Key Arguments

• He notes that 'Nothing in their etymology or in the history of the use of the terms requires such a distinction.', marking his use as conventional rather than philological.
• He defines ethics: 'It is, there fore, by convention that I reserve the term "ethics55 for the aim of an ac complished life', linking ethics with an overarching life-aim.
• He defines morality: 'and the term "morality" for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint (later I shall say what links these two features together).', stressing universality and constraint as key features of moral norms.
• He connects this to philosophical traditions: 'It is easy to recognize in the distinction between aim and norm the opposition between two heritages — an Aristotelian heritage, where ethics is charac terized by its teleological perspective, and a Kantian heritage, where mo rality is defined by the obligation to respect the norm, hence by a deontological point of view.'
• He announces three theses: 'I propose to establish, without concerning my self about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy, although not without pay ing close attention to the founding texts of these two traditions: (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice — impasses recalling at this new stage of our meditation the various aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face.'
• He formulates the encompassing relation: 'according to the working hypothesis I am proposing, morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispens able, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encompass morality.'
• He explicitly rejects any simple substitution: 'There will thus be no attempt to substitute Kant for Aristotle, despite a respectable tradition to the contrary. Instead, between the two traditions, I shall establish a relation involving at once subordi- nation and complementarity, which the final recourse of morality to ethics will ultimately come to reinforce.'

Source Quotes

Telling a story, we observed, is deploy ing an imaginary space for thought experiments in which moral judgment operates in a hypothetical mode. Now, what is there to say about the distinction proposed between ethics and morality? Nothing in their etymology or in the history of the use of the terms requires such a distinction. One comes from Greek, the other from Latin; both refer to the intuitive idea of mores, with the two fold connotation, which I shall attempt to decompose, of that which is considered to be good and of that which imposes itself as obligatory.

One comes from Greek, the other from Latin; both refer to the intuitive idea of mores, with the two fold connotation, which I shall attempt to decompose, of that which is considered to be good and of that which imposes itself as obligatory. It is, there fore, by convention that I reserve the term "ethics55 for the aim of an ac complished life and the term "morality" for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint (later I shall say what links these two features together). It is easy to recognize in the distinction between aim and norm the opposition between two heritages — an Aristotelian heritage, where ethics is charac terized by its teleological perspective, and a Kantian heritage, where mo rality is defined by the obligation to respect the norm, hence by a deontological point of view.

It is, there fore, by convention that I reserve the term "ethics55 for the aim of an ac complished life and the term "morality" for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint (later I shall say what links these two features together). It is easy to recognize in the distinction between aim and norm the opposition between two heritages — an Aristotelian heritage, where ethics is charac terized by its teleological perspective, and a Kantian heritage, where mo rality is defined by the obligation to respect the norm, hence by a deontological point of view. I propose to establish, without concerning my self about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy, although not without pay ing close attention to the founding texts of these two traditions: (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice — impasses recalling at this new stage of our meditation the various aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face.

It is easy to recognize in the distinction between aim and norm the opposition between two heritages — an Aristotelian heritage, where ethics is charac terized by its teleological perspective, and a Kantian heritage, where mo rality is defined by the obligation to respect the norm, hence by a deontological point of view. I propose to establish, without concerning my self about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy, although not without pay ing close attention to the founding texts of these two traditions: (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice — impasses recalling at this new stage of our meditation the various aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face. In other words, according to the working hypothesis I am proposing, morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispens able, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encompass morality.

I propose to establish, without concerning my self about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy, although not without pay ing close attention to the founding texts of these two traditions: (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice — impasses recalling at this new stage of our meditation the various aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face. In other words, according to the working hypothesis I am proposing, morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispens able, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encompass morality. There will thus be no attempt to substitute Kant for Aristotle, despite a respectable tradition to the contrary.

Key Concepts

• Now, what is there to say about the distinction proposed between ethics and morality? Nothing in their etymology or in the history of the use of the terms requires such a distinction.
• It is, there fore, by convention that I reserve the term "ethics55 for the aim of an ac complished life and the term "morality" for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint (later I shall say what links these two features together).
• It is easy to recognize in the distinction between aim and norm the opposition between two heritages — an Aristotelian heritage, where ethics is charac terized by its teleological perspective, and a Kantian heritage, where mo rality is defined by the obligation to respect the norm, hence by a deontological point of view.
• (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice — impasses recalling at this new stage of our meditation the various aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face.
• morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispens able, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encompass morality.

Context

Middle of the introductory section to the ethical studies, where Ricoeur stipulates his use of 'ethics' and 'morality', aligns them with Aristotelian teleology and Kantian deontology, and outlines his central thesis of ethical primacy combined with necessary normative mediation and feedback.