Key Arguments

• Ricoeur identifies this as the third 'place' of virtual aporia regarding autonomy: "The third "place" of virtual aporia, in relation to the eminent place conferred upon autonomy in the "Analytic," is to be sought in the opening essay on radical evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone."
• He observes that Kant’s attempt to exonerate inclination shifts the source of all earlier splits (inclination vs universalization, pathological desire vs categorical imperative, heteronomy vs autonomy) onto free choice itself: "Every thing in this essay that tends to exonerate desire — inclination — tends at the same time to make (free) choice the source of all the splits we observed above: the inadequation of inclination, insofar as it is empirical, to meet the test of the rule of universalization, the opposition of pathological de sire to the categorical imperative, the resistance of the penchant toward heteronomy to the principle of autonomy."
• He states that if desire is innocent, evil must be situated 'on the level of the formulation of the maxims' and conceived as perversion—a reversal of the correct order which puts respect for law above inclination: "If desire is innocent,27 then evil must be situated on the level of the formulation of the maxims, before one can ask — doubtless in vain — about its origin and declare it to be inscru table. Evil is, in the literal sense of the word, perversion, that is, a reversal of the order that requires respect for the law to be placed above inclina tion. It is a matter here of a misuse of (free) choice and not of the malefi cence of desire".
• He emphasizes that evil is not a corruption of practical reason itself (which would make humans 'diabolical') but a misuse of free choice: "(nor, moreover, is it a matter of the corruption of practical reason itself, which would make humankind diabolical and not simply — if we may say so — bad).28"
• He notes that everything still takes place at the level of maxims, but now by introducing a 'bad maxim' which serves as subjective ground for all bad maxims: "Once again, everything occurs on the level of maxims. But this time it is a matter of making room for a bad maxim which will be the subjective grounding for all the bad maxims. In this primordial maxim consists the propensity (Hang) for evil."
• He stresses that Kant distinguishes this propensity (Hang) from the predisposition (Anlage) to good in finite will, but that nevertheless it affects the exercise of freedom and the capacity to be autonomous: "It nevertheless remains that the propensity for evil affects the use of freedom, the capacity for acting out of duty — in short, the capacity for actually being autonomous. This is the true problem for us."
• He relates this to the status of autonomy: radical evil does not touch the principle (which 'continues to be autonomy') but compromises its realization: "For this affection of freedom, even if it does not strike the principle of morality, which contin ues to be autonomy, does put into question the exercise, the realization of freedom."
• He draws out the systematic consequence: this situation opens a distinct place for religion as regeneration of freedom, and brings back to the forefront the question of good and evil, which a strictly deontological morality had marginalized: "This uncommon situation opens, moreover, a place for religion that is distinct from that of morality — religion, according to Kant, pos sessing no theme other than the regeneration of freedom, that is, restoring to freedom the control over it of the good principle. In addition, this consideration of the capacity — lost and to be recovered — of freedom brings back to the forefront the problem of good and evil, which a strictly deontological version of morality had relegated to a subsidiary level".
• Citing Nabert, he insists that evil must be thought as a 'real opposition'—a 'negative magnitude'—so that the penchant for evil appears as 'real repugnance' to the moral law at the very level where the law itself is a motive: "The first is the idea, so heavily under scored by Nabcrt, that evil, in reference to the formation of maxims, is to be thought in terms of a real opposition, in the sense of the attempt to introduce into philosophy the concept of negative magnitude.30 On the plane where the moral law is itself a motive, the penchant for evil rises up as "real repugnance," to borrow Nabert's expression, namely as an incen tive contrary to the moral law and influencing choice (Religion, p. 20)."
• He concludes that this means the penchant for evil affects free choice on exactly the same plane where respect is the specific affection of freedom by the law, and that this is what makes evil 'radical' and 'inextirpable by human powers': "We thus have to admit that the penchant for evil affects free choice on the very level where respect is itself the specific affection that has been stated, the affection of freedom by the law. And it is as such that evil is radical (and not original): "This evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers" (p. 32)."
• The second idea is that by positing a 'bad maxim of all maxims', Kant simultaneously radicalizes free choice: choice becomes the seat of a real opposition at the source of maxims, revealing an 'original wound' in human freedom: "The second important idea is that, in radicalizing evil, in introducing the difficult idea of a bad maxim of all maxims, Kant also radicalized the very idea of (free) choice by the sole fact of having made it the seat of a real opposition at the very source of the formation of maxims. In this, evil reveals something about the ultimate nature of (free) choice. Human (free) choice appears to carry with it an original wound that affects its capacity for determining itself for or against the law; the enigma of the origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects the actual exercise of freedom."

Source Quotes

This conjunction within re spect between self-positing and self-affection authorizes us to question, in the following study, the independence of the principle of autonomy — the flower of the telcological conception of morality — in relation to the telcological perspective, in other words, to doubt the autonomy of autonomy. The third "place" of virtual aporia, in relation to the eminent place conferred upon autonomy in the "Analytic," is to be sought in the opening essay on radical evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Every thing in this essay that tends to exonerate desire — inclination — tends at the same time to make (free) choice the source of all the splits we observed above: the inadequation of inclination, insofar as it is empirical, to meet the test of the rule of universalization, the opposition of pathological de sire to the categorical imperative, the resistance of the penchant toward heteronomy to the principle of autonomy.

