Key Arguments

• He grants the hypothesis of universal consent 'for the sake of argument' and asks what its terms would have been: "But I wish that this consent, of which so much is made, had been given, either tacitly or formally. What would have been the result?"
• He answers that any such contract would require reciprocity and equivalence, not unilateral surrender: "Evidently, the surrenders would have been reciprocal; no right would have been abandoned without the receipt of an equivalent in exchange."
• From this he concludes that genuine consent implies equality as a precondition of appropriation: "We thus come back to equality again⁠—the sine qua non of appropriation."
• Consequently, when property is justified by universal consent, it is in fact being justified by equality; yet in practice property is then invoked to justify inequality of conditions: "so that, after having justified property by universal consent, that is, by equality, we are obliged to justify the inequality of conditions by property."
• He presents this as a logical impasse that can never be resolved in favor of property: "Never shall we extricate ourselves from this dilemma."
• He further notes that if property has equality as its condition within the social compact, the loss of equality implies the dissolution of the compact and therefore of property itself: "Indeed, if, in the terms of the social compact, property has equality for its condition, at the moment when equality ceases to exist, the compact is broken and all property".

Source Quotes

Now, to recognize the right of territorial property is to give up labor, since it is to relinquish the means of labor; it is to traffic in a natural right, and divest ourselves of manhood. But I wish that this consent, of which so much is made, had been given, either tacitly or formally. What would have been the result? Evidently, the surrenders would have been reciprocal; no right would have been abandoned without the receipt of an equivalent in exchange.

What would have been the result? Evidently, the surrenders would have been reciprocal; no right would have been abandoned without the receipt of an equivalent in exchange. We thus come back to equality again⁠—the sine qua non of appropriation; so that, after having justified property by universal consent, that is, by equality, we are obliged to justify the inequality of conditions by property.

Evidently, the surrenders would have been reciprocal; no right would have been abandoned without the receipt of an equivalent in exchange. We thus come back to equality again⁠—the sine qua non of appropriation; so that, after having justified property by universal consent, that is, by equality, we are obliged to justify the inequality of conditions by property. Never shall we extricate ourselves from this dilemma.

We thus come back to equality again⁠—the sine qua non of appropriation; so that, after having justified property by universal consent, that is, by equality, we are obliged to justify the inequality of conditions by property. Never shall we extricate ourselves from this dilemma. Indeed, if, in the terms of the social compact, property has equality for its condition, at the moment when equality ceases to exist, the compact is broken and all property

Never shall we extricate ourselves from this dilemma. Indeed, if, in the terms of the social compact, property has equality for its condition, at the moment when equality ceases to exist, the compact is broken and all property

Key Concepts

• But I wish that this consent, of which so much is made, had been given, either tacitly or formally. What would have been the result?
• Evidently, the surrenders would have been reciprocal; no right would have been abandoned without the receipt of an equivalent in exchange.
• We thus come back to equality again⁠—the sine qua non of appropriation;
• so that, after having justified property by universal consent, that is, by equality, we are obliged to justify the inequality of conditions by property.
• Never shall we extricate ourselves from this dilemma.
• Indeed, if, in the terms of the social compact, property has equality for its condition, at the moment when equality ceases to exist, the compact is broken and all property

Context

Middle and end of § 2, where Proudhon explores the hypothetical case of actual universal consent to property and shows that its internal requirement of reciprocal, equal exchange contradicts the real function of property as a source of inequality, thereby using the social contract logic itself to dissolve the legitimacy of property.