Key Arguments

• Ricoeur introduces 'another model of permanence in time besides that of character': 'It is that of keeping one's word in faithfulness to the word that has been given. I see in this keeping the emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted by the emblematic figure of character.'
• He insists that this model cannot be assimilated to a 'what'‑identity: 'Keeping one's word ex presses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of "who?"', clearly locating promise‑keeping on the side of ipseity.
• He appeals to ordinary language to reinforce the distinction: 'The perseverance of character is one thing,8 the perseverance of faithfulness to a word that has been given is something else again. The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is quite another.'
• He aligns this with Heidegger’s distinction between substance‑permanence and self‑subsistence, citing the term Selbst‑Ständigkeit and its French rendering as 'maintient de soi' rather than 'Constance a soi', as he had previously translated it, to emphasize self‑maintenance rather than substantial constancy.
• He notes that attitudes such as 'anticipatory resoluteness' toward death 'express a certain existential invest ment of the transcendentals of existence which Heidegger terms "existen- t ialia," among which we find selfhood', but adds that such resoluteness does not exhaust the sense of self‑constancy, implying that promise‑keeping is another, perhaps more everyday, realization of self‑constancy.
• He underscores the temporal and ethical force of promising by describing it as a challenge to change: 'In this respect, keeping one's promise, as was mentioned above, does indeed appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change: even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, "I will hold firm."'
• He concludes that 'It is here, precisely, that selfhood and sameness cease to coincide. And it is here, consequently, that the equivocalness of the notion of permanence in time is dissipated.', marking the model of promise‑keeping as the point where ipse can be seen independently of idem.

Source Quotes

Before setting out on this path, it is important to make the argument in favor of the distinction between the identity of the self and the identity of the same on the basis of the use we make of the notion of identity in the contexts in which the two sorts of identity cease to overlap, and even dissociate entirely from one another, baring in a sense the selfhood of the self, severed from its base in sameness. There is, in fact, another model of permanence in time besides that of character. It is that of keeping one's word in faithfulness to the word that has been given. I see in this keeping the emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted by the emblematic figure of character.

It is that of keeping one's word in faithfulness to the word that has been given. I see in this keeping the emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted by the emblematic figure of character. Keeping one's word ex presses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of "who?"

I see in this keeping the emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted by the emblematic figure of character. Keeping one's word ex presses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of "who?" Here, too, common usage is a good guide.

Here, too, common usage is a good guide. The perseverance of character is one thing,8 the perseverance of faithfulness to a word that has been given is something else again. The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is quite another. In this regard, Heideg ger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from self- subsistence (Selbst-St'dndigkeit— which Martineau has aptly translated in French as maintient de soi rather than as Constance a soi, as I did in Time and Narrative 3).9 This major distinction remains, even if it is not certain that "anticipatory resoluteness" in the face of death exhausts the sense of self-constancy.10 This attitude thus expresses a certain existential invest ment of the transcendentals of existence which Heidegger terms "existen- t ialia," among which we find selfhood.

The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is quite another. In this regard, Heideg ger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from self- subsistence (Selbst-St'dndigkeit— which Martineau has aptly translated in French as maintient de soi rather than as Constance a soi, as I did in Time and Narrative 3).9 This major distinction remains, even if it is not certain that "anticipatory resoluteness" in the face of death exhausts the sense of self-constancy.10 This attitude thus expresses a certain existential invest ment of the transcendentals of existence which Heidegger terms "existen- t ialia," among which we find selfhood. Other attitudes — situated at the same juncture of the existentiell and the existential, as all the Heidcggerian analyses revolving around Being-toward-death — reveal just as much about the fundamental conjunction between the problematic of perma nence in time and that of the self, inasmuch as the self docs not coincide with the same.

Other attitudes — situated at the same juncture of the existentiell and the existential, as all the Heidcggerian analyses revolving around Being-toward-death — reveal just as much about the fundamental conjunction between the problematic of perma nence in time and that of the self, inasmuch as the self docs not coincide with the same. In this respect, keeping one's promise, as was mentioned above, does indeed appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change: even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, "I will hold firm." It is not necessary, for the promise to be meaningful, to place keeping one's word within the horizon of Being-toward-death.

This ethical justification, considered as such, develops its own temporal implications, namely a modality of per manence in time capable of standing as the polar opposite to the perma nence of character. It is here, precisely, that selfhood and sameness cease to coincide. And it is here, consequently, that the equivocalness of the notion of permanence in time is dissipated. This new manner11 of opposing the sameness of character to the con stancy of the self in promising opens an interval of sense which remains to be filled in.

Key Concepts

• There is, in fact, another model of permanence in time besides that of character. It is that of keeping one's word in faithfulness to the word that has been given.
• I see in this keeping the emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted by the emblematic figure of character.
• Keeping one's word ex presses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of "who?"
• The perseverance of character is one thing,8 the perseverance of faithfulness to a word that has been given is something else again. The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is quite another.
• In this regard, Heideg ger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from self- subsistence (Selbst-St'dndigkeit— which Martineau has aptly translated in French as maintient de soi rather than as Constance a soi, as I did in Time and Narrative 3).9
• In this respect, keeping one's promise, as was mentioned above, does indeed appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change: even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, "I will hold firm."
• It is here, precisely, that selfhood and sameness cease to coincide. And it is here, consequently, that the equivocalness of the notion of permanence in time is dissipated.

Context

Beginning of subsection '3.' in the same study, where Ricoeur introduces a second experiential model of permanence in time—promise‑keeping—as the polar opposite of character and as the clearest expression of selfhood irreducible to sameness.