Key Arguments

• He states that "From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing ... and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor."
• He clarifies the difference with a personal-status example: "Thus the right of the partners to a marriage over each other’s person is the jus in re; that of two who are betrothed is only the jus ad rem. In the first, possession and property are united; the second includes only naked property."
• He applies this juridical scheme to his own class position: "With me who, as a laborer, have a right to the possession of the products of Nature and my own industry⁠—and who, as a proletaire, enjoy none of them⁠—it is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re."
• He asserts that "those who do not possess today are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess," implying that non‑possessing workers hold a legitimate jus ad rem equal to that of current owners.
• He frames his treatise as an "action petitoire"—an action concerning property rights—"against universal society": "In writing this memoir against property, I bring against universal society an action petitoire: I prove that those who do not possess today are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess."
• Despite establishing this equal title, he explicitly rejects the conclusion of simple redistribution or co‑sharing of property: "but, instead of inferring therefrom that property should be shared by all, I demand, in the name of general security, its entire abolition."

Source Quotes

This double definition of property⁠—domain and possession⁠—is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow. From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor. Thus the right of the partners to a marriage over each other’s person is the jus in re; that of two who are betrothed is only the jus ad rem.

From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor. Thus the right of the partners to a marriage over each other’s person is the jus in re; that of two who are betrothed is only the jus ad rem. In the first, possession and property are united; the second includes only naked property. With me who, as a laborer, have a right to the possession of the products of Nature and my own industry⁠—and who, as a proletaire, enjoy none of them⁠—it is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re.

In the first, possession and property are united; the second includes only naked property. With me who, as a laborer, have a right to the possession of the products of Nature and my own industry⁠—and who, as a proletaire, enjoy none of them⁠—it is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re. This distinction between the jus in re and the jus ad rem is the basis of the famous distinction between possessoire and petitoire⁠—actual categories of jurisprudence, the whole of which is included within their vast boundaries.

Petitoire refers to everything relating to property; possessoire to that relating to possession. In writing this memoir against property, I bring against universal society an action petitoire: I prove that those who do not possess today are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess; but, instead of inferring therefrom that property should be shared by all, I demand, in the name of general security, its entire abolition. If I fail to win my case, there is nothing left for us (the proletarian class and myself) but to cut our throats: we can ask nothing more from the justice of nations; for, as the code of procedure (art.

Key Concepts

• From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor.
• Thus the right of the partners to a marriage over each other’s person is the jus in re; that of two who are betrothed is only the jus ad rem. In the first, possession and property are united; the second includes only naked property.
• With me who, as a laborer, have a right to the possession of the products of Nature and my own industry⁠—and who, as a proletaire, enjoy none of them⁠—it is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re.
• I prove that those who do not possess today are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess; but, instead of inferring therefrom that property should be shared by all, I demand, in the name of general security, its entire abolition.

Context

Midway through section II, after defining property and possession, Proudhon introduces the classical rights jus in re and jus ad rem and directly applies them to the condition of the proletariat to argue for their legitimate claim and his radical conclusion against property.