s “Law,” for example. Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor.

It is usual to call some principles of the sociology of Verstehen “laws”—Gresham’s “Law,” for example. Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor. These motives and intentions are most likely to be understandable and unambiguous where the typical pattern of action observed is founded on purely purposively rational motives—or where such action can for reasons of expediency be attributed to a methodically constructed type—such that the relation between means and ends is clearly unambiguous according to empirical principles; where, for example, the means selected were “unavoidable.”

Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor. These motives and intentions are most likely to be understandable and unambiguous where the typical pattern of action observed is founded on purely purposively rational motives—or where such action can for reasons of expediency be attributed to a methodically constructed type—such that the relation between means and ends is clearly unambiguous according to empirical principles; where, for example, the means selected were “unavoidable.” In this case, we might say: if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other (for the participants, in pursuing their explicit and specifiable ends, can, for “technical” reasons, avail themselves of these and no other means).

These motives and intentions are most likely to be understandable and unambiguous where the typical pattern of action observed is founded on purely purposively rational motives—or where such action can for reasons of expediency be attributed to a methodically constructed type—such that the relation between means and ends is clearly unambiguous according to empirical principles; where, for example, the means selected were “unavoidable.” In this case, we might say: if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other (for the participants, in pursuing their explicit and specifiable ends, can, for “technical” reasons, avail themselves of these and no other means). This also goes to show how wrong it is to regard some form of “psychology” as the ultimate foundation of a sociology of understanding.

In this case, we might say: if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other (for the participants, in pursuing their explicit and specifiable ends, can, for “technical” reasons, avail themselves of these and no other means). This also goes to show how wrong it is to regard some form of “psychology” as the ultimate foundation of a sociology of understanding. Today, everyone has their own and slightly different understanding of “psychology.”

But sociology’s relation to psychology is not generally any closer than it is to any other discipline. The mistake lies in the concept of the “psychic”: what is not “physical” is supposed to be “psychic.” But the meaning of an arithmetical calculation that someone makes is of course not “psychic.” When a person makes a rational assessment of whether the anticipated outcomes of a particular course of action advance or injure specific given interests, and according to the result of this assessment makes a particular decision, no “psychological” considerations will make this process a jot more intelligible.

But the meaning of an arithmetical calculation that someone makes is of course not “psychic.” When a person makes a rational assessment of whether the anticipated outcomes of a particular course of action advance or injure specific given interests, and according to the result of this assessment makes a particular decision, no “psychological” considerations will make this process a jot more intelligible. Sociology, including economics, constructs most of its “laws” on just such rational assumptions.

Sociology, including economics, constructs most of its “laws” on just such rational assumptions. By contrast, there is no doubt at all that an interpretive psychology can contribute a great deal to the sociological explanation of the irrationalities of action. But that does not alter the fundamental methodological29 position in any respect. 11.

Key Concepts

• 10. It is usual to call some principles of the sociology of Verstehen “laws”—Gresham’s “Law,” for example.
• Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor.
• These motives and intentions are most likely to be understandable and unambiguous where the typical pattern of action observed is founded on purely purposively rational motives
• if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other (for the participants, in pursuing their explicit and specifiable ends, can, for “technical” reasons, avail themselves of these and no other means).
• This also goes to show how wrong it is to regard some form of “psychology” as the ultimate foundation of a sociology of understanding.
• The mistake lies in the concept of the “psychic”: what is not “physical” is supposed to be “psychic.” But the meaning of an arithmetical calculation that someone makes is of course not “psychic.”
• When a person makes a rational assessment of whether the anticipated outcomes of a particular course of action advance or injure specific given interests, and according to the result of this assessment makes a particular decision, no “psychological” considerations will make this process a jot more intelligible.
• By contrast, there is no doubt at all that an interpretive psychology can contribute a great deal to the sociological explanation of the irrationalities of action. But that does not alter the fundamental methodological29 position in any respect.

Context

Point 10 of 'I. Methodic Foundations,' where Weber relates sociological 'laws' (e.g., Gresham’s Law) to purposive rational action and clarifies sociology’s methodological relationship to psychology.