Key Arguments

• Weber generalises that 'Collegiality—apart from the monocratic type of collegiality where there is a mutual veto—almost inevitably inhibits precise, unambiguous, and in particular, rapid decision making (and in its irrational forms, it obstructs technical expertise).', highlighting its technical disadvantages.
• He notes that this slowing effect 'was not especially unwelcome for princes when they first introduced specialised officials.', but 'In time, however, this obstruction has been reduced, as the speed with which decisions had to be made and actions undertaken increased.'
• He observes that 'Where collegial instances had executive authority, the power of leading members was generally consolidated as formal and substantive preeminence (as a bishop, a pope, the prime minister of a cabinet).', showing a tendency back toward monocracy even within collegia.
• He states that 'Any interest in reviving the principle of executive collegiality usually originated in an interest in weakening the ruler’s position.', and that 'Mistrust and resentment of monocratic leadership is less commonly found among the ruled, who for the most part call for a “leader,” than among the administrative staff members. And this is by no means only a matter relating to those lacking in privilege, but is precisely something that originates among privileged strata.'
• He concludes that 'There is nothing at all especially “democratic” about collegiality. Wherever the privileged have sought to secure themselves from the threat of the underprivileged they have always sought to prevent the emergence of a monocratic ruler who could find support among the underprivileged.', and have 'created and maintained collegial bodies with supervisory and exclusive decision-making functions.'
• He insists that 'Collegiality secures a greater degree of “thoroughness” in administrative deliberations. Where thoroughness is preferred, even if at the cost of precision and speed, collegiality still tends to be preferred today, because of this and the other factors mentioned above.', but also that 'it divides responsibility, and in large bodies all personal responsibility vanishes entirely, whereas monocracy establishes responsibility in a clear and indubitable manner.'
• He draws the practical implication that 'Large tasks that require quick and consistent decisions are on the whole—from a technical point of view, quite properly—put in the hands of monocratic “dictators,” who carry sole responsibility for them.', and that 'It is impossible for mass states to conduct powerful, coherent, and effective domestic and foreign policy on a collegial basis.'
• Extending this to revolutionary scenarios, he remarks that 'The “dictatorship of the proletariat” as a means of socialising society does actually need a “dictator” who owes his position', implying that even proletarian rule requires monocratic leadership.

Source Quotes

For this, however, a discussion of parties is necessary. Collegiality—apart from the monocratic type of collegiality where there is a mutual veto—almost inevitably inhibits precise, unambiguous, and in particular, rapid decision making (and in its irrational forms, it obstructs technical expertise). However, this outcome was not especially unwelcome for princes when they first introduced specialised officials.

In time, however, this obstruction has been reduced, as the speed with which decisions had to be made and actions undertaken increased. Where collegial instances had executive authority, the power of leading members was generally consolidated as formal and substantive preeminence (as a bishop, a pope, the prime minister of a cabinet). Any interest in reviving the principle of executive collegiality usually originated in an interest in weakening the ruler’s position.

Where collegial instances had executive authority, the power of leading members was generally consolidated as formal and substantive preeminence (as a bishop, a pope, the prime minister of a cabinet). Any interest in reviving the principle of executive collegiality usually originated in an interest in weakening the ruler’s position. Mistrust and resentment of monocratic leadership is less commonly found among the ruled, who for the most part call for a “leader,” than among the administrative staff members.

And this is by no means only a matter relating to those lacking in privilege, but is precisely something that originates among privileged strata. There is nothing at all especially “democratic” about collegiality. Wherever the privileged have sought to secure themselves from the threat of the underprivileged they have always sought to prevent the emergence of a monocratic ruler who could find support among the underprivileged. While they have therefore sought to enforce strict equality among the privileged strata (this is dealt with separately in the following paragraph),50 they have created and maintained collegial bodies with supervisory and exclusive decision-making functions.

Large tasks that require quick and consistent decisions are on the whole—from a technical point of view, quite properly—put in the hands of monocratic “dictators,” who carry sole responsibility for them. It is impossible for mass states to conduct powerful, coherent, and effective domestic and foreign policy on a collegial basis. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” as a means of socialising society does actually need a “dictator” who owes his position

Key Concepts

• Collegiality—apart from the monocratic type of collegiality where there is a mutual veto—almost inevitably inhibits precise, unambiguous, and in particular, rapid decision making (and in its irrational forms, it obstructs technical expertise).
• Where collegial instances had executive authority, the power of leading members was generally consolidated as formal and substantive preeminence (as a bishop, a pope, the prime minister of a cabinet).
• Any interest in reviving the principle of executive collegiality usually originated in an interest in weakening the ruler’s position.
• There is nothing at all especially “democratic” about collegiality. Wherever the privileged have sought to secure themselves from the threat of the underprivileged they have always sought to prevent the emergence of a monocratic ruler who could find support among the underprivileged.
• It is impossible for mass states to conduct powerful, coherent, and effective domestic and foreign policy on a collegial basis. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” as a means of socialising society does actually need a “dictator” who owes his position

Context

Concluding paragraphs of §15, where Weber evaluates collegiality’s technical and political consequences, its class character, and its implications for modern mass states and revolutionary 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.