Key Arguments

• He proposes to 'demystify' the Hegelian state by interrogating political praxis and the specific forms of the tragedy of action there: 'The best way of demystifying the Hegelian state and, in so doing, of freeing its inexhaustible resources on the level of political philosophy is to question political practice itself and to examine the specific forms that the tragedy of action takes there.'
• He recalls the sharp distinction, following Hannah Arendt, between power and domination: 'Power, we admitted, following Hannah Arendt, exists only to the extent that—and only so long as—the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community.'
• He characterizes this power as the highest form of praxis whose end is its own enduring existence: 'This power is the highest expression of Aristote lian praxis, which produces nothing outside of itself but has as its end its own maintenance, its stability, and its long-lastingness.'
• He notes that this originating power tends to be forgotten and eclipsed by structures of domination between rulers and ruled: 'this power is forgotten as the origin of the political agency and is covered over by the hierarchical structures of domination between the governing and the governed.'
• He stresses the gravity of confusing power with domination, drawing on Spinoza’s potentia/potestas distinction: 'In this respect, nothing is more serious than the confusion between power and domination or, in Spinoza's vocabulary in his Political Treatise, between potentia and potestas.'
• He defines the virtue of justice (isotes) precisely as the effort to bring domination under the control of common power: 'The virtue of jus tice, in the sense of isotes in Pericles and in Aristotle, aims precisely at balancing this relation, that is, at placing domination under the control of the powcr-in-common.'
• He describes this balancing as an 'endless task', tied to the nature of democracy: 'Now this task, which perhaps defines democracy, is an endless task, each new agency of domination proceeding from an earlier one of the same nature, at least in Western societies.'

Source Quotes

And in what way do these conflicts relate to the ethical sense of justice? We must start here with the difference between power and domination, which we emphasized so strongly in the third section of the seventh study. Power, we admitted, following Hannah Arendt, exists only to the extent that—and only so long as—the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community.

We must start here with the difference between power and domination, which we emphasized so strongly in the third section of the seventh study. Power, we admitted, following Hannah Arendt, exists only to the extent that—and only so long as—the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community. This power is the highest expression of Aristote lian praxis, which produces nothing outside of itself but has as its end its own maintenance, its stability, and its long-lastingness.

Power, we admitted, following Hannah Arendt, exists only to the extent that—and only so long as—the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community. This power is the highest expression of Aristote lian praxis, which produces nothing outside of itself but has as its end its own maintenance, its stability, and its long-lastingness. But as we also admitted, this power is forgotten as the origin of the political agency and is covered over by the hierarchical structures of domination between the governing and the governed.

But as we also admitted, this power is forgotten as the origin of the political agency and is covered over by the hierarchical structures of domination between the governing and the governed. In this respect, nothing is more serious than the confusion between power and domination or, in Spinoza's vocabulary in his Political Treatise, between potentia and potestas.27 The virtue of jus tice, in the sense of isotes in Pericles and in Aristotle, aims precisely at balancing this relation, that is, at placing domination under the control of the powcr-in-common. Now this task, which perhaps defines democracy, is an endless task, each new agency of domination proceeding from an earlier one of the same nature, at least in Western societies.28 This gap between domination and power is marked, within the struc ture of the state itself, by the dialectic I once summed up under the name political paradox, in which form and force continue to confront one an other within the same agency.29 Whereas form finds its expression in the constitution's approximation of the relation of mutual recognition be tween individuals and between the latter and the higher agency, force finds its mark in all the scars left by the violent birth of all states, since become states of law; force and form are conjoined in the legitimate use of vio lence, which is considered by Max Weber to be a criterion in the definition of politics.30 On the basis of this gap between domination and power, constitutive of the political as such, we can define the political as the set of organized practices relating to the distribution of political power, better termed domination.

In this respect, nothing is more serious than the confusion between power and domination or, in Spinoza's vocabulary in his Political Treatise, between potentia and potestas.27 The virtue of jus tice, in the sense of isotes in Pericles and in Aristotle, aims precisely at balancing this relation, that is, at placing domination under the control of the powcr-in-common. Now this task, which perhaps defines democracy, is an endless task, each new agency of domination proceeding from an earlier one of the same nature, at least in Western societies.28 This gap between domination and power is marked, within the struc ture of the state itself, by the dialectic I once summed up under the name political paradox, in which form and force continue to confront one an other within the same agency.29 Whereas form finds its expression in the constitution's approximation of the relation of mutual recognition be tween individuals and between the latter and the higher agency, force finds its mark in all the scars left by the violent birth of all states, since become states of law; force and form are conjoined in the legitimate use of vio lence, which is considered by Max Weber to be a criterion in the definition of politics.30 On the basis of this gap between domination and power, constitutive of the political as such, we can define the political as the set of organized practices relating to the distribution of political power, better termed domination. These practices concern the vertical relation between the gov erning and the governed as well as the horizontal relation between rival groups in the distribution of political power.

Key Concepts

• We must start here with the difference between power and domination, which we emphasized so strongly in the third section of the seventh study.
• Power, we admitted, following Hannah Arendt, exists only to the extent that—and only so long as—the desire to live and act together subsists in a historical community.
• This power is the highest expression of Aristote lian praxis, which produces nothing outside of itself but has as its end its own maintenance, its stability, and its long-lastingness.
• nothing is more serious than the confusion between power and domination or, in Spinoza's vocabulary in his Political Treatise, between potentia and potestas.
• The virtue of jus tice, in the sense of isotes in Pericles and in Aristotle, aims precisely at balancing this relation, that is, at placing domination under the control of the powcr-in-common.
• this task, which perhaps defines democracy, is an endless task, each new agency of domination proceeding from an earlier one of the same nature

Context

Early in the discussion of 'Institution and Conflict', where Ricoeur shifts from Hegelian theory to concrete political practice, invoking Arendt and Spinoza to ground his account of democracy and justice in the tension between power‑in‑common and domination.