Key Arguments

• Ricoeur proposes that an effective way of displaying the reciprocal determination of action‑notions is through a chain of questions—who, what, why, how, where, when—and that each key notion draws its meaning from the specific answers to these cross‑signifying questions: “An effective way of establishing the reciprocal determination of the no tions belonging to this network of action is to identify the chain of ques tions that can be asked on the subject of action: who did or is doing what, with what design, how, in what circumstances, with what means and what results ? … which are themselves cross-signifying: who? what? why? how? where? when?”
• He initially presents the question ‘who?’ as promising for access to the concept of agent, even linking it to his earlier discussion of self and to Heidegger’s Selbstheit: “One can see in what sense this method of analysis would appear to be promising: a privileged access to the concept of agent is afforded by the replies provided to the question ‘who?’ … Now this question reveals a genuine affinity with the problematic of the self as we outlined it in the Introduction. In Heidegger, the investigation of ‘who?’ belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of the self (Selbstheit).”
• He also notes Hannah Arendt’s claim that action, unlike labor and work, “calls for narration,” and that narration has the function of determining the “who of action”: “Hannah Arcndt, echoing Heidegger, links the question ‘who?’ to a specific characteristic of the concept of action… action is that aspect of human doing that calls for narration. And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to determine the ‘who of action.’”
• Despite these affinities, Ricoeur insists it is a mistake to think theory of action can go so far: Heidegger’s and Arendt’s uses of ‘who?’ presuppose broader ontological or practical theories that exceed his present semantic analysis: “Despite these obvious affinities, it is a mistake to believe that the theory of action can lead this far. In Heidegger, the dependence of the problematic of Selbst on i lie existential Dasein draws the ‘who?’ within the same ontological field of gravity. As for Hannah Arendt's ‘who?’ it is mediated by a theory of action that exceeds the limits of the present analysis…”
• He states that the contribution of analytic theory of action to the ‘who?’ question is “considerably more modest” and often marks “a retreat” relative to Strawson, who had directly posed the problem of attribution of person‑predicates to ‘someone’ as the same thing: “The contribution of the theory of action to the question ‘who?’ is, in I act, a considerably more modest one. For the reasons I shall state, it often even marks a retreat in relation to Strawson's problematic, inasmuch as the latter squarely posed the question of attributing to ‘someone,’ considered 10 be the ‘same thing,’ predicates characteristic of the person.”

Source Quotes

It is the specificity of this network in relation to the general determination of the concept of person, established in the first study, that will henceforth concern us. An effective way of establishing the reciprocal determination of the no tions belonging to this network of action is to identify the chain of ques tions that can be asked on the subject of action: who did or is doing what, with what design, how, in what circumstances, with what means and what results ? The key notions of the network of action draw their meaning from the specific nature of the answers given to the specific questions, which are themselves cross-signifying: who? what? why? how? where? when?

An effective way of establishing the reciprocal determination of the no tions belonging to this network of action is to identify the chain of ques tions that can be asked on the subject of action: who did or is doing what, with what design, how, in what circumstances, with what means and what results ? The key notions of the network of action draw their meaning from the specific nature of the answers given to the specific questions, which are themselves cross-signifying: who? what? why? how? where? when? One can see in what sense this method of analysis would appear to be promising: a privileged access to the concept of agent is afforded by the replies provided to the question "who?"

The key notions of the network of action draw their meaning from the specific nature of the answers given to the specific questions, which are themselves cross-signifying: who? what? why? how? where? when? One can see in what sense this method of analysis would appear to be promising: a privileged access to the concept of agent is afforded by the replies provided to the question "who?" What Strawson called the "same thing," to which are attributed both mental and physical predicates, is now someone in response to the question "who?"

