Key Arguments

• Ricoeur introduces Austin’s initial distinction as the starting point of speech‑act theory: “The start ing point was, as we know, the distinction established in the first part of How to Do Things with Words between two classes of statements, perfor matives and constatives.”
• He characterizes performatives by the identity of saying and doing: “The former arc remarkable in that the simple fact of uttering them amounts to accomplishing the very thing that is stated.”
• He emphasizes promises as a paradigmatic performative that will later ground his ethics: “The example of promises, which will play a decisive role in the ethical determination of the self, is noteworthy in this regard. To say "I promise" is actually to promise, that is, to pledge to do something and (let us as sume) to do for someone else what I say I shall do.”
• He notes the French translation’s title to underscore the formula ‘when saying is doing’: “(The French translation of Austin's book has the title Quand dire, e'estfaire, "When saying is do ing.")”
• He stresses that ‘doing‑by‑saying’ is structurally tied to the first person singular present: “And notice how the "I" is marked at the start: performatives have the feature of "doing-by-saying" only when expressed by verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative.”
• He explicitly contrasts ‘I promise’ with ‘he promises’ to show the special reflexive force of the first person: “The expression "I promise" (or, more precisely, "I promise you") has the specific sense of promising which the expression "he promises" does not have, for the latter retains the sense of a constative (or, if one prefers, of a description).”

Source Quotes

I shall, therefore, be brief in the sketch that follows of its development from Austin to Searlc. The start ing point was, as we know, the distinction established in the first part of How to Do Things with Words between two classes of statements, perfor matives and constatives.3 The former arc remarkable in that the simple fact of uttering them amounts to accomplishing the very thing that is stated. The example of promises, which will play a decisive role in the ethical determination of the self, is noteworthy in this regard.

The start ing point was, as we know, the distinction established in the first part of How to Do Things with Words between two classes of statements, perfor matives and constatives.3 The former arc remarkable in that the simple fact of uttering them amounts to accomplishing the very thing that is stated. The example of promises, which will play a decisive role in the ethical determination of the self, is noteworthy in this regard. To say "I promise" is actually to promise, that is, to pledge to do something and (let us as sume) to do for someone else what I say I shall do.

The example of promises, which will play a decisive role in the ethical determination of the self, is noteworthy in this regard. To say "I promise" is actually to promise, that is, to pledge to do something and (let us as sume) to do for someone else what I say I shall do. (The French translation of Austin's book has the title Quand dire, e'estfaire, "When saying is do ing.") And notice how the "I" is marked at the start: performatives have the feature of "doing-by-saying" only when expressed by verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative.

To say "I promise" is actually to promise, that is, to pledge to do something and (let us as sume) to do for someone else what I say I shall do. (The French translation of Austin's book has the title Quand dire, e'estfaire, "When saying is do ing.") And notice how the "I" is marked at the start: performatives have the feature of "doing-by-saying" only when expressed by verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative. The expression "I promise" (or, more precisely, "I promise you") has the specific sense of promising which the expression "he promises" does not have, for the latter retains the sense of a constative (or, if one prefers, of a description).

(The French translation of Austin's book has the title Quand dire, e'estfaire, "When saying is do ing.") And notice how the "I" is marked at the start: performatives have the feature of "doing-by-saying" only when expressed by verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative. The expression "I promise" (or, more precisely, "I promise you") has the specific sense of promising which the expression "he promises" does not have, for the latter retains the sense of a constative (or, if one prefers, of a description). The distinction between performative and constative, however, was to be surpassed by Austin himself, opening the path in this way for Searlc's speech-act theory.4 The initial opposition between two classes of state ments is incorporated into a more radical distinction that concerns the hierarchical levels that can be discerned in all statements, whether consta tive or performative.

Key Concepts

• the distinction established in the first part of How to Do Things with Words between two classes of statements, perfor matives and constatives.
• the simple fact of uttering them amounts to accomplishing the very thing that is stated.
• The example of promises, which will play a decisive role in the ethical determination of the self, is noteworthy in this regard.
• To say "I promise" is actually to promise, that is, to pledge to do something and (let us as sume) to do for someone else what I say I shall do.
• performatives have the feature of "doing-by-saying" only when expressed by verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative.
• The expression "I promise" (or, more precisely, "I promise you") has the specific sense of promising which the expression "he promises" does not have

Context

Early in the section on speech acts, where Ricoeur sketches Austin’s performative/constative distinction and highlights promises and the first‑person ‘I’ as central to linking speech‑act theory with his later ethics of the self.