Key Arguments

• Ricoeur introduces the paradox explicitly, citing Husserl: "The first paradox is the following: the expression \"I\" is fraught with a strange ambiguity; Husserl spoke in this regard of a necessarily ambiguous expression."
• On one side, 'I' as a personal pronoun in the paradigm is an empty term that can be assumed by anyone and migrates between utterers: "On the one hand, \"I\" as a personal pronoun belonging to the system of language is a member of the paradigm of personal pronouns. As such, it is an empty term which, unlike generic expressions that keep the same sense throughout different uses, designates in each instance a different person for each new use; \"I\" in this first sense applies to anyone who, in speaking, designates himself or herself and who, in assuming this word, takes charge of language as a whole, according to Bcnveniste's fine expres sion. As a vacant term of this sort, \"I\" is a migrating term; it is a position with respect to which several virtual uttercrs can be substituted for one another."
• He notes that this substitutable, migrating character underlies the term 'shifter', which applies also to deictics: "Whence the term \"shifter,\" which has been attributed to all simi lar terms, including the deictic series, for the sake of assigning the empty term to a single, current, actual utterer"
• On the other side, in each actual utterance 'I' designates only one person here and now, functioning as an anchoring to a unique perspective: "On the other hand, in the same stroke, we have moved from one sense of the expression \"I\" to the other. We are no longer stressing the substitutable aspect of the shifter, but in stead the fixation that results from speaking. We have passed from the paradigmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which \"I\" belongs to the table of pronouns, to the syntagmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which \"I\" designates in each case only one person to the exclusion of any other, the one who is speaking here and now. Let us, along with Granger, call this referring to a nonsubstitutablc position, to a unique center of perspective on the world, anchoring."
• He names the paradox precisely as the contradiction between substitutability and non‑substitutability: "The paradox consists quite precisely in the apparent contra diction between the substitutable character of the shifter and the nonsub stitutablc character of the phenomenon of anchoring."
• He then invokes Peirce’s type/token distinction to explain how both aspects can coexist for indices: "The explanation in question rests on the distinction introduced by Peircc between type and token, which we must be careful not to confuse with that between a genus and a particular, to the extent that it holds only in the case of indices.11 The type concerns the order of \"in each case\"; the token is on the order of \"a single time,\" on the plane of actual utterance."
• By construing the type 'I' as essentially distributive ("in each case") and the token as "a single time", he argues that the necessary choice of a concrete speaker accounts for anchoring without cancelling substitutability: "Between the two, all contradiction disappears if we are willing to consider that the type implies in its very notion a necessary choice between candidates for the job of speaking subject.12 By reason of this necessary choice, the shifter takes on a distributive value in relation to all the instances of \"in each case\" that govern the exclusive attribution of the term \"I\" to a single, actual speaker."
• He then connects this to Husserl’s idea of 'occasional meaning', tying the 'in each case' of the type to the 'single time' of the token: "Here we meet up with Husserl: the amphibology of the \"I\" is that of a necessarily occasional meaning. The term \"occasional55 has the very precise sense of connecting the \"in each case55 belonging to the type to the token's aa single time.55"
• Yet he finally questions whether this type/token solution really resolves the paradox, since it remains compatible with a purely factual, sui‑referential reading of utterance: "However, does the distinction between type and token do away with every paradox concerning the \"I55? This becomes doubtful, if we consider that it is perfectly compatible with an interpretation of rcflexivity in the sense of sui-reference, that is, in the sense of a referral to the factuality of a spatiotemporal event occurring in the world."

Source Quotes

Confronting these paradoxes and aporias is placing oneself in line with the question "who?"—who is speaking?—which opened the problematic of identification. The first paradox is the following: the expression "I" is fraught with a strange ambiguity; Husserl spoke in this regard of a necessarily ambiguous expression. On the one hand, "I" as a personal pronoun belonging to the system of language is a member of the paradigm of personal pronouns.

On the one hand, "I" as a personal pronoun belonging to the system of language is a member of the paradigm of personal pronouns. As such, it is an empty term which, unlike generic expressions that keep the same sense throughout different uses, designates in each instance a different person for each new use; "I" in this first sense applies to anyone who, in speaking, designates himself or herself and who, in assuming this word, takes charge of language as a whole, according to Bcnveniste's fine expres sion. As a vacant term of this sort, "I" is a migrating term; it is a position with respect to which several virtual uttercrs can be substituted for one another.

As such, it is an empty term which, unlike generic expressions that keep the same sense throughout different uses, designates in each instance a different person for each new use; "I" in this first sense applies to anyone who, in speaking, designates himself or herself and who, in assuming this word, takes charge of language as a whole, according to Bcnveniste's fine expres sion. As a vacant term of this sort, "I" is a migrating term; it is a position with respect to which several virtual uttercrs can be substituted for one another. Whence the term "shifter," which has been attributed to all simi lar terms, including the deictic series, for the sake of assigning the empty term to a single, current, actual utterer, who assumes hie et nunc the Elo cutionary force of the act of utterance.

