Key Arguments

• Ricoeur, drawing on Martial Gueroult, argues that the certainty of the cogito is “a strictly subjective version of truth; the reign of the evil genius continues, with regard to whether certainty has any objective value,” since the cogito by itself cannot guarantee the truth of what it thinks.
• He quotes Gueroult’s characterization that the truth of the cogito “has certainty only within it, that is, for my self enclosed within itself,” which leaves unresolved the question of objective truth and the possible ‘evil genius’.
• Thus, in Descartes “only the demonstration of God5s exis tence will allow me to resolve the question,” assigning a decisive foundational role to the proof of God.
• Ricoeur explains that the Meditations thereby invert the intended order of discovery (ordo cognoscendi) that should lead from my ‘I’ to God and then to other truths; instead, in the order of “truth of things” (ordo essendi) “God, a mere link in the first order, becomes the first ring.”
• He insists that the cogito “would be genuinely absolute in all respects if it could be shown that there is but one order, that in which it is indeed first,” but “it does seem that the "Third Meditation55 reverses the order by placing the certainty of the cogito in a subordinate position in relation to divine veracity, which is first in accordance with the "truth of the thing.5514”
• On this basis, he concludes that “the cogito slips to the second ontological rank,” since Descartes explicitly writes that “the [notion] of God exists prior to the [notion] of myself,” and that because God is the ratio essendi of the self, he also becomes its ratio cognoscendi.

Source Quotes

But the objec tion formulated by Martial Gueroult in Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted ac cording to the Order of Reasons continues to seem to me to be irrefutable. The certainty of the cogito gives a strictly subjective version of truth; the reign of the evil genius continues, with regard to whether certainty has any objective value. The fact that my soul is pure intelligence is certain, but it is only an internal necessity of science: "Although this science is as certain as the Cogito for my understanding, it has certainty only within it, that is, for my self enclosed within itself.55 The difficulty being as just stated, it seems that in Descartes "only the demonstration of God5s exis tence will allow me to resolve the question.5513 However, this demonstra tion, as it occurs in the "Third Meditation,55 reverses the order of discovery, or ordo cognoscendi, which ought to be the only one, if the cogito were in every respect the first truth, to lead from the "I55 to God, then to mathe matical essences, then to sensible things and to bodies.

The certainty of the cogito gives a strictly subjective version of truth; the reign of the evil genius continues, with regard to whether certainty has any objective value. The fact that my soul is pure intelligence is certain, but it is only an internal necessity of science: "Although this science is as certain as the Cogito for my understanding, it has certainty only within it, that is, for my self enclosed within itself.55 The difficulty being as just stated, it seems that in Descartes "only the demonstration of God5s exis tence will allow me to resolve the question.5513 However, this demonstra tion, as it occurs in the "Third Meditation,55 reverses the order of discovery, or ordo cognoscendi, which ought to be the only one, if the cogito were in every respect the first truth, to lead from the "I55 to God, then to mathe matical essences, then to sensible things and to bodies. The demonstration reverses it to the benefit of another order, that of the "truth of things,55 or ordo essendi: a synthetic order according to which God, a mere link in the first order, becomes the first ring.

The fact that my soul is pure intelligence is certain, but it is only an internal necessity of science: "Although this science is as certain as the Cogito for my understanding, it has certainty only within it, that is, for my self enclosed within itself.55 The difficulty being as just stated, it seems that in Descartes "only the demonstration of God5s exis tence will allow me to resolve the question.5513 However, this demonstra tion, as it occurs in the "Third Meditation,55 reverses the order of discovery, or ordo cognoscendi, which ought to be the only one, if the cogito were in every respect the first truth, to lead from the "I55 to God, then to mathe matical essences, then to sensible things and to bodies. The demonstration reverses it to the benefit of another order, that of the "truth of things,55 or ordo essendi: a synthetic order according to which God, a mere link in the first order, becomes the first ring. The cogito would be genuinely absolute in all respects if it could be shown that there is but one order, that in which it is indeed first, and that the other order, in which it is set back to second place, derives from the first.

The cogito would be genuinely absolute in all respects if it could be shown that there is but one order, that in which it is indeed first, and that the other order, in which it is set back to second place, derives from the first. Now it does seem that the "Third Meditation55 reverses the order by placing the certainty of the cogito in a subordinate position in relation to divine veracity, which is first in accordance with the "truth of the thing.5514 What is the result of this for the cogito itself? By a sort of rebound effect of the new certainty (namely that of the existence of God) on that of the cogito, the idea of myself appears profoundly transformed, due solely to my recognizing this Other, who causes the presence in me of its own representation.

By a sort of rebound effect of the new certainty (namely that of the existence of God) on that of the cogito, the idea of myself appears profoundly transformed, due solely to my recognizing this Other, who causes the presence in me of its own representation. The cogito slips to the second ontological rank. Des cartes does not hesitate to write: "Thus the [notion] of the infinite some how exists in me prior to the [notion] of the finite, that is, the [notion] of God exists prior to the [notion] of myself" (Med.,

The cogito slips to the second ontological rank. Des cartes does not hesitate to write: "Thus the [notion] of the infinite some how exists in me prior to the [notion] of the finite, that is, the [notion] of God exists prior to the [notion] of myself" (Med., "Third Meditation," trans, modified, p.

Key Concepts

• The certainty of the cogito gives a strictly subjective version of truth; the reign of the evil genius continues, with regard to whether certainty has any objective value.
• it seems that in Descartes "only the demonstration of God5s exis tence will allow me to resolve the question.5513
• The demonstration reverses it to the benefit of another order, that of the "truth of things,55 or ordo essendi: a synthetic order according to which God, a mere link in the first order, becomes the first ring.
• it does seem that the "Third Meditation55 reverses the order by placing the certainty of the cogito in a subordinate position in relation to divine veracity, which is first in accordance with the "truth of the thing.5514
• The cogito slips to the second ontological rank.
• "Thus the [notion] of the infinite some how exists in me prior to the [notion] of the finite, that is, the [notion] of God exists prior to the [notion] of myself"

Context

Later in the section, where Ricoeur introduces Gueroult’s critique of Descartes, analyzes the shift from ordo cognoscendi to ordo essendi in the Third Meditation, and shows how this subordinates the cogito to God’s veracity.