Key Arguments

• Focusing on the flesh trait, Ricoeur writes: 'let us ponder the phenomenological trait of the flesh that designates it as a paradigm of otherness. The fact that the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran—these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire.', stressing its peculiar status as closest-yet-not-chosen.
• He crystallizes its otherness in the formula 'I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative. Otherness here signifies primordiality with respect to any design. Starting from this otherness, I can reign over. Primordiality, however, is not a reign.', making the givenness of embodiment prior to any project or mastery.
• Ontologically, he says, 'the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. It can, of course, be characterized by the "I can"; the CT can," however, docs not derive from the "I want" but provides a ground for it.', reversing the usual priority of will over capacity and rooting the will in bodily 'I can'.
• He defines the flesh as 'the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (Leistungen): the flesh is the matter (hule) in resonance with all that can be said to be hull in every object perceived, apprehended. In short, it is the origin of all "alteration of ownness."32', thus grounding both object-constitution and self-alteration in bodily passivity.
• He concludes that 'From the above, it results that selfhood implies its own "proper" otherness, so to speak, for which the flesh is the sup port.33 In this sense, even if the otherness of the stranger can—by some impossibility—be derived from the sphere of ownness, the otherness of the flesh would still precede it.', asserting that the self’s first other is its own flesh, prior even to interpersonal alterity.

Source Quotes

As we know, the method ological decision rests in the reduction to the sphere of ownness from which would be excluded all objective predicates indebted to intcrsubjec- tivity. The flesh would then prove to be the pole of reference of all bodies belonging to this nature (ownness).31 Let us leave aside here the derivation of the alter ego through pairing one flesh with another; let us ponder the phenomenological trait of the flesh that designates it as a paradigm of otherness. The fact that the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran—these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire.

The flesh would then prove to be the pole of reference of all bodies belonging to this nature (ownness).31 Let us leave aside here the derivation of the alter ego through pairing one flesh with another; let us ponder the phenomenological trait of the flesh that designates it as a paradigm of otherness. The fact that the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran—these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire. I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative.

The fact that the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran—these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire. I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative. Otherness here signifies primordiality with respect to any design.

I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative. Otherness here signifies primordiality with respect to any design. Starting from this otherness, I can reign over. Primordiality, however, is not a reign. Onto- logically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary.

Primordiality, however, is not a reign. Onto- logically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. It can, of course, be characterized by the "I can"; the CT can," however, docs not derive from the "I want" but provides a ground for it.

Onto- logically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. It can, of course, be characterized by the "I can"; the CT can," however, docs not derive from the "I want" but provides a ground for it. The flesh is the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (Leistungen): the flesh is the matter (hule) in resonance with all that can be said to be hull in every object perceived, apprehended.

It can, of course, be characterized by the "I can"; the CT can," however, docs not derive from the "I want" but provides a ground for it. The flesh is the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (Leistungen): the flesh is the matter (hule) in resonance with all that can be said to be hull in every object perceived, apprehended. In short, it is the origin of all "alteration of ownness."32 From the above, it results that selfhood implies its own "proper" otherness, so to speak, for which the flesh is the sup port.33 In this sense, even if the otherness of the stranger can—by some impossibility—be derived from the sphere of ownness, the otherness of the flesh would still precede it.

The flesh is the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (Leistungen): the flesh is the matter (hule) in resonance with all that can be said to be hull in every object perceived, apprehended. In short, it is the origin of all "alteration of ownness."32 From the above, it results that selfhood implies its own "proper" otherness, so to speak, for which the flesh is the sup port.33 In this sense, even if the otherness of the stranger can—by some impossibility—be derived from the sphere of ownness, the otherness of the flesh would still precede it. The question then arises whether HusserPs great discovery, supported by the distinction between flesh and body, can be dissociated from what above we termed its strategic role in transcendental phenomenology at the time of the Cartesian Meditations.

Key Concepts

• let us ponder the phenomenological trait of the flesh that designates it as a paradigm of otherness.
• the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran—these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire.
• I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative.
• Otherness here signifies primordiality with respect to any design. Starting from this otherness, I can reign over. Primordiality, however, is not a reign.
• Onto- logically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary.
• It can, of course, be characterized by the "I can"; the CT can," however, docs not derive from the "I want" but provides a ground for it.
• The flesh is the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (Leistungen): the flesh is the matter (hule) in resonance with all that can be said to be hull in every object perceived, apprehended.
• In short, it is the origin of all "alteration of ownness."32
• From the above, it results that selfhood implies its own "proper" otherness, so to speak, for which the flesh is the sup port.33
• the otherness of the flesh would still precede it.

Context

Central analytic moment in Ricoeur’s treatment of Husserl’s concept of flesh, where he generalizes the phenomenological traits of flesh into ontological claims about the structure of selfhood and its intrinsic 'proper otherness'.