We are no longer stressing the substitutable aspect of the shifter, but in stead the fixation that results from speaking. We have passed from the paradigmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which "I" belongs to the table of pronouns, to the syntagmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which "I" designates in each case only one person to the exclusion of any other, the one who is speaking here and now. Let us, along with Granger, call this referring to a nonsubstitutablc position, to a unique center of perspective on the world, anchoring.™ The paradox consists quite precisely in the apparent contra diction between the substitutable character of the shifter and the nonsub stitutablc character of the phenomenon of anchoring. To be sure, one can give an explanation for this first paradox without going outside of pragmatics; the solution proposed, however, will simply put off the difficulty, leaving it intact on a higher level.

We have passed from the paradigmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which "I" belongs to the table of pronouns, to the syntagmatic viewpoint, by virtue of which "I" designates in each case only one person to the exclusion of any other, the one who is speaking here and now. Let us, along with Granger, call this referring to a nonsubstitutablc position, to a unique center of perspective on the world, anchoring.™ The paradox consists quite precisely in the apparent contra diction between the substitutable character of the shifter and the nonsub stitutablc character of the phenomenon of anchoring. To be sure, one can give an explanation for this first paradox without going outside of pragmatics; the solution proposed, however, will simply put off the difficulty, leaving it intact on a higher level.

To be sure, one can give an explanation for this first paradox without going outside of pragmatics; the solution proposed, however, will simply put off the difficulty, leaving it intact on a higher level. The explanation in question rests on the distinction introduced by Peircc between type and token, which we must be careful not to confuse with that between a genus and a particular, to the extent that it holds only in the case of indices.11 The type concerns the order of "in each case"; the token is on the order of "a single time," on the plane of actual utterance. Between the two, all contradiction disappears if we are willing to consider that the type implies in its very notion a necessary choice between candidates for the job of speaking subject.12 By reason of this necessary choice, the shifter takes on a distributive value in relation to all the instances of "in each case" that govern the exclusive attribution of the term "I" to a single, actual speaker.

The explanation in question rests on the distinction introduced by Peircc between type and token, which we must be careful not to confuse with that between a genus and a particular, to the extent that it holds only in the case of indices.11 The type concerns the order of "in each case"; the token is on the order of "a single time," on the plane of actual utterance. Between the two, all contradiction disappears if we are willing to consider that the type implies in its very notion a necessary choice between candidates for the job of speaking subject.12 By reason of this necessary choice, the shifter takes on a distributive value in relation to all the instances of "in each case" that govern the exclusive attribution of the term "I" to a single, actual speaker. One can then say, without further paradox, that the actual anchoring of the token "I" is correlative to the substitutable character of the type "I" in the distributive and nongeneric sense of the constitution of the index.

One can then say, without further paradox, that the actual anchoring of the token "I" is correlative to the substitutable character of the type "I" in the distributive and nongeneric sense of the constitution of the index. Here we meet up with Husserl: the amphibology of the "I" is that of a necessarily occasional meaning. The term "occasional55 has the very precise sense of connecting the "in each case55 belonging to the type to the token's aa single time.55 However, does the distinction between type and token do away with every paradox concerning the "I55?

Here we meet up with Husserl: the amphibology of the "I" is that of a necessarily occasional meaning. The term "occasional55 has the very precise sense of connecting the "in each case55 belonging to the type to the token's aa single time.55 However, does the distinction between type and token do away with every paradox concerning the "I55? This becomes doubtful, if we consider that it is perfectly compatible with an interpretation of rcflexivity in the sense of sui-reference, that is, in the sense of a referral to the factuality of a spatiotemporal event occurring in the world.

Key Concepts

• the expression "I" is fraught with a strange ambiguity; Husserl spoke in this regard of a necessarily ambiguous expression.
• As such, it is an empty term which, unlike generic expressions that keep the same sense throughout different uses, designates in each instance a different person for each new use; "I" in this first sense applies to anyone who, in speaking, designates himself or herself
• As a vacant term of this sort, "I" is a migrating term; it is a position with respect to which several virtual uttercrs can be substituted for one another.
• by virtue of which "I" designates in each case only one person to the exclusion of any other, the one who is speaking here and now. Let us, along with Granger, call this referring to a nonsubstitutablc position, to a unique center of perspective on the world, anchoring.™
• The paradox consists quite precisely in the apparent contra diction between the substitutable character of the shifter and the nonsub stitutablc character of the phenomenon of anchoring.
• The type concerns the order of "in each case"; the token is on the order of "a single time," on the plane of actual utterance.
• By reason of this necessary choice, the shifter takes on a distributive value in relation to all the instances of "in each case" that govern the exclusive attribution of the term "I" to a single, actual speaker.
• Here we meet up with Husserl: the amphibology of the "I" is that of a necessarily occasional meaning.
• The term "occasional55 has the very precise sense of connecting the "in each case55 belonging to the type to the token's aa single time.55

Context

In the later part of section 2, Ricoeur turns from his critique of sui‑reference to a close analysis of the pronoun 'I', articulating its double status as shifter and anchor and using Peirce’s type/token and Husserl’s 'occasional meaning' to clarify—but not fully reconcile—the paradox of the subject of utterance.