Key Arguments

• Ricoeur explicitly assimilates the phenomenon of anchoring 'I' to the same kind of inscription at work in dating and localization: "From the deictic terms "now" and "here," we can return to the indica tors "I-you." The conjunction between the subject as the world-limit and the person as the object of identifying reference rests on a process of the same nature as inscription, illustrated by calendar dating and geographic localization."
• He says that the relation between 'I' and the proper name for a basic particular is a relation of inscription in an institutional sense: "The relation between the personal pronoun "I," taken as the subject of attribution, and the proper noun, as the designa tion of the token of a basic particular, is a relation of inscription in the institutional sense of the term."
• He describes naming as a specific illocutionary act that inscribes 'I' into the list of proper names according to conventional rules of family names and given names: ""I" is literally inscribed by virtue of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act—naming—onto the public list of proper names in accordance with the conventional rules that gov ern the attribution of family names and first names. (Thus, in France and in other countries, the family name is imposed by kinship rules— matrimonial rules, rules of filiation—and the first name is chosen, rela tively freely, by the legal parents, hence by someone other than the person who bears the name; in this sense, naming is through and through an act of inscription.)"
• He notes that a birth certificate exemplifies this triple inscription—name, date, and birthplace—into public records: "The expression is so well chosen that what we call a birth certificate contains a triple inscription: a proper name conforming to the rules of naming that have just been mentioned, a date in accordance with the usage of the calendar, a birthplace conforming to the rules of localiza tion in public space, the whole inscribed in public records. Inscribed in this way, the "I" is, in the proper sense of the term, registered."
• He draws the semantic conclusion that 'I' and the proper name co‑refer, and that the assimilation of person and subject is therefore not arbitrary but institutionally grounded: "From this registration, there results the one who states, "I, so and so, born on ... , at. . . ." In this way, "I" and "P.R." mean the same person. It is therefore not arbitrary that the person (object of identifying reference) and the sub ject (author of the utterance) have the same meaning; an inscription of a special kind, performed by a special act of utterance—naming—performs this conjunction."

Source Quotes

From the deictic terms "now" and "here," we can return to the indica tors "I-you." The conjunction between the subject as the world-limit and the person as the object of identifying reference rests on a process of the same nature as inscription, illustrated by calendar dating and geographic localization. The fact that the phenomenon of anchoring is assimilable to an inscription is marvelously attested to by the expression that so intrigued 54 SECOND STUDY Wittgenstein, namely "I."

The fact that the phenomenon of anchoring is assimilable to an inscription is marvelously attested to by the expression that so intrigued 54 SECOND STUDY Wittgenstein, namely "I." The relation between the personal pronoun "I," taken as the subject of attribution, and the proper noun, as the designa tion of the token of a basic particular, is a relation of inscription in the institutional sense of the term. "I" is literally inscribed by virtue of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act—naming—onto the public list of proper names in accordance with the conventional rules that gov ern the attribution of family names and first names.

The relation between the personal pronoun "I," taken as the subject of attribution, and the proper noun, as the designa tion of the token of a basic particular, is a relation of inscription in the institutional sense of the term. "I" is literally inscribed by virtue of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act—naming—onto the public list of proper names in accordance with the conventional rules that gov ern the attribution of family names and first names. (Thus, in France and in other countries, the family name is imposed by kinship rules— matrimonial rules, rules of filiation—and the first name is chosen, rela tively freely, by the legal parents, hence by someone other than the person who bears the name; in this sense, naming is through and through an act of inscription.) The expression is so well chosen that what we call a birth certificate contains a triple inscription: a proper name conforming to the rules of naming that have just been mentioned, a date in accordance with the usage of the calendar, a birthplace conforming to the rules of localiza tion in public space, the whole inscribed in public records.

"I" is literally inscribed by virtue of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act—naming—onto the public list of proper names in accordance with the conventional rules that gov ern the attribution of family names and first names. (Thus, in France and in other countries, the family name is imposed by kinship rules— matrimonial rules, rules of filiation—and the first name is chosen, rela tively freely, by the legal parents, hence by someone other than the person who bears the name; in this sense, naming is through and through an act of inscription.) The expression is so well chosen that what we call a birth certificate contains a triple inscription: a proper name conforming to the rules of naming that have just been mentioned, a date in accordance with the usage of the calendar, a birthplace conforming to the rules of localiza tion in public space, the whole inscribed in public records. Inscribed in this way, the "I" is, in the proper sense of the term, registered. From this registration, there results the one who states, "I, so and so, born on ... , at. . . ."

From this registration, there results the one who states, "I, so and so, born on ... , at. . . ." In this way, "I" and "P.R." mean the same person. It is therefore not arbitrary that the person (object of identifying reference) and the sub ject (author of the utterance) have the same meaning; an inscription of a special kind, performed by a special act of utterance—naming—performs this conjunction. On the threshold of our conclusion, one final question remains.

Key Concepts

• The conjunction between the subject as the world-limit and the person as the object of identifying reference rests on a process of the same nature as inscription, illustrated by calendar dating and geographic localization.
• The relation between the personal pronoun "I," taken as the subject of attribution, and the proper noun, as the designa tion of the token of a basic particular, is a relation of inscription in the institutional sense of the term.
• "I" is literally inscribed by virtue of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act—naming—onto the public list of proper names in accordance with the conventional rules that gov ern the attribution of family names and first names.
• what we call a birth certificate contains a triple inscription: a proper name conforming to the rules of naming that have just been mentioned, a date in accordance with the usage of the calendar, a birthplace conforming to the rules of localiza tion in public space, the whole inscribed in public records. Inscribed in this way, the "I" is, in the proper sense of the term, registered.
• In this way, "I" and "P.R." mean the same person. It is therefore not arbitrary that the person (object of identifying reference) and the sub ject (author of the utterance) have the same meaning; an inscription of a special kind, performed by a special act of utterance—naming—performs this conjunction.

Context

After treating 'now' and 'here', Ricoeur applies the same model of inscription to 'I', using the institutional practice of naming and civil registration to show how the reflexive subject of utterance is bound to the person as object of reference.