Key Arguments

• Ricoeur states explicitly that his purpose is “to show in Nietzsche's anticogito not the inverse of the Cartesian cogito but the de struction of the very question to which the cogito was held to give an absolute answer,” thus shifting from opposition to deconstruction.
• He characterizes the overall set of fragments as “the rigorous exercise of a hyperbolic doubt, where Nietzsche himself would be the evil genius,” suggesting that Nietzsche’s doubt now targets the self’s immediacy rather than only external reality.
• He cites a fragment in which Nietzsche proclaims “the phenomenalism of the inner world also,” meaning that “everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and com pletely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted,” so that inner life is no less constructed and mediated than outer experience.
• Ricoeur underlines that for Nietzsche “phenomenality in no way means objectivity in a Kantian sense, but precisely ‘arrangement, simplification, schematization, interpretation’,” denying that inner or outer appearances could ground stable objects or a stable subject.
• He recalls Nietzsche’s polemic against positivism: “where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are no facts, only interpretations,” a thesis that, when applied to inner experience, undermines the cogito’s claim to yield an indubitable ‘fact’ about the self.
• By “extending the critique to so-called internal experience, Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the world of waking,” since now the internal world is as interpretative and dubious as the external.
• On this reading, Nietzsche’s hyperbolic doubt “taken further than that of Descartes” is turned “against the very certainty that the latter believed he could eliminate from doubt,” thereby shattering the cogito’s privileged epistemic status rather than offering a rival foundation.

Source Quotes

What has just been termed a tropological reduction21 constitutes a very useful key for interpreting the frontal critique of the cogito that can be read in the fragments of the Nachlass scattered between 1882 and 1884.22 The choice of fragments with the most obvious anticogito content raises only a corner of the veil cast over this gigantic endeavor, in which the critique of Christianity is found next to the development of the enigmatic themes of the will to power, the overman, and the eternal return. But the strict selection made here is faithful to my purpose, which is to show in Nietzsche's anticogito not the inverse of the Cartesian cogito but the de struction of the very question to which the cogito was held to give an absolute answer. Despite the fragmentary nature of these aphorisms directed against the cogito, the constellation that they trace allows us to see in them the rig orous exercise of a hyperbolic doubt, where Nietzsche himself would be the evil genius.

But the strict selection made here is faithful to my purpose, which is to show in Nietzsche's anticogito not the inverse of the Cartesian cogito but the de struction of the very question to which the cogito was held to give an absolute answer. Despite the fragmentary nature of these aphorisms directed against the cogito, the constellation that they trace allows us to see in them the rig orous exercise of a hyperbolic doubt, where Nietzsche himself would be the evil genius. Consider this fragment from November 1887 to March 1888: "I am convinced of [ich halte] the phenomenalism of the inner world also: everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and com pletely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted, the actual process of inner 'perception,' the relation of causes between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed from us, and may be purely imaginary."

Despite the fragmentary nature of these aphorisms directed against the cogito, the constellation that they trace allows us to see in them the rig orous exercise of a hyperbolic doubt, where Nietzsche himself would be the evil genius. Consider this fragment from November 1887 to March 1888: "I am convinced of [ich halte] the phenomenalism of the inner world also: everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and com pletely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted, the actual process of inner 'perception,' the relation of causes between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed from us, and may be purely imaginary." To proclaim the phenomenal character of the internal world is, first, to align it with the so-called external world, where phenomenality in no way means objectivity in a Kantian sense, but precisely "arrangement, simpli fication, schematization, interpretation."

Consider this fragment from November 1887 to March 1888: "I am convinced of [ich halte] the phenomenalism of the inner world also: everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and com pletely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted, the actual process of inner 'perception,' the relation of causes between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed from us, and may be purely imaginary." To proclaim the phenomenal character of the internal world is, first, to align it with the so-called external world, where phenomenality in no way means objectivity in a Kantian sense, but precisely "arrangement, simpli fication, schematization, interpretation." To understand this point, one must keep in mind the attack on positivism; where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are no facts, only interpretations.

To proclaim the phenomenal character of the internal world is, first, to align it with the so-called external world, where phenomenality in no way means objectivity in a Kantian sense, but precisely "arrangement, simpli fication, schematization, interpretation." To understand this point, one must keep in mind the attack on positivism; where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are no facts, only interpretations. In extending the critique to so-called internal experience, Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the world of waking.

To understand this point, one must keep in mind the attack on positivism; where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are no facts, only interpretations. In extending the critique to so-called internal experience, Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the world of waking. To assume the phenomenality of the internal world is, in addition, to align the connection of inner experience with external "causation," which is also an illusion that conceals the play of forces under the artifice of order.

We slip back into the "inversion of words," denounced twenty years earlier. I shall not consider any further these arguments in which one should see nothing other, in my opinion, than an exercise of hyperbolic doubt taken further than that of Descartes and turned against the very certainty that the latter believed he could eliminate from doubt. At least in these fragments, Nietzsche says nothing other than simply, I doubt better than Descartes.

Key Concepts

• to show in Nietzsche's anticogito not the inverse of the Cartesian cogito but the de struction of the very question to which the cogito was held to give an absolute answer.
• the constellation that they trace allows us to see in them the rig orous exercise of a hyperbolic doubt, where Nietzsche himself would be the evil genius.
• "I am convinced of [ich halte] the phenomenalism of the inner world also: everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and com pletely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted,
• phenomenality in no way means objectivity in a Kantian sense, but precisely "arrangement, simpli fication, schematization, interpretation."
• where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are no facts, only interpretations.
• Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the world of waking.
• hyperbolic doubt taken further than that of Descartes and turned against the very certainty that the latter believed he could eliminate from doubt.

Context

Transition from the tropological reduction of language to the analysis of Nietzsche’s later aphoristic fragments in the Nachlass (1882–1888), where Ricoeur reconstructs Nietzsche’s extension of radical doubt to the inner world and its implications for the cogito.