Paul Ricoeur uses the title Oneself as Another to mark the primacy of reflective mediation over the immediate Cartesian-style positing of the subject in the first person (“I think,” “I am”), grounding this shift in the grammatical distinction between ‘self’ and ‘I’ and in the reflexive structure of natural languages.

By Paul Ricœur, from Oneself as Another

Key Arguments

  • He states that his first intention in the title is “to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: "I think," "I am."”
  • He appeals to “the grammars of natural languages inasmuch as they allow the oppo sition between "self" and "I,"” suggesting that ordinary language already distinguishes a reflexive dimensão (‘self’) from the immediate first-person subject (‘I’).
  • He notes that, despite cross-linguistic divergences, “these divergences are themselves instructive, to the extent that each grammatical peculiarity sheds light on part of the essential meaning sought,” using grammar not as a mere curiosity but as a heuristic for philosophical clarification.
  • By focusing on reflexive forms (soi, se) and their use with infinitives (e.g. “se presenter, se nommer”), he shows that the self is best approached as a reflexive structure that cuts across persons and tenses rather than as an immediately given, transparent ‘I’.

Source Quotes

INTRODUCTION The Question of Selfhood By the title Oneself as Another, I wish to designate the point of convergence between the three major philosophical intentions that influenced the preparation of the studies that make up this book. The first intention was to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: "I think," "I am."
INTRODUCTION The Question of Selfhood By the title Oneself as Another, I wish to designate the point of convergence between the three major philosophical intentions that influenced the preparation of the studies that make up this book. The first intention was to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: "I think," "I am." This initial intention draws support from the grammars of natural languages inasmuch as they allow the oppo sition between "self" and "I."
The first intention was to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: "I think," "I am." This initial intention draws support from the grammars of natural languages inasmuch as they allow the oppo sition between "self" and "I." This support takes different forms following the peculiarities of each language.
Beyond the broad correlation between the French soi, the English self, the German Selbst, the Italian se> and the Spanish si mismo, grammars diverge. But these divergences are themselves instructive, to the extent that each grammatical peculiarity sheds light on part of the essential meaning sought. With respect to French, soi is directly defined as a reflexive pronoun.
Se then designates the reflexive character of all the personal pronouns, and even the impersonal pronouns, such as "each," "anyone," "one," to which I shall frequently refer in the course of these investigations. This detour by way of se is not gratuitous, insofar as the reflexive pronoun soi also attains the same timeless range when it is added to the se in the infinitive mode: se decider soi-meme. (I am leaving aside for the moment the meaning attached to meme in the expression soi- 1.

Key Concepts

  • By the title Oneself as Another, I wish to designate the point of convergence between the three major philosophical intentions that influenced the preparation of the studies that make up this book.
  • The first intention was to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: "I think," "I am."
  • This initial intention draws support from the grammars of natural languages inasmuch as they allow the oppo sition between "self" and "I."
  • these divergences are themselves instructive, to the extent that each grammatical peculiarity sheds light on part of the essential meaning sought.
  • This detour by way of se is not gratuitous, insofar as the reflexive pronoun soi also attains the same timeless range when it is added to the se in the infinitive mode: se decider soi-meme.

Context

Opening of the Introduction, where Ricoeur explains the philosophical intentions condensed in the book’s title and motivates his approach by appealing to grammatical features of natural languages.