Key Arguments

• Ricoeur says that opposing sameness of character to constancy of self in promising 'opens an interval of sense which remains to be filled in. This interval is opened by the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time — the perseverance of char acter and the constancy of the self in promising.'
• He explicitly locates the needed mediation in temporality: 'It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to be sought.', indicating that the solution must address how time is structured in the life of the self.
• He then identifies narrative identity as occupying precisely this temporal middle region: 'Now it is this "milieu" that, in my opinion, the notion of narrative identity comes to occupy.', thereby assigning to narrative identity the role of mediating between character and promise.
• He characterizes narrative identity as oscillating between two limits: 'we will not be surprised to see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of the idem.'
• By defining these limits, he makes clear that narrative identity both incorporates the stabilizing role of character (lower limit) and reaches toward the pure self‑constancy of promise‑keeping (upper limit), but never fully coincides with either, instead mediating between them.
• He closes by indicating the next task: 'First, however, we must examine the claims of theories of personal identity which do not consider either the distinction of idem and ipse or the resources offered by narrativity to resolve the', signaling that the development of his own theory of narrative identity will be framed against competing, non‑narrative accounts.
• This framing reinforces his thesis that without both the idem/ipse distinction and the mediating function of narrativity, the problem of personal identity cannot be adequately treated.

Source Quotes

And it is here, consequently, that the equivocalness of the notion of permanence in time is dissipated. This new manner11 of opposing the sameness of character to the con stancy of the self in promising opens an interval of sense which remains to be filled in. This interval is opened by the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time — the perseverance of char acter and the constancy of the self in promising.

This new manner11 of opposing the sameness of character to the con stancy of the self in promising opens an interval of sense which remains to be filled in. This interval is opened by the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time — the perseverance of char acter and the constancy of the self in promising. It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to be sought.

This interval is opened by the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time — the perseverance of char acter and the constancy of the self in promising. It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to be sought. Now it is this "milieu" that, in my opinion, the notion of narrative identity comes to occupy.

It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to be sought. Now it is this "milieu" that, in my opinion, the notion of narrative identity comes to occupy. Having thus situated it in this interval, we will not be surprised to see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of the idem.

Now it is this "milieu" that, in my opinion, the notion of narrative identity comes to occupy. Having thus situated it in this interval, we will not be surprised to see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of the idem. First, however, we must examine the claims of theories of personal identity which do not consider either the distinction of idem and ipse or the resources offered by narrativity to resolve the

Having thus situated it in this interval, we will not be surprised to see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of the idem. First, however, we must examine the claims of theories of personal identity which do not consider either the distinction of idem and ipse or the resources offered by narrativity to resolve the

Key Concepts

• This new manner11 of opposing the sameness of character to the con stancy of the self in promising opens an interval of sense which remains to be filled in.
• This interval is opened by the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time — the perseverance of char acter and the constancy of the self in promising.
• It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to be sought.
• Now it is this "milieu" that, in my opinion, the notion of narrative identity comes to occupy.
• Having thus situated it in this interval, we will not be surprised to see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of the idem.
• First, however, we must examine the claims of theories of personal identity which do not consider either the distinction of idem and ipse or the resources offered by narrativity to resolve the

Context

Concluding paragraphs of this excerpt, where Ricoeur draws together the analyses of character and promise‑keeping into a polarity of temporal models of permanence, introduces narrative identity as the temporal mediator between them, and prepares to critique non‑narrative theories of personal identity that ignore both the idem/ipse distinction and narrativity.