Key Arguments

• Ricoeur notes the apparent paradox that ethical reflexivity, when characterized as self‑esteem, "seems indeed to carry with it the danger of turning in upon oneself, of closing up," apparently moving away from openness toward the horizon of the good life.
• He explicitly states his thesis against this threat: "my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been passed over in silence."
• He defines "unfolding" (from another context) as "a break in life and in discourse that creates the conditions for a second-order continuity," and applies this to the relation between self‑esteem and solicitude.
• On this basis he concludes that "self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the other," stressing their mutual implication rather than a linear derivation.
• He remains methodologically modest, claiming only that "That the solution to the paradox as it is sketched out here is not unthinkable, is all that can be asserted at the end of the present analysis," indicating that the argument is a plausible hermeneutical proposal rather than a demonstrative proof.

Source Quotes

2. . . . with and for Others . . . At the beginning of this study, in a single stroke and without any apparent continuity in our solution, we proposed a definition of the ethical perspec tive: aiming at the good life with and for others in just institutions. At the second stage of our meditation, the question that arises is the following: how does the second component of the ethical aim, which we designate by the beautiful name of solicitude, link up with the first one?

The question takes on a paradoxical twist calling for discussion when the reflexive aspect of this aim is characterized by self-esteem. Reflexivity seems indeed to carry with it the danger of turning in upon oneself, of closing up, and moving in the opposite direction from openness, from the horizon of the "good life." Despite this certain danger, my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been passed over in silence.

Reflexivity seems indeed to carry with it the danger of turning in upon oneself, of closing up, and moving in the opposite direction from openness, from the horizon of the "good life." Despite this certain danger, my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been passed over in silence. By unfolding, as has already been stated in another context, I mean, of course, a break in life and in discourse that creates the conditions for a second-order continuity, such that self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the other.

Despite this certain danger, my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been passed over in silence. By unfolding, as has already been stated in another context, I mean, of course, a break in life and in discourse that creates the conditions for a second-order continuity, such that self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the other. That the solution to the paradox as it is sketched out here is not un thinkable, is all that can be asserted at the end of the present analysis.

By unfolding, as has already been stated in another context, I mean, of course, a break in life and in discourse that creates the conditions for a second-order continuity, such that self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the other. That the solution to the paradox as it is sketched out here is not un thinkable, is all that can be asserted at the end of the present analysis. Let us first observe that it is not by chance that we have continually been speaking of esteem of the self and not esteem of myself.

Key Concepts

• we proposed a definition of the ethical perspec tive: aiming at the good life with and for others in just institutions.
• Reflexivity seems indeed to carry with it the danger of turning in upon oneself, of closing up, and moving in the opposite direction from openness, from the horizon of the "good life."
• my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been passed over in silence.
• by unfolding, as has already been stated in another context, I mean, of course, a break in life and in discourse that creates the conditions for a second-order continuity, such that self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the other.
• That the solution to the paradox as it is sketched out here is not un thinkable, is all that can be asserted at the end of the present analysis.

Context

Opening of subsection '2. . . . with and for Others . . .', where Ricoeur confronts the apparent opposition between reflexive self‑esteem and openness to others and advances his central claim that solicitude is the inherent dialogical unfolding of self‑esteem.