Key Arguments

• He poses 'the question of principle — better termed the crucial question, the question of confidence — that of determining whether the dcontological theory of justice does not in a certain way call upon the ethical sense of justice.', thereby directly connecting deontological justice back to ethical intuition.
• He restates this explicitly: 'In other words: does a purely procedural concep tion of justice succeed in breaking all ties to a sense of justice that precedes it and accompanies it all along? My thesis is that this conception provides at best the formalization of a sense of justice that it never ceases to presuppose. 54'
• He notes that 'Rawls himself admits that the argument upon which the procedural conception is based docs not allow us to construct an independent theory but rests upon a pre- understanding of what is meant by the unjust and the just, permitting us to define and interpret these two principles of justice before being able to prove — if ever we manage to do so — that these are indeed the principles that would be chosen in the original situation behind the veil of igno rance.'
• He explains that Rawls, rather than abandon the ideal of an independent proof, introduces the notion of 'reflective equilibrium': 'In truth, Rawls never repudiates his ambition to give an indepen dent proof of the truth of his principles of justice but, in a more complex way, demands for his theory what he calls a reflective equilibrium between the theory and our "considered convictions."55'
• He stresses the selective, critical character of these convictions: 'These convictions have to be well considered, for if, in certain cases of flagrant injustice (religious intolerance, racial discrimination), ordinary moral judgment seems a sure guide, we have less assurance when it comes to the fair distribution of wealth and authority. We must seek, Rawls says, a means of shedding our doubts.'
• He then assigns to theoretical argument the same role that Kant gave the universalization test: 'Theoretical arguments then play the same role of examination that Kant assigned to the rule of universalization of maxims.56 The whole sys tem of argumentation can therefore be seen as a progressive rationalization of these convictions, when they are affected by prejudices or weakened by doubts.'
• He characterizes reflective equilibrium as 'a complex process of mutual ad justment between conviction and theory.57', underscoring its bidirectional, iterative nature.
• From all this he infers that procedural justice presupposes and shapes, but does not create ex nihilo, our ethical sense of justice; it formalizes and rationalizes a pre‑existing moral understanding.

Source Quotes

Here there is no fact of reason to assume, but the laborious recourse to decision theory under uncertainty. The difficulties tied to this unparalleled situation in moral theory give rise to the question of principle — better termed the crucial question, the question of confidence — that of determining whether the dcontological theory of justice does not in a certain way call upon the ethical sense of justice. In other words: does a purely procedural concep tion of justice succeed in breaking all ties to a sense of justice that precedes it and accompanies it all along?

The difficulties tied to this unparalleled situation in moral theory give rise to the question of principle — better termed the crucial question, the question of confidence — that of determining whether the dcontological theory of justice does not in a certain way call upon the ethical sense of justice. In other words: does a purely procedural concep tion of justice succeed in breaking all ties to a sense of justice that precedes it and accompanies it all along? My thesis is that this conception provides at best the formalization of a sense of justice that it never ceases to presuppose. 54 Rawls himself admits that the argument upon which the procedural conception is based docs not allow us to construct an independent theory but rests upon a pre- understanding of what is meant by the unjust and the just, permitting us to define and interpret these two principles of justice before being able to prove — if ever we manage to do so — that these are indeed the principles that would be chosen in the original situation behind the veil of igno rance. In truth, Rawls never repudiates his ambition to give an indepen dent proof of the truth of his principles of justice but, in a more complex way, demands for his theory what he calls a reflective equilibrium between the theory and our "considered convictions."55 These convictions have to be well considered, for if, in certain cases of flagrant injustice (religious intolerance, racial discrimination), ordinary moral judgment seems a sure guide, we have less assurance when it comes to the fair distribution of wealth and authority.

