Key Arguments

• Ricoeur states that 'Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations' and then systematically distinguishes its components.
• First, 'numerical identity': we say 'they do not form two different things but "one and the same" thing', where identity denotes 'oneness' and its contrary is 'plurality'; this is tied to 'identification... in the sense of the reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, n times.'
• Second, 'qualitative identity, in other words, extreme resemblance', exemplified by 'x and y are wearing the same suit', where interchangeability 'without semantic loss, salva veritate' is the operative test.
• He stresses that these two components are 'irreducible to one another' yet not foreign, because when time affects occurrences, 'the reidentification of the same can provoke hesitation' and 'extreme resemblance' can serve as an 'indirect criterion' to support numerical identity.
• He then introduces a 'third component of the notion of identity, namely the uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the development of what we consider to be the same individual', especially salient when growth and aging undermine resemblance.
• He illustrates uninterrupted continuity with examples of an oak from acorn to grown tree, an animal from birth to death, and 'a man or of a woman — I am not saying of a person — as a simple token of a species.'
• He argues that time is here 'a factor of dissemblance' and that the 'threat' it poses is not dissipated 'unless we can posit, at the base of similitude and of the uninterrupted continuity, a principle of permanence in time.'
• He identifies this principle with 'the invariable structure of a tool' or, more importantly, 'the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual', where 'the idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied.'
• Invoking Kant, he notes that the idea of structure 'confirms the relational character of identity' and recalls that Kant classifies substance among the 'categories of relation' as the condition for conceiving change as affecting 'something which does not change'; thus 'permanence in time thus becomes the transcendental of numerical identity.'
• He concludes that 'The entire problematic of personal identity will revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong signification of permanence in time.'

Source Quotes

It is indeed under this heading alone that the analytic theories that we will examine later approach the question of personal identity and the para doxes related to it. Let us recall rapidly the conceptual articulation of sameness in order to indicate the eminent place that permanence in time holds there. Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations.

Let us recall rapidly the conceptual articulation of sameness in order to indicate the eminent place that permanence in time holds there. Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations. First comes numerical identity: thus, we say of two occurrences of a thing, designated by an invariable noun in ordinary language, that they do not form two different things but "one and the same" thing.

Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations. First comes numerical identity: thus, we say of two occurrences of a thing, designated by an invariable noun in ordinary language, that they do not form two different things but "one and the same" thing. Here, identity denotes one ness: the contrary is plurality (not one but two or several).

To this first component of the notion of identity corresponds the notion of identifica tion, understood in the sense of the reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, n times. In second place we find qualitative identity, in other words, extreme resemblance: we say that x and y are wearing the same suit — that is, clothes that are so similar that they arc interchangeable with no noticeable difference. To this second component corresponds the operation of sub stitution without semantic loss, salva veritate.

The trials of war criminals have occasioned just such confrontations along with, as we know, the ensuing risks and uncertainties. The weakness of this criterion of similitude, in the case of a great dis tance in time, suggests that we appeal to another criterion, one which belongs to the third component of the notion of identity, namely the un interrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the develop ment of what we consider to be the same individual. This criterion is predominant whenever growth or aging operate as factors of dissemblance and, by implication, of numerical diversity.

This criterion is predominant whenever growth or aging operate as factors of dissemblance and, by implication, of numerical diversity. Thus, we say of an oak tree that it is the same from the acorn to the fully developed tree; in the same way, we speak of one animal, from birth to death; so, too, we speak of a man or of a woman — I am not saying of a person — as a simple token of a species. The demonstration of this continuity functions as a supplemen tary or a substitutive criterion to similitude; the demonstration rests upon the ordered series of small changes which, taken one by one, threaten resemblance without destroying it.

This is why the threat it represents for identity is not entirely dissipated unless we can posit, at the base of similitude and of the uninterrupted continuity, a principle of permanence in time. This will be, for example, the invariable structure of a tool, all of whose parts will gradually have been replaced. This is also the case, of supreme interest to us, of the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual; what remains here is the or ganization of a combinatory system. The idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied.

This is also the case, of supreme interest to us, of the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual; what remains here is the or ganization of a combinatory system. The idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied. It confirms the relational character of identity, which does not appear in the ancient formulation of substance but which Kant reesta blishes by classifying substance among the categories of relation, as the condition of the possibility of conceiving of change as happening to some thing which does not change, at least not in the moment of attributing the accident to the substance; permanence in time thus becomes the tran scendental of numerical identity.3 The entire problematic of personal iden tity will revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong signification of permanence in time.

The idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied. It confirms the relational character of identity, which does not appear in the ancient formulation of substance but which Kant reesta blishes by classifying substance among the categories of relation, as the condition of the possibility of conceiving of change as happening to some thing which does not change, at least not in the moment of attributing the accident to the substance; permanence in time thus becomes the tran scendental of numerical identity.3 The entire problematic of personal iden tity will revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong signification of permanence in time. 2.

Key Concepts

• Let us recall rapidly the conceptual articulation of sameness in order to indicate the eminent place that permanence in time holds there.
• Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations.
• First comes numerical identity: thus, we say of two occurrences of a thing, designated by an invariable noun in ordinary language, that they do not form two different things but "one and the same" thing.
• In second place we find qualitative identity, in other words, extreme resemblance: we say that x and y are wearing the same suit — that is, clothes that are so similar that they arc interchangeable with no noticeable difference.
• The weakness of this criterion of similitude, in the case of a great dis tance in time, suggests that we appeal to another criterion, one which belongs to the third component of the notion of identity, namely the un interrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the develop ment of what we consider to be the same individual.
• Thus, we say of an oak tree that it is the same from the acorn to the fully developed tree; in the same way, we speak of one animal, from birth to death; so, too, we speak of a man or of a woman — I am not saying of a person — as a simple token of a species.
• This will be, for example, the invariable structure of a tool, all of whose parts will gradually have been replaced. This is also the case, of supreme interest to us, of the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual; what remains here is the or ganization of a combinatory system.
• The idea of structure, opposed to that of event, replies to this criterion of identity, the strongest one that can be applied.
• permanence in time thus becomes the tran scendental of numerical identity.
• The entire problematic of personal iden tity will revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong signification of permanence in time.

Context

First numbered subsection of the discussion, where Ricoeur reconstructs 'identity as sameness' into its numerical, qualitative, and continuity components and connects them to Kant’s category of substance and to structural invariants such as genetic codes.