Key Arguments

• Ricoeur cautions against misunderstanding both 'content and status' of the good life: 'We must not, however, be misled about the content and the status of this notion in the theory of praxis.', preparing his nuanced account.
• He defines its content: 'With respect to its content, the "good life" is, for each of us, the nebu- lus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled.', stressing its vague, imaginative, and evaluative character.
• He describes its temporal dimension with Proustian overtones: 'It is the plane of "time lost" and of "time regained."', tying the good life to remembrance and recovery.
• He characterizes it as the ultimate 'in view of which' of action: 'In this sense, the "good life" is "that in view of which" all these actions are directed, actions which were nevertheless said to have their ends in themselves.', introducing the idea of 'finality within finality'.
• He insists that this higher finality does not abolish the self‑sufficiency of practices: 'This finality within finality, however, does not destroy the self-sufficiency of practices as long as their end has been pos ited and continues to be so.', preserving the integrity of practices.
• He explains that the horizon of the good life 'opens' otherwise closed practices when existential doubt emerges: 'This opening, which fractures practices oth erwise held to be closed in upon themselves when doubts arise about the direction of our life, maintains a tension, most often a discrete and tacit one, between the closed and the open within the global structure of praxis.', stressing a permanent latent tension.
• He formulates the task conceptually: 'What we are summoned to think here is the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be internal to human action.', explicitly naming the good life as an internal, higher finality.

Source Quotes

Moreover, while the notion of life plan places an accent on the voluntary, even willful, side of what Sartre termed the existential project, the notion of narrative unity places its accent on the organization of intention, causes, and chance that we find in all stories. The person appears here from the outset as suffering as well as acting, subject to those whims of life which have prompted the fine Hellenist and philosopher Martha Nussbaum to speak of the "fragility of goodness,55 the fragility of the goodness of human action, that is.9 The series of intermediaries we have just traced have, if not a comple tion, at least a horizon (or, of one prefers, a limiting idea) in the notion, already mentioned several times, of "good life." We must not, however, be misled about the content and the status of this notion in the theory of praxis.

The person appears here from the outset as suffering as well as acting, subject to those whims of life which have prompted the fine Hellenist and philosopher Martha Nussbaum to speak of the "fragility of goodness,55 the fragility of the goodness of human action, that is.9 The series of intermediaries we have just traced have, if not a comple tion, at least a horizon (or, of one prefers, a limiting idea) in the notion, already mentioned several times, of "good life." We must not, however, be misled about the content and the status of this notion in the theory of praxis. With respect to its content, the "good life" is, for each of us, the nebu- lus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled.

We must not, however, be misled about the content and the status of this notion in the theory of praxis. With respect to its content, the "good life" is, for each of us, the nebu- lus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled. It is the plane of "time lost" and of "time regained."

With respect to its content, the "good life" is, for each of us, the nebu- lus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled. It is the plane of "time lost" and of "time regained." In this sense, the "good life" is "that in view of which" all these actions are directed, actions which were nevertheless said to have their ends in themselves.

It is the plane of "time lost" and of "time regained." In this sense, the "good life" is "that in view of which" all these actions are directed, actions which were nevertheless said to have their ends in themselves. This finality within finality, however, does not destroy the self-sufficiency of practices as long as their end has been pos ited and continues to be so.

This finality within finality, however, does not destroy the self-sufficiency of practices as long as their end has been pos ited and continues to be so. This opening, which fractures practices oth erwise held to be closed in upon themselves when doubts arise about the direction of our life, maintains a tension, most often a discrete and tacit one, between the closed and the open within the global structure of praxis. What we are summoned to think here is the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be internal to human action.

This opening, which fractures practices oth erwise held to be closed in upon themselves when doubts arise about the direction of our life, maintains a tension, most often a discrete and tacit one, between the closed and the open within the global structure of praxis. What we are summoned to think here is the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be internal to human action. The epistemological status of this horizon or limiting idea turns on the tie mentioned above between phronesis and phronimos.

Key Concepts

• The series of intermediaries we have just traced have, if not a comple tion, at least a horizon (or, of one prefers, a limiting idea) in the notion, already mentioned several times, of "good life."
• We must not, however, be misled about the content and the status of this notion in the theory of praxis.
• With respect to its content, the "good life" is, for each of us, the nebu- lus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled.
• It is the plane of "time lost" and of "time regained."
• In this sense, the "good life" is "that in view of which" all these actions are directed, actions which were nevertheless said to have their ends in themselves.
• This opening, which fractures practices oth erwise held to be closed in upon themselves when doubts arise about the direction of our life, maintains a tension, most often a discrete and tacit one, between the closed and the open within the global structure of praxis.
• What we are summoned to think here is the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be internal to human action.

Context

Immediately after revisiting 'life plans' and 'narrative unity', Ricoeur thematizes the 'good life' as the horizon of the intermediaries of praxis, clarifying its content as nebulous ideals and its status as an internal but higher finality that structures the openness of practices.