My thesis is that this conception provides at best the formalization of a sense of justice that it never ceases to presuppose. 54 Rawls himself admits that the argument upon which the procedural conception is based docs not allow us to construct an independent theory but rests upon a pre- understanding of what is meant by the unjust and the just, permitting us to define and interpret these two principles of justice before being able to prove — if ever we manage to do so — that these are indeed the principles that would be chosen in the original situation behind the veil of igno rance. In truth, Rawls never repudiates his ambition to give an indepen dent proof of the truth of his principles of justice but, in a more complex way, demands for his theory what he calls a reflective equilibrium between the theory and our "considered convictions."55 These convictions have to be well considered, for if, in certain cases of flagrant injustice (religious intolerance, racial discrimination), ordinary moral judgment seems a sure guide, we have less assurance when it comes to the fair distribution of wealth and authority.

54 Rawls himself admits that the argument upon which the procedural conception is based docs not allow us to construct an independent theory but rests upon a pre- understanding of what is meant by the unjust and the just, permitting us to define and interpret these two principles of justice before being able to prove — if ever we manage to do so — that these are indeed the principles that would be chosen in the original situation behind the veil of igno rance. In truth, Rawls never repudiates his ambition to give an indepen dent proof of the truth of his principles of justice but, in a more complex way, demands for his theory what he calls a reflective equilibrium between the theory and our "considered convictions."55 These convictions have to be well considered, for if, in certain cases of flagrant injustice (religious intolerance, racial discrimination), ordinary moral judgment seems a sure guide, we have less assurance when it comes to the fair distribution of wealth and authority. We must seek, Rawls says, a means of shedding our doubts.

We must seek, Rawls says, a means of shedding our doubts. Theoretical arguments then play the same role of examination that Kant assigned to the rule of universalization of maxims.56 The whole sys tem of argumentation can therefore be seen as a progressive rationalization of these convictions, when they are affected by prejudices or weakened by doubts. This rationalization consists in a complex process of mutual ad justment between conviction and theory.57 At the end of this course, two conclusions stand out.

Theoretical arguments then play the same role of examination that Kant assigned to the rule of universalization of maxims.56 The whole sys tem of argumentation can therefore be seen as a progressive rationalization of these convictions, when they are affected by prejudices or weakened by doubts. This rationalization consists in a complex process of mutual ad justment between conviction and theory.57 At the end of this course, two conclusions stand out. On the one hand, one can show in what sense an attempt to provide a strictly procedural foundation for justice applied to the basic institutions of society carries to its heights the ambition to free the dcontological viewpoint of morality from the telcological perspective of ethics.

Key Concepts

• the question of confidence — that of determining whether the dcontological theory of justice does not in a certain way call upon the ethical sense of justice.
• does a purely procedural concep tion of justice succeed in breaking all ties to a sense of justice that precedes it and accompanies it all along? My thesis is that this conception provides at best the formalization of a sense of justice that it never ceases to presuppose. 54
• the argument upon which the procedural conception is based docs not allow us to construct an independent theory but rests upon a pre- understanding of what is meant by the unjust and the just
• In truth, Rawls never repudiates his ambition to give an indepen dent proof of the truth of his principles of justice but, in a more complex way, demands for his theory what he calls a reflective equilibrium between the theory and our "considered convictions."55
• These convictions have to be well considered, for if, in certain cases of flagrant injustice (religious intolerance, racial discrimination), ordinary moral judgment seems a sure guide, we have less assurance when it comes to the fair distribution of wealth and authority.
• Theoretical arguments then play the same role of examination that Kant assigned to the rule of universalization of maxims.56
• The whole sys tem of argumentation can therefore be seen as a progressive rationalization of these convictions, when they are affected by prejudices or weakened by doubts.
• This rationalization consists in a complex process of mutual ad justment between conviction and theory.57

Context

Central interpretive section where Ricoeur moves from Rawls’s contract construction to his own thesis that such a construction formalizes and presupposes an ethical sense of justice, and appropriates Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium as evidence that convictions and theory continually adjust to one another.