Key Arguments

• Ricoeur states that 'It is finally on the ethical plane that the affection of the self by the other displays the specific features that belong as much to the properly ethical plane as to the moral plane of obligation.', marking this as the level where affective relations with others are most explicitly thematic.
• He recalls his definition of ethics: 'The very definition of ethics that we have proposed—living well with and for others in just institutions— cannot be conceived without the project of living well being affected by solicitude, both that which is exerted and that which is received.', so ethical self‑project is essentially modified by receiving and giving care.
• He reinterprets his earlier analysis of self-esteem and friendship: 'Prior to any consideration of the justice of the exchanges, the dialectic of self- esteem and friendship can be entirely rewritten in terms of a dialectic of action and affection.', emphasizing that self-relation is mediated by affective relations with friends.
• He claims that 'In order to be the "friend of oneself"—in accordance with Aristotelian pbilautia—one must already have entered into a relation of friendship with others, as though friendship for oneself were a self- affection rigorously correlative to the affection by and for the other as friend.', making self-friendship derivative of interpersonal friendship.
• He concludes that 'In this sense, friendship forms the bed of justice, as the virtue "for others," following another of Aristotle's sayings.', so interpersonal solicitude undergirds justice as a social virtue.
• Regarding the move from ethics to morality, he writes that it 'occurred, in the study that followed, under the pro tection of the Golden Rule, to which we thought we gave full credit by assigning to it the merit of interposing the commandment at the very intersection of the asymmetrical relation between doing and undergoing (the good you would want to be done to you, the evil you would hate to be done to you).', so the Golden Rule mediates between the asymmetry of acting and suffering.
• He describes how roles tend to separate: 'Acting and suffering then seem to be distributed between two different protagonists: the agent and the patient, the latter appearing as the potential victim of the former.', but immediately adds that 'because of the reversibility of the roles, each agent is the patient of the other.', so every subject is both doer and sufferer.
• He argues that 'Inasmuch as one is affected by the power over one exerted by the other, the agent is invested with the responsibility of an action that is placed from the very outset under the rule of reciprocity, which the rule of justice will transform into a rule of equality.', so being-affected by another's power calls forth responsibility and reciprocal obligation that justice formalizes as equality.
• He finally connects this to Kantian formalism: 'Since each protagonist holds two roles, being both agent and patient, the formalism of the categorical imperative requires the "matter" of a plurality of acting beings each affected by forces exerted reciprocally.', indicating that the categorical imperative presupposes a field of mutually affecting, reciprocally vulnerable agents.

Source Quotes

Being-affected in the fictive mode is therefore incorporated into the self's being-affected in the "real" mode. It is finally on the ethical plane that the affection of the self by the other displays the specific features that belong as much to the properly ethical plane as to the moral plane of obligation. The very definition of ethics that we have proposed—living well with and for others in just institutions— cannot be conceived without the project of living well being affected by solicitude, both that which is exerted and that which is received.

It is finally on the ethical plane that the affection of the self by the other displays the specific features that belong as much to the properly ethical plane as to the moral plane of obligation. The very definition of ethics that we have proposed—living well with and for others in just institutions— cannot be conceived without the project of living well being affected by solicitude, both that which is exerted and that which is received. Prior to any consideration of the justice of the exchanges, the dialectic of self- esteem and friendship can be entirely rewritten in terms of a dialectic of action and affection.

Prior to any consideration of the justice of the exchanges, the dialectic of self- esteem and friendship can be entirely rewritten in terms of a dialectic of action and affection. In order to be the "friend of oneself"—in accordance with Aristotelian pbilautia—one must already have entered into a relation of friendship with others, as though friendship for oneself were a self- affection rigorously correlative to the affection by and for the other as friend. In this sense, friendship forms the bed of justice, as the virtue "for others," following another of Aristotle's sayings.