Every thing in this essay that tends to exonerate desire — inclination — tends at the same time to make (free) choice the source of all the splits we observed above: the inadequation of inclination, insofar as it is empirical, to meet the test of the rule of universalization, the opposition of pathological de sire to the categorical imperative, the resistance of the penchant toward heteronomy to the principle of autonomy. If desire is innocent,27 then evil must be situated on the level of the formulation of the maxims, before one can ask — doubtless in vain — about its origin and declare it to be inscru table. Evil is, in the literal sense of the word, perversion, that is, a reversal of the order that requires respect for the law to be placed above inclina tion.

If desire is innocent,27 then evil must be situated on the level of the formulation of the maxims, before one can ask — doubtless in vain — about its origin and declare it to be inscru table. Evil is, in the literal sense of the word, perversion, that is, a reversal of the order that requires respect for the law to be placed above inclina tion. It is a matter here of a misuse of (free) choice and not of the malefi cence of desire (nor, moreover, is it a matter of the corruption of practical reason itself, which would make humankind diabolical and not simply — if we may say so — bad).28 Once again, everything occurs on the level of maxims.

It is a matter here of a misuse of (free) choice and not of the malefi cence of desire (nor, moreover, is it a matter of the corruption of practical reason itself, which would make humankind diabolical and not simply — if we may say so — bad).28 Once again, everything occurs on the level of maxims. But this time it is a matter of making room for a bad maxim which will be the subjective grounding for all the bad maxims. In this primordial maxim consists the propensity (Hang) for evil. To be sure, Kant is careful to distinguish this propensity for evil from the predisposition (Anlage) to good, which he holds to be inherent in the condition of a finite will and, consequently, to affirm the contingency of this propensity on the scale of human history.

To be sure, Kant is careful to distinguish this propensity for evil from the predisposition (Anlage) to good, which he holds to be inherent in the condition of a finite will and, consequently, to affirm the contingency of this propensity on the scale of human history. It nevertheless remains that the propensity for evil affects the use of freedom, the capacity for acting out of duty — in short, the capacity for actually being autonomous. This is the true problem for us. For this affection of freedom, even if it does not strike the principle of morality, which contin ues to be autonomy, does put into question the exercise, the realization of freedom.

This uncommon situation opens, moreover, a place for religion that is distinct from that of morality — religion, according to Kant, pos sessing no theme other than the regeneration of freedom, that is, restoring to freedom the control over it of the good principle. In addition, this consideration of the capacity — lost and to be recovered — of freedom brings back to the forefront the problem of good and evil, which a strictly deontological version of morality had relegated to a subsidiary level (C.Pr.R. "Analytic," chap.

Two ideas should be kept in mind here. The first is the idea, so heavily under scored by Nabcrt, that evil, in reference to the formation of maxims, is to be thought in terms of a real opposition, in the sense of the attempt to introduce into philosophy the concept of negative magnitude.30 On the plane where the moral law is itself a motive, the penchant for evil rises up as "real repugnance," to borrow Nabert's expression, namely as an incen tive contrary to the moral law and influencing choice (Religion, p. 20).

We thus have to admit that the penchant for evil affects free choice on the very level where respect is itself the specific affection that has been stated, the affection of freedom by the law. And it is as such that evil is radical (and not original): "This evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers" (p. 32).

In this, evil reveals something about the ultimate nature of (free) choice. Human (free) choice appears to carry with it an original wound that affects its capacity for determining itself for or against the law; the enigma of the origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects the actual exercise of freedom. The fact that this penchant is always already present in every opportunity to choose but that it is at the same time a maxim of (free) choice is no less inscrutable than the origin of evil.

Key Concepts

• The third "place" of virtual aporia, in relation to the eminent place conferred upon autonomy in the "Analytic," is to be sought in the opening essay on radical evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
• If desire is innocent,27 then evil must be situated on the level of the formulation of the maxims, before one can ask — doubtless in vain — about its origin and declare it to be inscru table.
• Evil is, in the literal sense of the word, perversion, that is, a reversal of the order that requires respect for the law to be placed above inclina tion.
• this time it is a matter of making room for a bad maxim which will be the subjective grounding for all the bad maxims. In this primordial maxim consists the propensity (Hang) for evil.
• It nevertheless remains that the propensity for evil affects the use of freedom, the capacity for acting out of duty — in short, the capacity for actually being autonomous. This is the true problem for us.
• this consideration of the capacity — lost and to be recovered — of freedom brings back to the forefront the problem of good and evil, which a strictly deontological version of morality had relegated to a subsidiary level
• the penchant for evil rises up as "real repugnance," to borrow Nabert's expression, namely as an incen tive contrary to the moral law and influencing choice
• this evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers
• Human (free) choice appears to carry with it an original wound that affects its capacity for determining itself for or against the law; the enigma of the origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects the actual exercise of freedom.

Context

Later part of the passage, where Ricoeur turns from respect to Kant’s doctrine of radical evil in Religion, drawing on Nabert to interpret evil as a real opposition at the level of maxims that wounds free choice and complicates the exercise of autonomy.