Key Arguments

• He notes that because Comte has rejected the theory of occupancy, yet knows 'that labor could not constitute the right in the absence of a previous permission to occupy,' Comte must smuggle in this permission via 'the authority of the government,' effectively resting property on 'the sovereignty of the people; in other words, upon universal consent,' a theory Proudhon has already refuted.
• He calls this circular: 'To say that property is the daughter of labor, and then to give labor material on which to exercise itself, is, if I am not mistaken, to reason in a circle.'
• He analyzes Comte’s example of a possessor who, by labor, doubles the productivity of a piece of land, and grants that the laborer’s 'new value is his work, his creation,' but insists, 'I maintain that the possessor is paid for his trouble and industry in his doubled crop, but that he acquires no right to the land.'
• He generalizes with analogies: the skilled fisherman and hunter, whose superior catch never entitles them to own fishing‑grounds or game‑forests; likewise, the industrious cultivator’s reward is 'the abundancy and superiority of his crop,' not ownership of the soil.
• He argues that if property rested solely on labor, 'a man would cease to be proprietor as soon as he ceased to be a laborer'; since the law nonetheless maintains ownership after labor ceases, property must actually be based on 'immemorial, unquestionable possession; that is, prescription.'
• He emphasizes that 'Labor is only the sensible sign, the physical act, by which occupation is manifested,' so when civil law allows the cultivator to remain proprietor after recouping the purchase price, it is 'Because of the right of occupancy, in the absence of which every sale would be a redemption.'
• He concludes that 'The theory of appropriation by labor is, then, a contradiction of the Code; and when the partisans of this theory pretend to explain the laws thereby, they contradict themselves,' showing inconsistency between the labor‑theory rhetoric and legal reality.

Source Quotes

Comte, the apostle of property and the eulogist of labor, supposes an alienation of the soil on the part of the government, we must not think that he does so without reason and for no purpose; it is a necessary part of his position. As he rejected the theory of occupancy, and as he knew, moreover, that labor could not constitute the right in the absence of a previous permission to occupy, he was obliged to connect this permission with the authority of the government, which means that property is based upon the sovereignty of the people; in other words, upon universal consent. This theory we have already considered.

This theory we have already considered. To say that property is the daughter of labor, and then to give labor material on which to exercise itself, is, if I am not mistaken, to reason in a circle. Contradictions will result from it.

Contradictions will result from it. “A piece of land of a certain size produces food enough to supply a man for one day. If the possessor, through his labor, discovers some method of making it produce enough for two days, he doubles its value. This new value is his work, his creation: it is taken from nobody; it is his property.” I maintain that the possessor is paid for his trouble and industry in his doubled crop, but that he acquires no right to the land. “Let the laborer have the fruits of his labor.”

“Let the laborer have the fruits of his labor.” Very good; but I do not understand that property in products carries with it property in raw material. Does the skill of the fisherman, who on the same coast can catch more fish than his fellows, make him proprietor of the fishing-grounds? Can the expertness of a hunter ever be regarded as a property-title to a game-forest? The analogy is perfect⁠—the industrious cultivator finds the reward of his industry in the abundancy and superiority of his crop.

Never, under any circumstances, can he be allowed to claim a property-title to the soil which he cultivates, on the ground of his skill as a cultivator. To change possession into property, something is needed besides labor, without which a man would cease to be proprietor as soon as he ceased to be a laborer. Now, the law bases property upon immemorial, unquestionable possession; that is, prescription.

To change possession into property, something is needed besides labor, without which a man would cease to be proprietor as soon as he ceased to be a laborer. Now, the law bases property upon immemorial, unquestionable possession; that is, prescription. Labor is only the sensible sign, the physical act, by which occupation is manifested. If, then, the cultivator remains proprietor after he has ceased to labor and produce; if his possession, first conceded, then tolerated, finally becomes inalienable⁠—it happens by permission of the civil law, and by virtue of the principle of occupancy.

If a piece of land yields one thousand francs, we say that at five percent it is worth twenty thousand francs; at four percent twenty-five thousand francs, etc.; which means, in other words, that in twenty or twenty-five years’ time the purchaser would recover in full the amount originally paid for the land. If, then, after a certain length of time, the price of a piece of land has been wholly recovered, why does the purchaser continue to be proprietor? Because of the right of occupancy, in the absence of which every sale would be a redemption. The theory of appropriation by labor is, then, a contradiction of the Code; and when the partisans of this theory pretend to explain the laws thereby, they contradict themselves.

Because of the right of occupancy, in the absence of which every sale would be a redemption. The theory of appropriation by labor is, then, a contradiction of the Code; and when the partisans of this theory pretend to explain the laws thereby, they contradict themselves. “If men succeed in fertilizing land hitherto unproductive, or even death-producing, like certain swamps, they create thereby property in all its completeness.”

Key Concepts

• As he rejected the theory of occupancy, and as he knew, moreover, that labor could not constitute the right in the absence of a previous permission to occupy, he was obliged to connect this permission with the authority of the government, which means that property is based upon the sovereignty of the people; in other words, upon universal consent.
• To say that property is the daughter of labor, and then to give labor material on which to exercise itself, is, if I am not mistaken, to reason in a circle.
• “A piece of land of a certain size produces food enough to supply a man for one day. If the possessor, through his labor, discovers some method of making it produce enough for two days, he doubles its value. This new value is his work, his creation: it is taken from nobody; it is his property.” I maintain that the possessor is paid for his trouble and industry in his doubled crop, but that he acquires no right to the land.
• Very good; but I do not understand that property in products carries with it property in raw material. Does the skill of the fisherman, who on the same coast can catch more fish than his fellows, make him proprietor of the fishing-grounds? Can the expertness of a hunter ever be regarded as a property-title to a game-forest?
• To change possession into property, something is needed besides labor, without which a man would cease to be proprietor as soon as he ceased to be a laborer.
• Now, the law bases property upon immemorial, unquestionable possession; that is, prescription. Labor is only the sensible sign, the physical act, by which occupation is manifested.
• If, then, after a certain length of time, the price of a piece of land has been wholly recovered, why does the purchaser continue to be proprietor? Because of the right of occupancy, in the absence of which every sale would be a redemption.
• The theory of appropriation by labor is, then, a contradiction of the Code; and when the partisans of this theory pretend to explain the laws thereby, they contradict themselves.

Context

Second half of § 4, where Proudhon turns from common lands to the general labor‑theory of property, using Comte’s own examples and legal doctrine to show that labor cannot, by itself, justify appropriation of land or other means of production.