In order to be the "friend of oneself"—in accordance with Aristotelian pbilautia—one must already have entered into a relation of friendship with others, as though friendship for oneself were a self- affection rigorously correlative to the affection by and for the other as friend. In this sense, friendship forms the bed of justice, as the virtue "for others," following another of Aristotle's sayings. The passage from ethics to morality—from the optative mode of living well to the imperative mode of obligation—occurred, in the study that followed, under the pro tection of the Golden Rule, to which we thought we gave full credit by assigning to it the merit of interposing the commandment at the very intersection of the asymmetrical relation between doing and undergoing (the good you would want to be done to you, the evil you would hate to be done to you).

In this sense, friendship forms the bed of justice, as the virtue "for others," following another of Aristotle's sayings. The passage from ethics to morality—from the optative mode of living well to the imperative mode of obligation—occurred, in the study that followed, under the pro tection of the Golden Rule, to which we thought we gave full credit by assigning to it the merit of interposing the commandment at the very intersection of the asymmetrical relation between doing and undergoing (the good you would want to be done to you, the evil you would hate to be done to you). Acting and suffering then seem to be distributed between two different protagonists: the agent and the patient, the latter appearing as the potential victim of the former.

Acting and suffering then seem to be distributed between two different protagonists: the agent and the patient, the latter appearing as the potential victim of the former. But because of the reversibility of the roles, each agent is the patient of the other. Inasmuch as one is affected by the power over one exerted by the other, the agent is invested with the responsibility of an action that is placed from the very outset under the rule of reciprocity, which the rule of justice will transform into a rule of equality.

But because of the reversibility of the roles, each agent is the patient of the other. Inasmuch as one is affected by the power over one exerted by the other, the agent is invested with the responsibility of an action that is placed from the very outset under the rule of reciprocity, which the rule of justice will transform into a rule of equality. Since each protagonist holds two roles, being both agent and patient, the formalism of the categorical imperative requires the "matter" of a plurality of acting beings each affected by forces exerted reciprocally.

Inasmuch as one is affected by the power over one exerted by the other, the agent is invested with the responsibility of an action that is placed from the very outset under the rule of reciprocity, which the rule of justice will transform into a rule of equality. Since each protagonist holds two roles, being both agent and patient, the formalism of the categorical imperative requires the "matter" of a plurality of acting beings each affected by forces exerted reciprocally. The question here is that of determining what new figure of otherness is called for by this affection of the ipse by the other than self and, by implication, what dialectic of the Same and the Other replies to the de mand for a phenomenology of the self affected by the other than self.

Key Concepts

• It is finally on the ethical plane that the affection of the self by the other displays the specific features that belong as much to the properly ethical plane as to the moral plane of obligation.
• The very definition of ethics that we have proposed—living well with and for others in just institutions— cannot be conceived without the project of living well being affected by solicitude, both that which is exerted and that which is received.
• In order to be the "friend of oneself"—in accordance with Aristotelian pbilautia—one must already have entered into a relation of friendship with others, as though friendship for oneself were a self- affection rigorously correlative to the affection by and for the other as friend.
• In this sense, friendship forms the bed of justice, as the virtue "for others," following another of Aristotle's sayings.
• under the pro tection of the Golden Rule, to which we thought we gave full credit by assigning to it the merit of interposing the commandment at the very intersection of the asymmetrical relation between doing and undergoing (the good you would want to be done to you, the evil you would hate to be done to you).
• because of the reversibility of the roles, each agent is the patient of the other.
• the agent is invested with the responsibility of an action that is placed from the very outset under the rule of reciprocity, which the rule of justice will transform into a rule of equality.
• the formalism of the categorical imperative requires the "matter" of a plurality of acting beings each affected by forces exerted reciprocally.

Context

Middle of the section 'The Otherness of Other People', where Ricoeur recalls his 'little ethics' and reinterpretation of self-esteem, friendship, justice, and Kantian morality in terms of the self’s being affected by others, and the reciprocity between agent and patient.