Key Arguments

• He identifies "different kinds of property," first "Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property."
• He cites Duranton: "Possession ... is a matter of fact, not of right," and Toullier: "Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact," establishing a standard doctrinal separation.
• Examples: "The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors."
• He offers a vivid comparison to clarify the asymmetry: "If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor."
• He insists that "This double definition of property⁠—domain and possession⁠—is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow," signaling that his later argument will turn on this distinction.

Source Quotes

That is a confirmation of the principle, not a limitation of it. There are different kinds of property: 1. Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property. 2. Possession. “Possession,” says Duranton, “is a matter of fact, not of right.”

Possession. “Possession,” says Duranton, “is a matter of fact, not of right.” Toullier: “Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact.” The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors.

Toullier: “Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact.” The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors. If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor.

The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors. If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor. This double definition of property⁠—domain and possession⁠—is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow.

If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor. This double definition of property⁠—domain and possession⁠—is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow. From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor.

Key Concepts

• There are different kinds of property: 1. Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property. 2. Possession.
• “Possession,” says Duranton, “is a matter of fact, not of right.” Toullier: “Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact.”
• The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors.
• If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor.
• This double definition of property⁠—domain and possession⁠—is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow.

Context

Still in section II’s definitional part, Proudhon lays out the standard civil-law distinction between property and possession to prepare the ground for his attack on property and his defense of possession.