Now this question reveals a genuine affinity with the problematic of the self as we outlined it in the Introduction. In Heidegger, the investigation of "who?" belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of the self (Selbstheit). l Hannah Arcndt, echoing Heidegger, links the question "who?" to a specific characteristic of the concept of action, which she contrasts to those of labor and work. 2 While labor is wholly externalized in the thing produced, and while the work changes culture through its embodiment in documents, monuments, and institutions in the space of appearing opened up by politics, action is that aspect of human doing that calls for narration.

Now this question reveals a genuine affinity with the problematic of the self as we outlined it in the Introduction. In Heidegger, the investigation of "who?" belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of the self (Selbstheit). l Hannah Arcndt, echoing Heidegger, links the question "who?" to a specific characteristic of the concept of action, which she contrasts to those of labor and work. 2 While labor is wholly externalized in the thing produced, and while the work changes culture through its embodiment in documents, monuments, and institutions in the space of appearing opened up by politics, action is that aspect of human doing that calls for narration. And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to determine the "who of action."

In Heidegger, the investigation of "who?" belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of the self (Selbstheit). l Hannah Arcndt, echoing Heidegger, links the question "who?" to a specific characteristic of the concept of action, which she contrasts to those of labor and work. 2 While labor is wholly externalized in the thing produced, and while the work changes culture through its embodiment in documents, monuments, and institutions in the space of appearing opened up by politics, action is that aspect of human doing that calls for narration. And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to determine the "who of action." Despite these obvious affinities, it is a mistake to believe that the theory of action can lead this far.

And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to determine the "who of action." Despite these obvious affinities, it is a mistake to believe that the theory of action can lead this far. In Heidegger, the dependence of the problematic of Selbst on i lie existential Dasein draws the "who?" within the same ontological field of gravity.

As for Hannah Arendt's "who?" it is mediated by a theory of action that exceeds the limits of the present analysis and will only have a place much later, when we pass from action in the narrow sense to practice in the broad sense we announced above. The contribution of the theory of action to the question "who?" is, in I act, a considerably more modest one. For the reasons I shall state, it often even marks a retreat in relation to Strawson's problematic, inasmuch as the latter squarely posed the question of attributing to "someone," considered 10 be the "same thing," predicates characteristic of the person.

The contribution of the theory of action to the question "who?" is, in I act, a considerably more modest one. For the reasons I shall state, it often even marks a retreat in relation to Strawson's problematic, inasmuch as the latter squarely posed the question of attributing to "someone," considered 10 be the "same thing," predicates characteristic of the person. But this question of attribution tends to be relegated to the sidelines to make room lor the much more important question of the relation between the ques tions "what?" and "why?" (quoi? etpourquoi?) which overrides the relation between the pair of questions "what?-why?" and the question "who?"

Key Concepts

• An effective way of establishing the reciprocal determination of the no tions belonging to this network of action is to identify the chain of ques tions that can be asked on the subject of action: who did or is doing what, with what design, how, in what circumstances, with what means and what results ?
• The key notions of the network of action draw their meaning from the specific nature of the answers given to the specific questions, which are themselves cross-signifying: who? what? why? how? where? when?
• a privileged access to the concept of agent is afforded by the replies provided to the question "who?"
• In Heidegger, the investigation of "who?" belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of the self (Selbstheit).
• Hannah Arcndt, echoing Heidegger, links the question "who?" to a specific characteristic of the concept of action, which she contrasts to those of labor and work. 2
• action is that aspect of human doing that calls for narration. And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to determine the "who of action."
• Despite these obvious affinities, it is a mistake to believe that the theory of action can lead this far.
• The contribution of the theory of action to the question "who?" is, in I act, a considerably more modest one.
• it often even marks a retreat in relation to Strawson's problematic, inasmuch as the latter squarely posed the question of attributing to "someone," considered 10 be the "same thing," predicates characteristic of the person.

Context

Middle of the section, where Ricoeur uses the chain of interrogatives to structure the action‑network, relates ‘who?’ to Heidegger and Arendt, but then sharply limits what analytic theory of action can contribute to the ontological question of the ‘who’ of selfhood.