Key Arguments

• He explicitly formulates the result of his confrontation between Husserl and Levinas: 'From this confrontation between Husscrl and Levinas results the sug gestion that there is no contradiction in holding the movement from the Same toward the Other and that from the Other toward the Same to be dialectically complementary.', stating his thesis of complementarity.
• He differentiates their domains so they do not cancel each other: 'The two movements do not annihilate one another to the extent that one unfolds in the gnoseological dimension of sense, the other in the ethical dimension of injunction.', assigning cognitive priority to the former and ethical priority to the latter.
• Ricoeur links ethical assignment of responsibility to the self’s gnoseological power of self‑designation and its transferability: 'The assignment of responsibility, in the second dimension, refers to the power of self- designation, transferred, in accordance with the first dimension, to every third person assumed to be capable of saying "I."', thus connecting Levinasian heteronomous responsibility to Husserlian analogical recognition of others as 'I'.
• He then recalls his earlier analysis of the promise as anticipating this intersecting dialectic: 'Was not this intersecting dialectic of oneself and the other than self anticipated in the analysis of the promise?', suggesting that promising is a paradigmatic site where the two movements cross.
• He hints at the interpersonal structure of promising by raising the conditional question: 'If another were not counting on me, would I be capable of', implying that my capacity to commit myself (ipseity) is inseparable from another’s expectation and trust, i.e., from the Other’s movement toward me.
• This synthesis salvages elements from both Husserl and Levinas: from Husserl, the analogical movement from ego to alter ego that yields a gnoseological sense of 'other as capable of saying "I"'; from Levinas, the ethical 'assignment of responsibility' that comes from the Other toward the Same; Ricoeur’s point is that these should be seen as intersecting, not mutually exclusive.

Source Quotes

It remains that, through the form of the accusative, the first person is indirectly involved and that the accusative cannot remain "nonassumablc," to borrow an expression quoted above, under pain of stripping all meaning from the very theme of substi tution, under the aegis of which Levinas reassumes the theme of testimony. From this confrontation between Husscrl and Levinas results the sug gestion that there is no contradiction in holding the movement from the Same toward the Other and that from the Other toward the Same to be dialectically complementary. The two movements do not annihilate one another to the extent that one unfolds in the gnoseological dimension of sense, the other in the ethical dimension of injunction.

From this confrontation between Husscrl and Levinas results the sug gestion that there is no contradiction in holding the movement from the Same toward the Other and that from the Other toward the Same to be dialectically complementary. The two movements do not annihilate one another to the extent that one unfolds in the gnoseological dimension of sense, the other in the ethical dimension of injunction. The assignment of responsibility, in the second dimension, refers to the power of self- designation, transferred, in accordance with the first dimension, to every third person assumed to be capable of saying "I."

The two movements do not annihilate one another to the extent that one unfolds in the gnoseological dimension of sense, the other in the ethical dimension of injunction. The assignment of responsibility, in the second dimension, refers to the power of self- designation, transferred, in accordance with the first dimension, to every third person assumed to be capable of saying "I." Was not this intersecting dialectic of oneself and the other than self anticipated in the analysis of the promise?

The assignment of responsibility, in the second dimension, refers to the power of self- designation, transferred, in accordance with the first dimension, to every third person assumed to be capable of saying "I." Was not this intersecting dialectic of oneself and the other than self anticipated in the analysis of the promise? If another were not counting on me, would I be capable of

Was not this intersecting dialectic of oneself and the other than self anticipated in the analysis of the promise? If another were not counting on me, would I be capable of

Key Concepts

• From this confrontation between Husscrl and Levinas results the sug gestion that there is no contradiction in holding the movement from the Same toward the Other and that from the Other toward the Same to be dialectically complementary.
• The two movements do not annihilate one another to the extent that one unfolds in the gnoseological dimension of sense, the other in the ethical dimension of injunction.
• The assignment of responsibility, in the second dimension, refers to the power of self- designation, transferred, in accordance with the first dimension, to every third person assumed to be capable of saying "I."
• Was not this intersecting dialectic of oneself and the other than self anticipated in the analysis of the promise?
• If another were not counting on me, would I be capable of

Context

In the closing sentences of the subsection 'The Otherness of Other People', after a detailed re‑reading of Husserl’s appresentation and Levinas’s ethics of the Other, Ricoeur articulates his own hermeneutic synthesis: the Husserlian movement of analogical recognition (Same → Other) and the Levinasian movement of ethical summons (Other → Same) are dialectically complementary, intersecting especially in promising, where another’s expectation ('counting on me') and my power to say 'I' in self‑designation mutually presuppose each other.