Key Arguments

• Ricoeur first affirms the strength of the predicative framework: “the notion of person is determined by means of the predicates that we ascribe to it. The theory of person is therefore contained within the general framework of the theory of predication applied to logical sub jects. The person is thus in the position of a logical subject in relation to the predicates that are ascribed to it. This is the great strength of the ap proach to the person by way of identifying reference.”
• He immediately notes that in such a framework, ascription to the person has “no specific character to distinguish it from the common process of attri bution,” so that “the question of the self continues to be hidden.”
• He criticizes Strawson’s lack of surprise at “the strange implications for a gen eral theory of predication of the following statement: "Wc ascribe to ourselves certain things."
• Ricoeur analyzes how the first‑person plural is effectively depersonalized: “the uwe" here receives so little emphasis that it becomes the equivalent of "one." Ascribing is what is done by anyone, by each one, by one, in relation to anyone, each one, one.”
• He stresses that, despite this anonymity, the distributive sense of ‘each one’ must later be preserved and reinterpreted from the standpoint of utterance: “The force of this each one will have to be preserved, for it marks a designation that is distributive rather than anonymous, in an analysis of the self stemming from the theory of utterance.”

Source Quotes

1. First, the notion of person is determined by means of the predicates that we ascribe to it. The theory of person is therefore contained within the general framework of the theory of predication applied to logical sub jects. The person is thus in the position of a logical subject in relation to the predicates that are ascribed to it.

The theory of person is therefore contained within the general framework of the theory of predication applied to logical sub jects. The person is thus in the position of a logical subject in relation to the predicates that are ascribed to it. This is the great strength of the ap proach to the person by way of identifying reference. It is now important to stress, however, that the question of the self continues to be hidden to the extent that the ascription of these predicates to the person carries with it no specific character to distinguish it from the common process of attri bution.

This is the great strength of the ap proach to the person by way of identifying reference. It is now important to stress, however, that the question of the self continues to be hidden to the extent that the ascription of these predicates to the person carries with it no specific character to distinguish it from the common process of attri bution. Strawson shows no surprise at the strange implications for a gen eral theory of predication of the following statement: "Wc ascribe to ourselves certain things."

It is now important to stress, however, that the question of the self continues to be hidden to the extent that the ascription of these predicates to the person carries with it no specific character to distinguish it from the common process of attri bution. Strawson shows no surprise at the strange implications for a gen eral theory of predication of the following statement: "Wc ascribe to ourselves certain things." I do not deny the force that this alignment of ascription to ourselves in accordance with the attribution to something may possess: the uwe" here receives so little emphasis that it becomes the equivalent of "one."

Strawson shows no surprise at the strange implications for a gen eral theory of predication of the following statement: "Wc ascribe to ourselves certain things." I do not deny the force that this alignment of ascription to ourselves in accordance with the attribution to something may possess: the uwe" here receives so little emphasis that it becomes the equivalent of "one." Ascribing is what is done by anyone, by each one, by one, in relation to anyone, each one, one. The force of this each one will have to be preserved, for it marks a designation that is distributive rather than anonymous, in an analysis of the self stemming from the theory of utterance. 2.

Key Concepts

• the notion of person is determined by means of the predicates that we ascribe to it. The theory of person is therefore contained within the general framework of the theory of predication applied to logical sub jects.
• The person is thus in the position of a logical subject in relation to the predicates that are ascribed to it. This is the great strength of the ap proach to the person by way of identifying reference.
• the question of the self continues to be hidden to the extent that the ascription of these predicates to the person carries with it no specific character to distinguish it from the common process of attri bution.
• Strawson shows no surprise at the strange implications for a gen eral theory of predication of the following statement: "Wc ascribe to ourselves certain things."
• the uwe" here receives so little emphasis that it becomes the equivalent of "one." Ascribing is what is done by anyone, by each one, by one, in relation to anyone, each one, one. The force of this each one will have to be preserved, for it marks a designation that is distributive rather than anonymous, in an analysis of the self stemming from the theory of utterance.

Context

Beginning of section 4, ‘The Primitive Concept of Person’, where Ricoeur restates the predicative, identifying‑reference approach to the person and points out that, in this grammar, ‘we’ is reduced to an anonymous ‘one’, thus concealing selfhood while foreshadowing a later analysis of the distributive ‘each one’ in a theory of utterance.