Key Arguments

• Ricoeur argues that, phenomenologically, we are not compelled to maintain the motive/cause opposition: "To begin with, phenomenologically speaking, the opposition between motive and cause is not obligatory (later on we shall see that it is contest- able on the very plane of logic where it is asserted)."
• He proposes that ‘wanting’ offers itself as a mixed category whose specificity is missed if motives are confined to ‘reasons‑for’: "It seems instead that the category of wanting offers itself as a mixed category, whose apposite - uess is missed as soon as, for logical reasons, one casts motive on the side of the reason for acting."
• He describes the dual aspect of wanting: "what con stitutes the very peculiarity of wanting—namely that it offers itself as a meaning which can be expressed both within the sphere of justification and as a force which can be transcribed, more or less analogously, as be longing to the sphere of physical energy—will go unnoticed."
• Ricoeur links this to his own earlier semantics of desire: "This mixed character of wanting, of desire—the semantics of which I attempted to work out in my book on Freud9—finds a reflection on the very plane where the theory of action has chosen to place itself, namely that of ordi nary language."
• He appeals to ordinary questions like "What prompted you to do this or that?" and notes that in English one even asks, "What 'caused' you to act that way?", which justify responses in terms of causes rather than purely reasons‑for: "Do we not ask, What prompted you to do this or that? In English one even says, What "caused" you to act that way? I see three types of situation in which this sort of question is justified by a response in terms of cause."
• He outlines three such affective contexts: incidental impulses or drives, enduring dispositions, and emotions where the object is also the cause: "The first would involve the question, What prompted you to do this or that? to which one could provide an answer stating neither an antecedent in the sense of a Humcan cause nor a reason- for in the rational sense but an incidental impulse, or a drive (Treib), as it is called in psychoanalysis. ... In the second type of situation ... the response mentions a disposition, an enduring or even permanent tendency. The third type of situation concerns a question such as, What made you jump? to which you reply, A dog frightened me. ... It is the feature peculiar to emotion, from the perspective of its linguistic expression, that its object is its cause and vice versa."
• He groups these under the heading of affect or passion and insists that some passivity correlates with action in these cases: "These three contexts can be grouped together under the generic heading of affect, or passion in the ancient sense of the term. Indeed, in these three contexts, a certain passivity does seem to cor relate with the action of doing something."
• Ricoeur concludes that this phenomenology compels us to say that motives are also causes: "This phenomenology of wanting, extended to include affect, com pels us to say that even in the case of rational motivation, motives would not be motives for action if they were not also its causes."
• He adds that this gives "a certain plausibility" to the causalist thesis and raises the question of whether we need a non‑Humean causal model: "This phenomcnological justification will give a certain plausibility to the causalist thesis. The question will then be to know whether a causal model other than that of Hume is not required to parallel the idea of motive as it has been recast, which is reduced to that of reason-for."

Source Quotes

Allow me first to state why the dichotomous approach was destined to be heavily nuanced before being bluntly rejected. To begin with, phenomenologically speaking, the opposition between motive and cause is not obligatory (later on we shall see that it is contest- able on the very plane of logic where it is asserted). It seems instead that the category of wanting offers itself as a mixed category, whose apposite - uess is missed as soon as, for logical reasons, one casts motive on the side of the reason for acting.

To begin with, phenomenologically speaking, the opposition between motive and cause is not obligatory (later on we shall see that it is contest- able on the very plane of logic where it is asserted). It seems instead that the category of wanting offers itself as a mixed category, whose apposite - uess is missed as soon as, for logical reasons, one casts motive on the side of the reason for acting. Even if one is attempting by this to underscore the originality of the mode of implication between motive and action, the danger remains that the reason-for will be taken in the sense of a techno logical, strategic, or ideological type of rationalization and that what con stitutes the very peculiarity of wanting—namely that it offers itself as a meaning which can be expressed both within the sphere of justification and as a force which can be transcribed, more or less analogously, as be longing to the sphere of physical energy—will go unnoticed.

It seems instead that the category of wanting offers itself as a mixed category, whose apposite - uess is missed as soon as, for logical reasons, one casts motive on the side of the reason for acting. Even if one is attempting by this to underscore the originality of the mode of implication between motive and action, the danger remains that the reason-for will be taken in the sense of a techno logical, strategic, or ideological type of rationalization and that what con stitutes the very peculiarity of wanting—namely that it offers itself as a meaning which can be expressed both within the sphere of justification and as a force which can be transcribed, more or less analogously, as be longing to the sphere of physical energy—will go unnoticed. This mixed character of wanting, of desire—the semantics of which I attempted to work out in my book on Freud9—finds a reflection on the very plane where the theory of action has chosen to place itself, namely that of ordi nary language.

This mixed character of wanting, of desire—the semantics of which I attempted to work out in my book on Freud9—finds a reflection on the very plane where the theory of action has chosen to place itself, namely that of ordi nary language. Do we not ask, What prompted you to do this or that? In English one even says, What "caused" you to act that way? I see three types of situation in which this sort of question is justified by a response in terms of cause.

It is the feature peculiar to emotion, from the perspective of its linguistic expression, that its object is its cause and vice versa. These three contexts can be grouped together under the generic heading of affect, or passion in the ancient sense of the term. Indeed, in these three contexts, a certain passivity does seem to cor relate with the action of doing something.

This would be, precisely, an action without any element of desire! This phenomenology of wanting, extended to include affect, com pels us to say that even in the case of rational motivation, motives would not be motives for action if they were not also its causes. This phenomcnological justification will give a certain plausibility to the causalist thesis.

This phenomenology of wanting, extended to include affect, com pels us to say that even in the case of rational motivation, motives would not be motives for action if they were not also its causes. This phenomcnological justification will give a certain plausibility to the causalist thesis. The question will then be to know whether a causal model other than that of Hume is not required to parallel the idea of motive as it has been recast, which is reduced to that of reason-for. The point can be discussed only at the end of the itinerary which will have led to the absorption of the idea of motive into that of cause.

Key Concepts

• phenomenologically speaking, the opposition between motive and cause is not obligatory
• the category of wanting offers itself as a mixed category, whose apposite - uess is missed as soon as, for logical reasons, one casts motive on the side of the reason for acting.
• what con stitutes the very peculiarity of wanting—namely that it offers itself as a meaning which can be expressed both within the sphere of justification and as a force which can be transcribed, more or less analogously, as be longing to the sphere of physical energy—will go unnoticed.
• Do we not ask, What prompted you to do this or that? In English one even says, What "caused" you to act that way?
• These three contexts can be grouped together under the generic heading of affect, or passion in the ancient sense of the term.
• This phenomenology of wanting, extended to include affect, com pels us to say that even in the case of rational motivation, motives would not be motives for action if they were not also its causes.
• This phenomcnological justification will give a certain plausibility to the causalist thesis. The question will then be to know whether a causal model other than that of Hume is not required

Context

Later part of the section, where Ricoeur criticizes the dichotomous view of motive and cause on phenomenological grounds and prepares the way for reconsidering causal models.